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METHOD
1. There wiLL be no descriptive section so that aLL the space avai[abLe can
be used to deveLop ideas about the future Union. For a description of the
present situation, reference shouLd be made to the Commissionrs and
ParLiament's background rlocuments. The best description of Union Law is
in our opjnion to be found in rThe European Communityts tegal systemr
(periodi caL 611981, Euror)ean Documentation). Some of Partiamentts reports
wìLt be referred to in connection rith the discussion of certain specific
probIems.
2. The present Community Treaties constitute a mixture of constitutionaI and
policy provisions. In the union, decisiorrs witt be taken by the
institutions of the Union in accordance vìth the provisions of the
Treaty. The rules contained ìn the Treaty witL thus be of a pureLy
constitutionaL nature. As a result the Treaty wil.I be short and c[ear-
As regards Union poticy, the Treaty riLt deaL onLy with generaL objectives
(in the preamb[e and first fetr artictes) and the distribution of pouers at
the various teveLs (Union, ilember States, regions) and between the
ìnstitutions. This means that the Treaty of the Union tliLI not contain
chapters mainty devoted to pol,ìcies (such as agricuLture, transport or
sociaL poLicy) (otheryìse we tould be obL'iged to drav up a Treaty
contain'ing some thousand artic[es) '
3. The existing Community ìs based on Latr. As such, the construction of
Europe has been a succe,s. The foLLoring vieus are thus based on existing
taw as devetoped particr Larl.y in the case-taw of the Court of Justice.
I. PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVI S OF THE UNION
A - ÀNJR9DUCTToN_
4. In view of deveLopments in the Community «luring the seventies and the
Union.s neb, poHers, Union Law shouLd form the basis for reIialrLe and
efficient European construct ion. The structuraI principtes tlrat wi tL give
the Union'its image and represent the basic values from vhich Union
[eaders shoutd dray ins,>iration yitL have to be defined much ttore ctearLy
than uas the case in the Comrnunity conceived as a means of at aìning
certain objectives.
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5.
1. Potit'icat bases
The system is based on d'mocracy: the institutionsr polers stem from
either direct (ParLiamer r) or indirect (Counci[, Commission) elections.
The lay of the Union, approvcd by the tro branches of the Legistative
authority (ParLiament and the Councit) is the instrument through yhich the
Unionts main decisions are taken.
6: Respect for fundamentaI rights and their deveLopment are the prerequislte
for and essentiaI foundeti.on of the Union.
7. Respect for fundanentaL rights and their deveLopment yi[[ provide the
construction of Europe uith the necessary tegitimacy.
2. Rute of Lar
E. Rules and poLicies wiLL be formutated and app[ied strictLy in accordance
rrith the provisions of the Trcaty and the scparation of polers trhiLst
a[loring such intervent{oh aS is necessary for the proper functioning of
the Union. This viLl. fuLty guarantee the States and the Union that their
respcctive powers uitL be respected and the citizens that their rights
wiLL be safeguarded and that they ttitt be able to dctermine yho is
responsibte for the poIicies pursued.
3. Primacy of Union tatr
9. Union lav takes precedence over the lay of the filember States. This basic
principle already exist:; in the Community, but ue must ensure that it is
complied with and un'iformLy appLied. It is a sjg-lrygg for. the
construction of Europe.
4. Singte legaI and potitic;rt corpus
10. The construction of Europe rrrust b€ more than the su,n total of initiatives
that reftect different ruLe:, administered by different institutions. The
Union ui[[ have to centrati,e and harmonize the different (Community, EilS,
poLiticaL cooperation) initratives by adopting estabLished Community Lar.
ALL poLicies and initiatives faLLing rithin the jurisdiction of the.Union
rit[ have to form part of the single Union system.
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11. The abovc prineipLes are of paramount inportance to the construction of
Europe even though it is not atrays easy to define their subject-matter.
FundanentaL rights, a singtc Legal and potitical corpus and the primacy of
Union lav nust horever be ctear[y dcscribed.
B - luNDAirEttA! trcHrs_
1.@
12. Fundamcntal, rights occut)y an important position since thcy provide the
construction of Europe nith rhe ncccssary legitimacy.
13. In our socìeties, any constitutionat structure rcquires legitìmacy vhich
comes from tyo source§: denocracy and protection of fundamentaI rights-
Apart from the occasionaI rutes contained in the existing Treaties,
protection of fundannntat rights has becn deveLoped by CJ decisions dating
from the judgnent in thc Staudcr case (1).
14. Th-e CJ atso dccided that thc contcnts of the European Convention on the
Protection of Human Rights and FundanentaL Freedoms and its protocots rere
an integral. part of the protection of fundamcntal rights rithin the
Community. ALthough a[[ such rights and their protection (in the same ray
as other internationaL conventions and covenants (2) and the fundarnentaI
rights common to a[[ the trlcmber States (3)) are an integra[ part of
Community tar, the Comnunityrs shortcomings as regards protecl ion of
'fundanental rights have frequcnt[y been deptored. This is a "eference to
by the effect of tegitinacy that fundamentat rights can confe' upon a
poLfticaI systcn, an eff,rct rhich does not occur untess a [is of
fundamental. rights is avritablc. Onty a List can provide the necessary
' l,egitimacy. It is such .r Iist that ui [[ provide the pubLic irrage of the
Union.
qt-eiieEl69; (1969) EcR 419 et seq.(2) Case 4173, No[d, «974» ECR 491 et seq.(3) Case 71.1702 Internationa[e Handelsgesettschaft, «970, ECR 1125 et seg.
See aLso the Joint DccLeration by Partiement; the Councit and the
Conmlssién, 0J l{o. C 103, ?7 Aprit = Reports of Cascs p. 366 ct seq.
TPOSE9E
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15. Since tre are speaking of r pubLic image, the [ist should inctude only
those fundamentat rights that are deemed essential and meet yith broad
consensus. The List does not thercfore need to bc exhaustive. In any
case, no [ist can providr sotutions to a[[ disputes that may arise; that
is and viLt continue to tre a matter for court decisions. Neverthetess,
the [ist viLt be supplemented by a generat reference to internationat
conventions and covenant; rhich the iember States have signed (1).
2. LegaI protection
Protection of the f undamc.ntal rights recognized in a ilenrber St.rte rli [[ not
of course be caU.ed in question.
There can thus be no restriction on or derogation from the fundamentat
rights recognized or in force in the ilember States or the Community under
the pretext that the Treaty of the Union does not recognize them or
recognizes them to a [esser degree. This rute does not justify the
failure of the liember States or courts to apply Union legislation rhich
respects-fundamentaL rights on the pretext that they confLict with a
nationaI constitution.
18. tJhen adopting ruLes and applying them, the institutions of the Union and
the l{ember States rit[ have to respect the fundamenta[ rights enshrined in
the annex to the Treaty of the Union.
19. It uil.I be the task of t:he institutions of the Union and the l{ember States
to bring about conditiorrs ensuring that alt their nationals ard, to the
extent Laid dorn in the lars of the Union, a[[ those residing on the
territory of the Union, can effectiveLy exercise their fundamentaL
rig'trts. At the same tir,E, citizens riLI have the right to recruest that
appropriate mcasures bc taken to ensure that those rights cln be
exercisad.
@ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsand
Fundamcntat Freedoms and the 1966 Unitcd Nations InternationaL Covenants
on Economic, Sociat and Cutturat Rights and CiviI and Politicat Rights and
the European SociaI Chat tcr.
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20. Restrictions on the enjoyment of such rights rliLL be laid dovn by the
Union Treaty and by Lay onLy to the extent compatibte vith the nature of
such rights and sotety in order to promote generaL veLtbeing in a
democratic sqciety. Suclr restrictions, particutarty those retating to
pubLic order and securit,, may not exceed yhat is strict[y hecosgary to
safeguard those requiren,lnts and shou[d not prevent the l{ember States fron
impLementing the taws ol the Union.
As regards the protectior of civiI and poLiticaI rights, the Union and the
ilember States uliLL respet:t and grant to any person vithin their respective
jurisdiction the rights rnd freedoms contained in the Treaty and those
stemming from the Consti utions of the l{ember States, the European
Convention for the Prott ;tion of Human Rights and FundamentaI Freedoms and
the United Nations Interrrationat Covenant on CiviI and Potiticat Rights.
As regards the.protcction of ry the
Union and the ftlember States undertake to create, uphoLd and deve[op,
Hithin the Limits of thr ir respective competences, the rights and
principtes contained in rhe Treaty and stemming from the Constitutions of
the liember States, the E /ropean Social Charter and the United Nations
InternationaL Covenant or Economic, SociaI and Culturat Rights.
23. The Treaty estabLishing che European Union yitL contain in a annex thereto
a List of the fundament, I rights inctuding particular[y the rìghts set out
be Lor:
24. Civi L and poLitical. rigl ts
(a) the right to Life ,1) and to physicat integrity
(b) personaL Liberty(c) freedom of thought, consc'ience (inctuding the right of conscientious
objection) (2) and expression
21.
?2.
(T'
(2>
SeeIheVAYSSADE report, Doc. 1-651E1, and the
EP on 18 June 1981,0J No. C 172 of 13.7.19E1
see the r,lAccloccHl report, Doc . 1-546181, and
the EP on 7 February 1983, 0J No. C
resoLution adopted by
the resolution adopted
the
by
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(d)freedom of movement and freedom to choose oners residence(e) absoLute equa['ity in the enjoyment of rights(f) equa[ìty of access to the pubLic serv'ice(g) the right to respect for famiLy and private Lìfe, home and
correspondence
(h) freedom of association and asembLy(i) the right to potitìcaI asytum(k) the right to freedom of education and scient'ific research(L) the right to vote and to stand for election
(m) the right to be tried by the proper court(n) the right to a swift judgment
(o) the right of petition and appeaL against administrative decisions
25. Economic, sociaI and cutturat rights
(a) the right to work and to protection against unempLoyment(b) the freedom of economic initiative(c) the right of ownershìp(d) the right of rorkers to fair pay(e) equatity of the sexes as regards the right to work and pay(f) freedom to choose a profession and to exercise ìt throughout the
territory of the Union
(g) the right to strike(h) worker participation in the running of undertakings
(i ) the right to heatth protection and sociaI security(k) the right to educar ion and vocationaL training(t) the rìght to housirrg
(m) the right to rest and Ieisure hours(n) recognition of the rights of ethnic and Linguistic minorities(o) the right to the protection of the ecologicaL baLance and the
envi ronment.
26. Any discrimination on grounds of national.ity betueen the citizens of the
Union is prohibited in the Union and the Member States. The List of
fundamental rights wiLl. state uhich of these rights appLy onty to citizens
of the Union.
r.,P0329E
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c - rHE gNloN'S SINGLE_LEGAL_AND_ PoLITICAL_CoRPUS
27. The need {or LegaL r;oherence and certainty in the system means that there
must be a sing[e [ega[ and potit'icaI corprrs if the objective of the Union
is to be attained.
28. In order to achieve this, aIt existing Community poLicies and future Union
poLicies must first of aLL be incorporated into a singte system. This
means that poLiticat coooeration and the F.ltlS wi LL be ìncorporated into the
Unionrs institutionaI structure and admin'istered by the same institutions
in accordance with the ru[es taid down in the Treaty of the Urìon.
29. The relationsh'ip betueen the Community pat rimony and the Law of the Union
must therefore be cLarified.
30. As regards the Community patrimony, the resotution adopted by ParLiament
on 6 JuLy 1982 (1) states that: rThe Communìty patrimony - comprising the
existìng Laws and poticies of the Communities, potiticaL cooperation and
the European monetary system, as ue[[ as aLL bodies olinstitutions set up
rrithin the Commun'ity context - shatI remain in force ìn the Union unLess
and untiI aLtered by new taws or poLicies of the Unionr.
31. This raises a hierarchicaI probLem. Legis[ative provisions of
exist'ing Community can olrvìousLy be changed by the tegistature
Union. In the same way, the Unionrs exectrtive body can change
regutations. For the ruLes taid dovn in the exìstìng Treat'ies,
the Unìon Treaty shouLd provide for a rminor amendmentr systen
«lown in the oId Treaties.
the
of the
houeve r,
as Laid
(1) Doc.1-305182/A paragraph 10,0J N0. C 238,13.9.1982, p.27 et seq.
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32, If the system of the Union is to be uniform, the tarr of the Urrion must
take precedence over nationaL [aw. This forms part of the Community
patrimony recognized by the case-tar of the CJ (1). This is not a question
of potiticaI supremacy, but simpLy a condition for consistency. As
regards the position of nationaI courts, in its decision in the SII4MENTHAL
case (2) the Court of Justìce ruted that the consequence of the primacy of
Comnunity lau ras that every national court must, as an organ of a Member
State, protect the rights conferred upon individuaLs by Commurity Law in a
case vithin its jurisdiction. It fol.lons that it is not necessary for
such courts to request or atlaìt the actuaI setting as'ide by tle nat'ionaL
authorites empoi.ered so to act of any national measures rhich might impede
the direct and immediate appLication of Community rules. In our opinion
this judgment shou[d be interpreted as fol.tows. Any nationaI court
appLying Community latlis empouered, soteLy on the basis of the princìp[e
of primacy of Community [ar, to dec[are the confl.icting nationaL [aw is
not appticabIe.
II - ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS COilPONENTS OF UNION LAh,
A - gNroN LqgrsLlTroN
33. It is not yithin the scope of this report to define the organ:, and
procedures that shouLd create and impLemerrt the tau of the Un on. The
report tritI however cove'the nature of the Lays of the Union,. the persons
to rhom they are addres.ed, their implementation and the persons that must
apply them. They witI te based on the Community system yhich has atready
proved its worth, owing above a[[ to the case-[aw of the CJ.
@Ienet,(2) Case 106177, (197E) ECR <1964> ECR 1141 et seq.629 et seq.
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34.
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A c Lear and sìmpte sy:,teo rrnd terminoLogy must be dev'ised.
OutLine of the Unionrs legr stative acts:
Là
Exec u rer States
nt ons
The basic Iaw (constitution)
36. The basìc law of the Unìon is primarity contained'in the Treaty of
Union and - where the Latter so provides - in the other Commurrity
Treaties. InternationaI lcts on the protection of human rightr; wiLL
part of the basic laul a: provided for in the section of the r€'port
with fundamentat rights.
2. Laws
the
fo rm
deaLing
37. The laws of the Union are adopted solely lry the Legistature of the Union
in order to imptement the Union's poIicie,; in accordance with the
provisions of the Union rreaty and within the scope of its competences.
The Law is the onIy l"egistative act adopted by the Legistatur,r.
3E. The [aws must compLy w'it h and be compatibLe uith the basic [a.,r of the
Un i on.
-12- PE83.326/fin.tc
The difterent types of Laws are as foItows:
39. - Laws revising the Treaty
must be rat'i f i ed try a [ [
40. - organic Laws specifying,
t he organi zat i on of the
by speciaL majorities;
t,P0J29E
OR. FR.
wt ich are adopted by spec'ial majoritìes and
Member Statesi
in the circumstances Laid down by the Treaty,
institutions and other bodìes; they are adopted
41. - ordinary taws which ar: of a generat nature; they lay down the
frameuork, princ'iples rnd objectives governing the measures taken by the
Unionrs executive body or the nationaI authoritìes;
12. - budgetary LaHS which fix irr detaiL the annuaI revenue and expenditure of
the Union.
43. AtL [aws are direct[y appLicable throughout the Union. .tf they are
outLine taws, in other words if they lay doun the framework for secondary
[eg'istat'ion to be adopted either by the Unionts executive body or by the
nationaI authorìtìes, thu'/ aro directLy appticabte in the sense that they
confer upon'inividuats rights which they can enforce in a Member State and
which the nationaL courts must uphoLd (1).
44. with regard to the concept ol a tvariabte rate of integration', a Union
Law may provide that its entry'into force may be preceded by transìtionaI
periods Limited'in time. The periods may be varied by the taw from one
Member State or region to another where there is a ctear need but these
varjations may onIy serve to faci Litate the subsequent fuL[ ì,rptementation
of the law in the State rr reg'ion in question.
45. The Unionrs executìve bo,ly and the authorities of the trlember States -
where necessary, the Loc rI authorities (regions or countries) - are
responsibte for imptemerring the taws.
@case-LawoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanCommunities
on the appLicabiLity of directives - an expression which uiLL no tonger
exist in the terminotog" of the Un'ion - see Case 33/70, SACE, (1970) ECR
1213 et seq. and Case 4 174, VAN DUYN, <1974) EUR 1347 et seq.
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3. Regutations
46. The execut'ive witt stitL be emporered to adopt (impLementing)
regulations. The lau wi LL stipuLate the contents, objectìve and scope and
of the executive's pouer to adopt a regutation.
47. Laws adopted by the LegisLatr,re are a[ways generaL and abstract in nature.
Imptementing regutations adopted by the executive may however be detaiLed
and specific. As regards the Limits, the lrierarchicat system shouId be
maintained under which each provision must be in conformity with a higher
provision.
4. Decisions
48. Decisions are the responsibit ity of the executive body. They are
addressed to specific partie,r (for examp[e a Member State, a region, an
undertaking or a citizen) and may be taken onLy in pursuance of a Law or a
Treaty on the conditions and for the purposes taid down. They are bindìng
on the addressees, as laid doyn in the Community Treat.ies.
49. Preparatory acts, recommendations and opinions provided for ìr, the Union
Treaty and - unless amended by the union Treaty - in the commtrn'ity
Treaties, wìLL be issued in accordance trith the prov'is'ion of those
Treaties and the procedures [aid rJown in the rutes of procedure of the
ìnstitution which is to,rdopt the measure.
B - tPlLrcATIoN 0F_UNIoN_LAh, 
_
50. The Laws of the Un'ion w'i 't lay doun any ruLes and set up any bod'ies which
may be required for the rxecutive to impLement the taw and policies of the
Union and, where appropriate, provide for the power of the Unìon executjve
to exerci se di rect contr oL over certain nationaL bod'ies.
51. Prìmary responsibiLity for i,npLementing Laws and poLicies as wet[,rs the
budget of the Union is veste,l ìn the executive .hich witl. have the power
to verify that the t{ember states and, where approprìate, LocaL and
regionaL authorities, fuLfiL their obtigatìons). The executive has the
poHer to ensure either by legaI proceedings (before nationaI courts or the
court of Justice of the union) or by adm'inistrative means, that
obL'igat ions are f uLf i L Lcd.
h,P0329E
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')2. As regarcs the impLementation of the taw and poLicies of the Union - and
the formctation of regulations implementing the Laws - the State cannot be
exonerat€d from tiabitily for the acts or omissions of the regionat or
IocaI aut hority which ì: in principte responsibLe.
! - lUgIeIlL_ 
-REVlErr
53. JudiciaI review of the .ommunityts acts and activities is treIt deveLoped
in the s'stem 'in force. For this reason the Court of Justice wiLL be
respons'i r[e for judicì r revieu uithin the Union on the same conditions as
those taid down ìn the lommunity Treaties, with the foLtowìng add'itionat
detai[s lnd amendments rhich wiLL be specified by the tatr of the Union:
54. - riider access for indiuiduaLs by means of individuaI appLications to the
Court of Justice in cases where as person has been adverseLy affected by
any urìon act concerring him;
55. -
56. -
expre: s jurisdiction
fundan entat rights,
exhau: tedi
right of the Court o
back 'o the national
is re'used or a prel
appea. is possibLe;
of the Court in respect of the protection of
n princip[e after domest'ic remedies have been
Justice to annuL the dec'ision and refer the case
court where an apptication for a preLiminary rutìng
minary ruling i s mi sinterpreted and no further
57. - equatity of access t, and of review of their acts by the Court of
Just'i :e for aU. the institutionsi
58- - power of the Court of Justice, on the basis of a Union Law, to ìmpose
penatties on Member States for faiLure to futfiL their obIigations under
Unior taw;
59. - power of the court to annul a union act within the context of
proc€edings brought by a private individuat;
60. - juri: diction of the Court of Justice in any dispute between trlember
Statr s in connect ior rlith the tasks and principtes of the Unìon.
t|,P0329E
OR. FR.
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61. The CJ draws up its rr.es of procedure in accordance uith the Treaty and
laws of the Union.
62. The executive of the t nion has the right to intervene in nationaL judiciat
proceedìngs accord'ing to the Latrs of the tilember States if the
subject-matter of the case is of interest to the Union and reLated to the
competences of the Union.
63. t'Jhere the existence of a serious and persistent infringement of democratic
principLes, fundamentat rights or important provisions of the Treaty has
been estabLished by the Court of Justice at the request of partiament or
of the Commission, the European Councit, after hearing the LegisLative and
executive bodies, wi L[, by speciat majorities, take the foLLouing:
64. - measures suspending the apptication of part or the uhoLe of the Treaty
mechanisms to the State.in question,
65. - uhich may go as far,rs suspending participat'ion by the State in question
and its nationaLs in the Institutions of the Union.
D - rHE EUrolErN_JgDIcIA! AREA_
66. The objective of European Union is not Limited to certain economic
requirements. The Community has atready demonstrated the need to extend
its fieLd of actìon in order to create a judicial area for European
citizens.
1. Harmonization of nationat LegisLation
67. within the scope of irs competences, the Community has taken numerous
measures to harmonize rules of civiI and pubtic tay (for exampte regarding
customs and taxation) Even interpreted broad[y, ArticLe 100 of the EEC
Treaty makes provision for this only in the case of matters that directty
affect the estabtishment or functioning of the common market.
rdP0329E
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68. In addition to the develop,1s61 of the taw of the Union based on the Treaty
and the common measures taken by the Unìon, the latter witI proceed with
the harmon'ization of nationaL tegistation in accordance with the
cooperation method with a v'iew to forming a homogeneous judiciaL area
within the union.
69. The Commission and th,,ParLiament may submit recommendations aLong these
Lines to the European Counci t.
70. The fight against internationaL forms of crime is a matter of cooperation
rrithin the framework r f the European Counci[.
71. The creation of a comr ln jud'iciaL area wi[[ hetp to bring to fruition the
concept of European c tizenship, the main component of which is the common
enjoyment of fundament,lt rìghts.
E - rHg rErRlTgRr 0F_THE_urqI0N_
72. In the Community Treaties, the probtem of the territory of the Union is
defined in ArticLe 79 of the ECSC Treaty, ArticLe ??7 of the EEC Treaty
and ArticLe 198 of the ECSC Treaty. 0bviously any change in the territory
to which the Treaties appty witL entaiL an amendment of the Treaties. The
Treaties make no provi s'ion for total or partia[ withdrawaL. If a
poLìticat probLem arises, ìt must be resoLved as such. This situation
must not be changed.
73. As regards maritìme terrìtoty, probLems have arisen over the excLusive
economic zone. So far the probLem has concerned the deLimitation of
customs territory. It has been accepted on the one hand that maritìme
zones - which to somc'extent are subject to the sovereignty of the ilember
States - are a part ot the customs territory of the Community and, on the
other, that the Commur ity cannot be excLuded from negotiations on those
zones. Moreover, as regards fisheries, the Community has the exclusive
pouer to negotìate rith thi rd countries.
74. The Union must retain the prerogatives of the Community; a provision couLd
be inserted in the Treaty g'iving the Union exctusive or concurrent
competences as regards agreements deIimiting maritime economic zones,
incLuding fisheries problems and the deLimitation of customs territory.
tdP0329E
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F - REVTSIoN_or rHE rR!.Al Y
75. As part of a balanced syst,m guaranteeing the defence of the interests of
the ttlember States and the lnion a procedure must be taid down for the
revision of the Treaty which invotves aLt the union,s potitical.
authorities and aLI ilember States:
76. Three detegations of the CrunciL of the Union, a third of the frlembers of
ParLianent or the Commiss'i:n may submit to the Legìstature a reasoned
draft [ar supptementing, abotishing or amending certain artictes of the
TreatY.
7'1. Ihe proposaL for amentlment may onty be adopted by agreement of the tro
branches of the Legislature deciding by quaLified majoritìes.
78. The proposaI thus approved is submitted to the member states for
ratification and comes'into force rhen they have aLL ratified it.
t.,P0329E
OR. FR.
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1.
?.
I rHrnooucrroH I
By its fese!g!ien_g!_2_lg!y._!29!, parLiament resotved 'to take fuIt
initiative in giving fresh impetus to the estabLishment of European
union', and to create a committee rvhose task it niil, be to drau up
amendments to the existing Treaties,.
By ìts Iqgg!g!!90_eI-é_lg!y.-!29?, partiament defined more precisety the
terms of reference of that commìttee by instructìng ìt to prepare ,a
draft of modifications of the Treaties..., defining the tasks, compe-
tences and Institutions of the Union in accordance yith the Community's
fundamentaI vatues'.
In the gggnggig_§gg!9l, this resoLution specifies as fo[lorls:
-rThe tasks of the Union... shaLl. be formutated with a vie!, to growìng
politìca[, economic and sociaL soLidarìty of its peoptes... and to a
stabte and open econory'11
- 
rTo carry out these tasks ... the union... must poSSÉrs appropriate
ggEp§lgnggs in order to... propose ney initiatives... in the fotLowing
areas: ... generaI economìc poticy (in particutar: credit, rnvestment,
taxatìon, research), sectoraL poticies (industry, agricutture, the
tertiary sector, energy) and commercìaI poLicy (in particuIar as regards
energy and rav materia[s suppLies), monetary pol.ìcy and the paraL[eL
deveLopment of the economic and the monetary aspects of economic and
monetary unìon, and in particutar the devetopment of common instruments,2.
4. The task of the rapporteur on the internat and externat economic pot.icy
of the union, in other vords the Economic union, is thus to define:
- on one hand, the 3gg!g vhich the Union must undertake in the economic
sector;
- on the other, the ggEpglgnggs uhich ìt must have in order to carry
out those tasks.
3.
learagraph 4 of
2P"""gr"ph 6 "
-o-
the resotutiun of 6.7.19E2 (0J No. C ?38 of 13.9.1992, p. ?5)
ll tt ,t rt
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5. These yiIt therefore form the tvo main parts of this document, which wiLL
however be preceded by a chapter on the definition of therEconomic Unionr,
its objectives and its fundamentat prìnciples.
-o-
Ihg rsppgc!ssr:§-viersel!!
6. As an introduction to this survey, the rapporteur voutd Iike to specify
his generat poIiticaI concept;:
Within the context of the rfresh impetus to the estabtishment of European
Unionr, the essentiat probLem is to promote Europe from the rank of a
vortd gg4ggtgie! power to that of a genuine gggngglg and potiticaL power:
in the key sectors (energy, industry and technotogy, currency and so forth),
Europe must be abLe both to meet the formidabLe chattenges posed by the
economic changes in the modern ror[d and to guarantee its independence,
and therefore its security, in relation to its major competitors and
partners. By achìeving genuine economìc independence Europe rlit-L finaU.y
be abte to become a poLiticat actor on the wor[d stage.
7. This objective witt be achieved if the efforts towards economic recovery
made on a national scale are united and at the same time passed on by a
considerab[e strengthening in at
Union Levet.
The scope and diversity of the probtems to be deaLt with make it necessary
to explore g!! avenues, encourage e!! initiatives and impIement q!! means
in order to encourage such cooperation since on[y the creation or the
devetopment of gg44g4-pgligigS rhich are not on[y stronger and boLder
but also more imaginative and more varied than those hitherto pursued
by the Community uliLL enabLe the Union to achieve this ambitious objective.
These new poticies wì[L on[y attain their true proportions ìf they are
accompanied by certain changes in the dggj.gign:Ee!i0tl-E9g!3019U9, or
even in the ilglilgligng!_lfgggUgqL of the existins Community. Various
specific, concrete and pragmatic suggestìons are put forward to this
effect betov.
8.
9.
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10. 0n the other hand, it seems necessary to stress the c[ose Links which
must unite gg9!94tg-ggd_gggig!_ggli9fgs in Europe. Some form of sociaL
consensus is in fact the essentiaL characteristic of the European economic
system: sociaL progress must accompany (and not 'compensate forr) economic
progress. SociaI harmonization'ris therefore a necessary basis for European
cohesion and sotìdarity.
9bserye!ren§-e§-!e-!Ee-qg!!gds-gsed
11. a) In drafting this document, the author has of course constantLy borne
in mind the impo6tance of the gg44gnilU_pelglgg3y in the economic
sector, both the poLiticaI consensus between the Member States of
the Community as regards the Legitimacy of and the need for economic
integration as welL as the specific achievements. of that Community
in tlrenty-five years of activity (customs union, agricuLture - but
a[so, to a certaìn extent, competition, coaI and steet and so forth).
1?. The author has aIso taken into account 'gqqqgOtlX_Ugf!:in:ìI99!gs§',
in other words action being carried out and projects for reform or
extension (see the 1980 'mandate').
13. Thus, a[though basing his anatysis on past experience, your rapporteur
has been however chiefLy inspired by a y9lgnlgtig!._eCqspggltyg_ggnggp!
g!-Egfgpgg0-Ulig!, paying particu[ar attention to eticiting the innovating
features which wiLI enabLe a genuine quaLitative Leap forward to be made
and existing contradictions truty to be overcome rather than enabIing
corrections or adjustments to be made to the existing situation; in
so doing he fett that he lras correctty ìnterpreting parIiament,s
resotution of 9 JuLy 1981 'to take fuLl.'initiative in giving fresh
impetus to the estabIishment of European Union..
14. b) tlithin this working document, 'Economic Union' covers the various
sectors of economic activity. Horever, certain sectors are excluded
from this study which, atthough having undeniabLe but secondary
economic repercussions, are deaLt yith from a different angte in the
working documents on 'the Union's policy for societyr (ìn particu[ar,
-fggjgIrgJ poLicy and socjal poLicy) and on 'the Union,s inlgCnaltgna!
Ig!g!19!:' (in particuLar, non-commerciaI economic retations).
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15.
DEFINITION - OBJECTIVES - PRINCIPLES
1. gcIinilien
The concept of European Union covers a very larga fieLd of
activities yhich may be grouped under two main ideas:
- the unification of the economic, commerciaL and monetary
- the carrying-out of common sectoraL poLicies.
very different
area;
17.
Unrfl ge!r9!-9I-!hs-es9!98!is-qree
16. This unification consists of approximating, coordinating, harmonizing and
compLeting, according to the circumstances and vhere the need arises, the
Iglgg governing the operation of the economic mechanisms in the various
Member States, so that they do not jeopardize but rather encourage the
best possible use of the ccmmon potentiaL of the Union; it is necessary
to create the gqqqqn_fla[eHaq! of European economic actir,.iy.
These ru[es, to which economic operators are subject, are generatty
fixed by the pubtic authorities of the Member States, so that their
activities must be harmonized or coordìnated so as to achieve the foltouing:
- compLete openness, fLuidity and unity of the 'in!gCng!_Eg4!g!';
- coordination of nationa[ §h9g!:!9t4_gg9494lg_p9!igiqg;
- the impLementation of a common 0909!Agy_end_linengie!-pe!igy;
- the finat consotidation of the external Customs Union and the creation
of a common ggp4gtgie!_pgligy.
The unification of the economic area has been partLy taid down and organized
'in the Community Treatìes and partLy carried out in some sectors; but part
of the Community patrimony is fragiLe (internat mar:ket), it has been
impossibLe futLy to achìeve certain objectives (common commerciat poLicy)
and others have barely been deatt Hith at att (short-term economic poLicy).
18.
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Ihe-seccxing:eg!-e!-eeEEen-esg!ere!-pe!is!gs
19. The harmonization of this area and these economic rutes, rlhich is stiLt
very unsatisfactory in the fietd of major sectoraL poLicies, is intended
to enabIe the deveLopment of ggliyg cooperation between economic operators.
Houever, to be effective, this cooperation *itI necessìtate varying degrees
of organisat'ion, management, incentive and financiaI guarantees wh'ich the
Union must provide. t.lìth this aìm in view, the institutions of the Union
vi[[ formutate measures more or tess Limited in scope and more or Less
structured poticies.
20. The major sectors concerned wiLt be ggllggllgl9r 9!gI9I, Igggglg!/dgyglqp:
EenUinngvalign, indgslrv and !99!q9!9gv and !re!§pgr! and !9!gggoqsuge!L9n!
The Community patrimony is Iarge in certain of these sectors (agricuIturaI
guarantees, nuctear research) even if adjustments are nou necessary; it
is on the other hand smatt or even negligìbLe in other fieLds.
2- 9Dieggives-sod-pringip!es
Ihe-oeed-Iqc-Egsngnls-Unren 
-
21. At the end of the Second Uortd tlar, the Western, and thus the European, econc
began its reconstruction and devetopment on the basis of the two great
foundations of the Egg!!90-Uggdg and @[ agreements; this net.l wor[d
economic order encouraged the commencement of Community integration
which great[y benefìted from the hìgh-growth period of the 'sixties.
0n the contrary, the graduaI disarray of wortd monetary and commerciaL
mechanisms from 1970 onwards considerabIe checked this impetus, whìtst
successive energy crìses have ptaced a great straìn on the econonìc and
poLiticaI soLidarity between European countries.
2?. The need to give lfgsh_iqpglgs to European economic integration is
based on three findings:
- s'ince the beginning of the rseventies, the European area has not
adjusted itseLf adequatety to the neu uor[d economic situation in the
energy, industriat, technoLogicaI and monetary fieLds; its competitive
capacity has decreased; the decIine in grorrth and corresponding rise
ìn unemptoyment not onty threaten the tiving standard of citizens and
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the poLiticat stabi[ity and social cohesion of the Member States but atso
their economic independence amongst the great ìndustriaL porers;
efforts toyards recovery, chiefty made at nationat Ievet, have been
insuffJclent to reverse these deveLopmentr; they have been Littl.e
or badly coordinated, oring in some measure to faiLure by the Community
institutions to act, and have in fact yorsened the economic dìsparìty
betveen the various states, non of which can any longer have a reasonabLe
hope of meeting these ner chattenges on its oun;
the Community arrangements, as designed 25 or 30 years ago in a completeLy
different. worLd economic setting and intended to initiate cooperation
projects in certain specific sectors (coaL and steeL, customs union,
agricutture and so forth) no Longer have at present the necessary means
to devetop a more ìntense and more varied form of activity and cooperation.
23. Confronted uith this situation, it is necessary to define t e ngl-lge!!g:
l9l! in wlich the essential common action for economic recovery may be
taken; this framevork must be outtined bearing in mind two comp cmentary
requirements:
- on the one hand, more nuoerous, more daring and more extensive common
actìon and poLicies must be formulated;
- on the other, decision-r'raking structures and procedures rrrust be adapted
as far as necessary to aU.ow the variety of action necessary
and guarantee that it is effective, speedy and permanent.
4-pregqe!rg-epptgesh
24. After 25 years of experience, the Union yitL have a clearer idea of the
gllglgglgs to be impLemented, in other words of the definition of the
objectives to be attained (market unity, Community preference, monetary
union, and so forth) and of the ways and means of achieving them; it
vitL thus be able to refirre to some extent the economic rote of the
Community. In this sense there cannot be any opposition between the
concepts of common 'stratr:gìest and rpoIicìest.
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25; The Union yiLL thus perform economic tasks which are extreme[y varied
and perform them at varying teveLs of responsìbiLity. It vitL therefore
be necessary to speak of gg44gn-t9§pgnsipilily-Iel-gpggtftg-pro!Lgmg for
rlhich appropriate solutions must be found at Union LeveL rather than of
a graduaLr generaI and Iinear transfer of the econom'ic competence of the
Member States to the institutions of the Union. In certain cases thìs
responsibiLity rlitL take the form of integrated actìon and an integrated
poLicy leaving LittLe autonomy to the nationaL bodies entrusted b,ith their
implementation. In other sectors, it wiLL simpLy take the form of an
exchange of information and mutuaI consuLtations. However, variety does
not mean dispersaI and the instìtutions of the Union witL ensure that
the common decisìons are consistent as a trhote and ìmptemented effectiveLy.
26. This necessary pragmatism witL atso mean that the mechanisms wiLL be
impIemented gfgdgglly. The use of stage-by-stage procedures, which has
proved itsetf in the Community system, for exampte as regards the abol.i-
tion of customs tariffs, wiLL be extended to fresh areas of ggliyg coope-
ration. It wiIL a[so be possible to have recourse to cooperation projects
in which the participation of the Member States varies, i r other words
the projects come into force graduaLLy and differentty from one Member
State to another: such act'ion, decided by the reIevant institutions of
the Union, w'itL initiatty be taken on[y by certain Member States and the
other Member States witt join in later on in accordance with a timetable
which wi IL take into account specìfic problemts and difficuLties; it
wiLI however be necessary to attach certain safeguards to this speciaI
procedure; these witL be specified beLow.
Ihs-pcioglp!e-e!-pe!r!ige!-rse!rsq-end-respeosiDi!i!y
27. The Union must exercise some degree of direct or indirect regulation of
the economy. Its actions witI thus have a pgliligg! aspect which ìs
LikeLy to raise questions of the foLtoring kind:
- how far can the Union interfere, or urge the Member States to interfere,
in the activities of undertakings; may it, for example, pursue a
detaiIed 'industriaI poLicy' ?
-?8 
-
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hrhat sort of short-term economic poLicy may it pursue, encourage or
recommend? t{hat priority shoutd be given to the fìght for employment
and against inftation? t{hat type of economic recovery shou[d ìt
advocate (consumption, investment) ?
- etc.
28. The repties to these questions must be based on the common characteristics
of the economic systems of the Member States: mixed economy systems
(State/ private undertakings), systems in which resources are redistri-
buted, cottectìve guarantee systems and so forth. tlithin this context
the Union must seek, through its action and poLicìes, economic and
sociaI effectiveness at the Lowest possibLe cost.
29. Therefore, the principLe criterion for action witL be the rationaLity
of the economic mechanisms emptoyed and the implementation at the same
time of a Union'po[icy for society' (in the regionat, -ociat and
envi ronmentat sectors).
30. However, if circumstances so require, the Union must be able to sotve
certain questions vhich have poLiticaL aspects and are Linked to its
economic activities (for examp[e, the development of nuclear energy,
the reorganization of ulhoLe industriaL sectors, the choice of industrìaL
processes, and so forth): the Institutions of the Union must have
sufficient poLiticat status, tegitìmacy and responsibiLity to take
such decisions.
Ibe-pcrnsrp!e-e!-§gDsidie ci!v
31. According to this principte rthe Union shatI onty undertake those
tasks uhich can be executed more effectìvety in common than by the
Member States separate[y, or those whose execution requires a con-
tribution from the Unionr; consequentty, it is clear that 'the
Union shaLt act onty in cLearLy detineated a.eas,1.
1 Paragraphs(0J No. C
5 (a)
238 of
and (b) of ParLiamentrs reso[ution of 6 Juty 1982
13.9.19E2, p. ?5).
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32. The competence of the Union riL[ therefore'be Limited to what is
assigned to it, meaning that its fieLd of competence witL be specifìed
in the Act of Constitution, other matters being left to the Menrber
States'1.
33. The apptication of this principte shouLd both guarantee the Member
States an autonomous area or Levet of economic competence and ensure
the complementarity of the activìtìes of the Member States and of the
Union.
34. This principle does not prevent the Member States from contìnuing to
participate (direct[y or indirectl.y)'in European or interhationaL
cooperation projects desìgned, deveIoped and financed ggl§].qg_!hg
!ege!_!fgqg:tgl!_91_!hg-U!t9n (for exampLe Ariane, Aìrbus, CERN and
so forth); these activities must however rema'in compatib[e with the
objectives of the Union and may possibly be integrated in the future
in its oyn activities if a common interest is reveated, in apptìca-
tion of the princip[e of subsidiarity.
Ihe-e!lgnueo!-e!-eeeoeote§
35. The struggle to reduce the development gap between the Member States and
betveen the regions, whìch is both the objective and the principle for any
action, must form the basis of the whoLe economic potìcy of the Un'ion.
36. The Union must of course equip itse[f with spec'ific means for regìonaL
devetopment but it must above aIt ensure that in al.t sectors (energy,
industry, agriculture, currency and credit and so forth) the poLicies
pursued aìm to bftng_!!e_!eye!S-gI_dgyg!epnen!-g!9§gl_!99glhgr, wh.i t st
respecting the typicaL economic characteristics of the regìons (industry,
agricutture, services and so forth).
Horever, the Union must al.so ggJ!49_!hg-eg!ge!_pftngfp!g_91-q!tg0gg0!
so as to define more precise Lines of action: there must be no forced,
artificiat unification of the means of and procedures for regutat.ion
of the economy nor must some model based on one or other 'dominating
Paragraph 12 of the Report of the Commission of the European Communities on
European Union «975).
37.
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economy' vithin the union be imposed. 0n the cont?aty, the aim yiLL be
to define precise objectives (for exampLe as regards rates of inftatìon,
pubLic spending deficits, investment programmes and so forth) ulhich are
coordinated and harmonized at the Level of the trlember states and the
regions: it vi[[ thus be possibLe to deveLop genuine interdependence
and reat economic cohesion rhich uiIL enable the Union to preserve
its autonomy in the internationaI context.
3E. As stated in the introduction, the aim of
to define the tasks which the Union witt
economi c sector;
- to define the fieLd of competence uith which it witL be entrusted in
order to fuLfi I those tasks.
39. PreLiminary anal.ysis of the tasks to be accomptished is essentiaI not
onLy in order to appreciate the nature and importance of the corresponding
fietds of competence which are necessary but above aLL to glplgig §pggl:
Ilge!!X, sector by sect,)r, !he_need_I9I_e_te§tge!_pg9s! to economic
cooperation between the Member States.
40. This anaLysis uil.t of necessity be only an outLine but ìt aims to describe
the gggg4lie!-Igglgtgs of the reforms, reinforcement and ìnnovations which
are desìrabte in order that the new European potiticaL soLidarity, symbo-
Lized by the Union, is met by reinforced ggg4gqic cohesion; it wiLL
moreover be for the institutions of the Union, once they are set up,
to define precisety thc contents of the policies which are onty outtined
in generat belotr.
41. In many sectors, the economic tasks of the Union take the form of ex-
tendìng Community achievements to which I shatI therefore briefLy refer;
I sha[[ hoyever emphasize the innovative aspect of these tasks.
this document is twofotd:
have to perform in the
EC0Not'lIC
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43.
42. For the purposes of the anatysis thro chief functions of the Economic
Union may be distinguished, as stated above:
unification of the economic area;
the carrying-out of common sectorat poticies.
44.
A. UNIEIgAIIgN-gT-IHE-EqQN9EI9-ABE4
This term covers not on[;r the creation of a genuine internal market
uithin the Unìon but ats,: the Unilige!!90-9I-!he-!faqe-tpJ! 
-9!-eggngqig
ggliyily: short-term eccnomic poIicy, monetary poticy, commerciaI poLicy
and so forth.
The creation of a unified economic area rlas the originat goat of the
EEC and is stiLL the foremost requirement of the Unioi-
It is in fact the prerequisite for the development of ggliy' economic
cooperation through common action or poticies. Four main sectors witt
be anatysed in turn:
- the internaI market;
short-term economic poLicy;
monetary and financiaI PoticY;
externat economic reLations.
1. Ihe-ingerna!-Eer!s!
45. This concept covers aLI measures which are necessary to ensure free
movement of goods, persons and capita[, to harmonize the conditions of
competition so as to devetop a Legat framework common to the under-
takings of the various Member States. CompLete LiberaLizatìon of the
internaL market witt in particutar be achieved by continuing to harmonize
nationaL tegisLatìon, but this harmonizatìon must be timited to uhat is
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strict[y necessary and pay attention as far as possib[e to the speciat
nature of nationat Lavs and customs.
46. a) Ereedeu-gl-usYgugn!
- gggd§: totat abotition of customs duties and quotas is a considerabLe
achievement for the Union but the continued or even increased admini-
strative barriers (customs documents, VAT) and technicat barriers
(technicaL and heatth standards) at frontier crossing-points prevents
the attainment of a genuine internaL market;
- ggl§gn§: reaI and guaranteed freedom for aIt Community emptoyees
in the private sector to work in any Member State is an achievement
yhich ìs just as fundamentaL; progress ìs unfortunateLy much stower
rith regard to the professions and non-existent as regards the
pubLic sector;
- gggl!g!: the reticence of the frlember States and the,.ack of a
sufficientLy integrated common monetary poLicy have prevented the
provisions of the EEC on the free movement of capita[ frotn being
impLemented, a[though they are binding; at present this freedom
of movemént is in conftict with disparate nationaL measures which
are often very restrictive.
47. The sLow progress made in certain of these sectors for the Last 25 years
Eglgg_1!_iqpgSSiple for the Union to proceed at the same pace and
according to the same methods; the often artificiaI nature of the
obstacLes encountered (unwiLLingness to aIter customary procedures
or ru[es) and the need to increase the degree of openness and thus the
economic vitaLity of the tCommon Market' just'ify a qglg-gngggg!-ig
epplgagh to this probtem in-!g!gCe.
48. llt is therefore proposed that the Union shouLd undertake to take (in
accordance wìth a specific and binding programme and timetabLe) g!!
lneaEUfeg_nqggssell in order actuatty to LiberaLize the internat marketI 
---,-----
Itrttf and definitivety, at Least where this LiberaLization is not directLy
!subject to the existence of a common poLicy ìn this sector: (for exampte
4
1 Prr.g.rphs marked thus
I
I
I
I
a re the rapporteur' . 
.P-.opota L a.
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movement of capìtaI and monetary union); in the Latter ca: , progr.ess
shoutd be made gradualty and at the same time.
49. This programme wou[d be decided by the Leg'istatìve authority on:i croposal
It.o, lhg-Unienls-9l9ggltyg-bedy; the tatter uouLd be respcnsibLe for
lcarrying out the programme and ìts decisìons wouLd come'into force after
l.".a.in periods had elapsed unLess they were expressLy vetoed by an
loverwheLning majority of the Leg.istative body.
50. (b) 9eoee!i!reB-peLlsy
The existence of a free market onLy enabtes ava'iLabLe resources to be
better attocated towards the best possìbte LeveI of productivity if
common ruLes of competition are apptied.
51. In this respect, the provisions of the Treaties, the regutations and
directives and Community case-law have enabLed the devetopment of an
effective and even exemptary 'ggEpgllllg!_pgllgy' in certaìn respects
_ 
(particutarty as regards the extent of the fieLd of competence conferrecj
upon the Community executive).
52. This poL'icy has however c(,flr€ up against fixed llnlfS eitherin the form,.
competition between undertak'ings (the Lack of a regutatìon on the contr,,_
of combinations) or especiaL Ly 'in that of state intervent ion in econom.ic
activities (for exampIe, di rect or conceaLed subsidies and the rutes
retating to pubLic undertakings). The tendency towards oLigopoLization
of the industriaL structure and the effects of the present cris.is even
provoke a suspicion that 1.he Community ìnst'itutions have somewhat Lq:f
control of this polìcy when confronted with the power of the major
industriaL groups and parl'icutarty when conf ronted w'ith the uni Latera,
and determined steps taken by certa'in Member States; the Community has
thus paid more attention to prohibìting certaìn practices to tackLirrg the
necessary reorganization of European industry.
53. Union must therefore first of att.restore the authority of thr: common!'ìr,"
II comoetition poticy, part'icutarLy in retation to the pubLic sector and to
I the member states themseIves. The existing LegisIative Lacunae mustI
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54.
therefore be speedil.y fiLled and the authority of the executive body ril"t
be strengthened (porers of information, investigation, decision-making
and power to impose penatties).
Horrever, the unìon must at the same time ensure that its activities
in this sector do not cripp[e the necessary glgg1i3e!]9n_gl-!!g_ggqqg0t!y
indgslffg!_gtgg; competition poticy must not prevent the Union from
progressing from the stage of a commercial area to that of a production
a rea.
(c) Ihe-!ege!-Jreueuer!-el-sndqr!e!ings
The union uri[[ not actual[y become an integrated area of trade and
production untess the obstacIes caused by Legal differences are removed
by sensibte approximation of nationat Legis[ation and, if, at the same
time, a specifìc tegaI framevork is proposed for undertakings wishìng
to operate straight aHay at European tevel.
The !g!_tgsg!! of 25 years of Community effort in this sector is in
substantiat: the nationa[ legistation on the ruIes apptying to companies is
stiLL widety dìsparate in spite of the arduous adoption of 7 directives and
it has been impossib[e to create gny-lggg!-frgogrgr! to accommodate companies
of European proportions and character; nor are there rules or even a common
code of conduct appLicabte to muttinationaI undertakings. ALthough a uniform
patent taw and even a European Patent Office had existed on paper since 1975
nothing has yet come into force because of tack of ratificatìon; the
creation of a European trademark is at the drafting stage. Apart from
the undisputed success of the harmonization of the basìs for assessing
the vatue-added tax (the lglgs are stitI very different), tax harmonization
progresses very sIovLy whereas nationat LegisLation is in constant evotution;
the irritating question of duty-free atLowances for travetters comes up
against the great differences in the rates of vAT and excise duties.
The Union must pay particular attention to the speedy fitting of this
legat vacuum whìch hampers the activities of undertakings and even
diSgggdgS them from organizing their production on a European scate;
to this end, the two fottowing projects wìtI be resotutely carried out:
t-
55.
56.
l:57.
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as a priority, a Legal framexork yiIt be created vhich is as comptete as
necessary to enabte 'Egtgpggn_gndgglglllg§' to be formed and to operate
out of reach of the disparities betveen nationaL Legistation;
this franerork riLL be proposed by the executive body (in particutar
on the basis of proposats which atready exist) and L,iLL be adopted
by a majority vote of the Legislature;
L
the harmonization of nationat Legistation in atL fìeLds in which this
appears to be economicatty justified uiLL be continued in accordance
uith a precise, bìnding timetabIe.
2- §hec!:!ecE-eseoeois-pe!!sY
58. 4fglg!e_1Ql_el-!he_EE9:ICSe!y provides as fotLows: 'Member States shaLL
regard their conjuncturaI poticies as a matter of common concern. They
shaLI consutt each other and the Commission on the measures to be taken
in the Light of the prevaiLing circumstances... The CounciL may, acting
unanimousty on a proposaL from the Commission, decide upon measures
appropriate to the situationr.
59. 0n the other hand, Afgiglg_M_e1_lhe_EEg:ICeety provides that ,the
Councit shaLL ... ensure coordination of the generaI economic poIicies.
of the Member Statesr.
60. 0n these two bases, e-gggngf!-dggl.gfgO 
-9!-!9,r?r!!/!1aims to attaìn a ,high
degree'of convergence of the economic poLicies of the Member States ...'
uithout which rthere can be no graduaL attainment of economic and monetary
uniont. This decision provides that:
- the CounciL shat[, each yeat, acting on a proposat from the Commìssì.n
estabLishrthe guidetines to be fottored by each Member states in it:
economic policy for the foLLowing year';
the CounciL shaLL adopt every five years, on a proposat from the Commissìon,
a medium-term economic poLicy programme rhose purpose is'to ensure the
convergence of overa[[ economic poticiesr;
- standing and prior consultations on the economic poticy measures en-
visaged by Member states are provided for, as welI as the possìbiLity
of examining, in an emergency meeting of the Councit, economic or
1 o..l tto. L 63, 5.3.1974, p.16
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budgetary measures of a ttlember State rdeparting from the guideLines
laid dovn by the CounciL'.
61. The precise, or even binding, nature of the provisions is in strange
contrast rith the Ieggg-g!-!h9-pggsgn!-§i!gg!190: these mechanisms function
LittLe or badLy and do not come to grips vith reatities; the Member States
and even the Commun'ity institutions have shown c[ear[y their disaffection
for the annuaL and medium-term programra.l; the cruciaL instruments of
short-term economic potìcy (budget, credit, prices and incomes) are used
rl'ith complete autonomy by each of the Member States.
6?. The fact that there has been comparative faiture in relation to the
objectives heratded in the Treaty (and specified in 1974) is partiaLty
due to the disarray of the national economies provoked by the crisis and
by poLiticaI differences as to the economic prioritìes; however, the
fundame,rtal cause of the faiture Lies above atL ìn the fact that there
is not sufficient mutuaI confidence to transfer to common administrative
bodies the competences which ought necessari[y to be conferred upon them,
as Mr Tindemans noted as Long ago as 1975 in his Report on European Union.
63. The effect of this situation has been to ieepeCdige_lhe_eJJqgliygness
of the measures taken unilateratly by each Member State (faiLure to
inject fresh dynam'ism into other sectors, or even contradiction between
poticies of deftation/reftation fotIored by major trading partners) and
to prevent them from reactìng together and tfus effectivety to outs'ide
events (for exampLe, the wortd rise in ìnterest rates); this situation
atso makes the consotidation of a European Monetary System very hazardous,
since that system must be based on a minimum of economic cohesion and
cons i stency.
lparLiament considers that the four medium-term programmes taid down up to
1981, have fai[ed. (Resotution on the Fifth Programme, paragraph 39);
the Commission [eales it to the nationaL experts in the Economic PoLicy
Committee to draw up the Eillh_EfggfgO4g'and fai Ls to propose any
programme containing specific figures; the CounciL faiIs in practice
to adopt any programme, remarking on rthe different views of the Member
States as to the retative priority of objectives'.
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64. i The Unlgn must therefore make gg4sldglgllg-pfqgCggs in this se:.for,
I whiLst taking into account the diversity of structures and habits and
It the difficuLty of effective[y controtLing the short-term ebonomic
I
r sìtuation; the foLLowing may for examp[e be envìsaged:
I
I
| - ttre progressive deveLopment of qq[Eqn means of intervention (budgetI and Lending/borrowing);
I
I| - the more precise and more binding establishment of quantified
I
r objectives by the Member States in the key sectors (budgetary def.icits,
Ii interest rates and so forth);
I
I
,- the provision of a mechanism to rmonitor'nationaI measures based on that
I
, 
Laid down urithin the context of the EMS or even of the l0!glng!lg0e!
I Eqnetarv-Egnd which wouLd be accompanied by possibLe penatties for| -------I example in the grant of toans or even of budget appropr.iations;I
I
l- ttre gìving of a vider and more autonomous field of competence to the
executive body of the Union as regards the appraisaI of the requirements
of the economic situation, rhiLst Leaving the Legislatìve body the po]rer
to oppose certain decisions by a majority vote.
3. Eens!etr-end-linenste!_ps!igy
65. Th'is term covers the common mechanisms for the reguLation of exchange
rates (EMS) and for recourse to the cap'itaI markets (borrowings/Lendings).
These thro aspects witI be examined in turn.
Ihe-Escepeeo-Eene!ery_§r§lso
66. The probtems of the EMS from the creation of the'snake, .in 1969 untiL
the present 'system' ulas set up 1n 19?9, are sufficientLy 51eLt-known
to make it superftuous to repeat the background here.
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67. Nor is it necessary to insist on the reasons uhich make such a mechanism
gggg0!19! in an economic area in the process of integration such as the
Community: Iinks betreen the stab'iLity of exchange rates and economic
growth, free movement of capitat, equaLization of conditions of competi-
tion, functloning of a system of common agriculturaI prices and so forth.
68. It is however a fact that monetary unìon has deveLoped not on the basis
of specific provisions of the Treaties but under the direct prossure of
U!ggne!igng!_E94g!AIy_9y9!!§, uhich have by turns fostered and disrupted
it.
69. The present system is often considered to be one of the fundamentaI achieve-
ments of the Community not onLy because of its purely technicat merits but
aIso because of the gg!!!!ge!_§yqbg! which it represents, 'in retation both
to Community t:ubLìc opinion and to the outside yortd. In fact it has
functioned satisfactoriLy in sometimes difficuLt conditions and has preserved
some stabiLity 'in Community exchange rates thus aLLowìng the pursuit of
economic integration.
70. Th'is system is however yg!3gggplg because it has both Iimits and amibi-
guities. Considerab[e progress tritL have to be made within the context
of the Union to ensure that it is strengthened and made permanent.
71. The EMS is in fact !4gggp!g!g: the achievement of the first stage (margìns
of fluctuation, financiaI assistance and common monetary unit) can onLy
be safeguarded by the speedy adoption of the second series of measures
(known as 'institutionaLizat'ion' measures) the objective of yhi ch i s
in essence to strengthen the structure by the creation of a reat European
Monetary Fund administering an increasing proportion of thè
reserves of the Member States, a common system of intervention in retatìon
to other currencies, uide use of the ECU and so forth. It rlil.L atso be
necessary to strengthen the paratteI undertakings retating to economic
poticy to be given by Member States in case of monetary disequiIibrium:
ìn this Hay it r{itL be possible to conso[idate the essentiat Link between
the monetary poLicy and economic poticy of the Union.
72. The present rpolitìcat'status of the EMS is gqblggggs: it appears to
be more in the nature of a temporary technicaL (and therefore revocabte)
agreement betueen the centrat banks rather than an authentic common poIicy
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decided by responsibLe and representative poLiticaL institutions and
administered by a permanent autonomous centraL 'instìtution; the
deIiberate non-participation of one Member State in the present system
is probabty not the onty cause of this situation which has chief[y been
brought about by the politicaI reticence of certaìn other ftlember States.
73. To summarize, !bg_!gg!_el_!h9_9nren-in-!hg-Egng!ety-lt9!d witt therefore
be as follows:
- the adoption of'technica['measures which determine the transition
to the second stage of the EMS (a system of progressive phases may
be envisaged provided that each of them is'irreversibLe and that the
trans'ition to the next is automatìc except where majority decisions
to the contrary are taken by the Union's politicat bodies;
- the unreserved integration of the EMS into the institutionaL (and
decision-mak'ing) framework of the Union by the creation of a specìfic
body (of European Monetary Fund) whìch wiIL have some autonomy but be
accountabte to the potiticaL authorities of the Union;
- the part'ic'ipation of g!! Member States of the tlnion in the system is
necessary according to detaì[ed rutes adapted to certain speciaL
situations.
Ue-fl nensie!-oeshenisE§
74. The Community has at present severaI autonomous mechanisms for coLlecting
and lending capital on behalf of some of its poticies. They have eithe"
been estabLished by the Trea.ties (EIB, ECSC) or on the basis of them
(Euratom), o.' lrave been created subsequentty (support f rsr baLance of
payments, NCI). They represent a not inconsiderabte totaL financiaI
cost (4.5 thousand mitLion ECUs in 1980 or a[most 20% of the EEC budget)
principatty intended for the fìnancing of measures of common interest in
the energy sectors «O'/.), inf rastructure sector (302) and productìon
sectors (3O'A)- They are cLearLy a yg!gg!!g intervention ingltggg!! cf
the Communìty'in support of its economic activìties and the institutions
unanimous[y hope that they wiLL be developed further.
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75. rI these instruments nevertheLess suffer from certaìn shortcomìngs wirich have
been ernphasized on many occasions, particutarLy by ParLiament, and one
of the tasks of the Union witL be to make the necessary IEPI9YSES4!§,
trh'ich may be summari zed as f o[ [ows:
- tgllgngliZglfgn of financiaL poLicy by amatgamating the various mechanisms
under a singLe authorìty so as to encoutage a coordinated approach to the
capitaL markets and a more comprehensive financing poLicy (th'is ama[-
gamation might perhaps be.carried out under the aegis of the EIB insofar
as i ts actìv'ities and structures wouLd be more c Lc''se[y associated to
those of the execut'ive body of the Union);
- development of the glJgg!]ygggss of financìaL poL'icy on the one hand
by a gradual but appreciabte increase in the totaL volume (an amount
of 101000 mittion t.las proposed by ParLiament for 1985) and on the other
by increased use of a tlexibte but un'iform system of aid towards the
payment uf interest borne by the Union budget;
- increase in the gglglg4y of the ìnstitution of the Union responsibLe
for the administrat'ion of this system by che aboLition of the present
system of ceitings and successive amounts decided by the CounciI and
by freer access to the capital markets within the Union; at the same
time gyglg!! poLitìcaI controL of the financìaL management of that
ìnstitution w'iLt be ensured by the Un'ion's budgetary authority;
- gllgn§lgp of the rote of this mechanìsm in the field of the short-
term econom'ic poLicy of the Union (particuLarty for monetary and
Loans poLicy) and the possìbiLity of a d'irect issue of Ioans to the
pub t'i c .
4. Er!srBe!-9ee09Ere-se!e!1sns1
76. The EEC Treaty is a sol'id basis not only for the establishment of a
customs union but atso for iimpLementing a gg44g0-pg!fgy-in-!!g-!ig!d
g1-gl!gllg!-!Cgdg' (ArtìcLe 111 (1)). In fact, Community competences
in this fieLd have graduatty deveLoped and diversified: the estabtish-
ment of the common externaI tarift, partic'ipation in muLtinationaI trade
The theme of the internationaI economic retations of the Union is atso
devetoped (exc[uding the pureLy commerciaI aspect) in Mr PRAG's work'ing
document (PE 80.381 )
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negotiations (GATT), signature of association agreements (Mediterranean
countries) and of economic cooperation agreements (Canada), signature of
specific internationaI agreements (muttifibre), commencement of harmoni-
zation of certain instruments of commerciaI poLicy (export credits).
77. Even if real probtems stitt exist (the
lation and the maintenance of nationaI
countries), the European Community has
lfgdfng_SXSlgU rhich has enabLed it to
foremost rlortd tradìng power.
harmonization of customs Legis-
quotas in retation to certain
been abte to create a ggq4g!
assert ìts position as the
78. It is ctear however that it has not succeeded in entisting thìs strength
on behal.f of a ggnglng common ggpgglgie!_SlfglggX adapted to the modern
situation in 'internationaI trade; there is hardty any cooperation as
regards the active promotion of exports of the varìous Member States
and the faiture of the European Export Bank has clearLy shoun the
hesitancy on the part of the ftlember States in this fìeLd; above a[1,
the EEC p[ays practicaLLy no part in the devetopment of the major inter-
nationat cooperatìon agreements concLuded by trlember States, each on its
ogn behaIf" and reLating particutarLy to their energy suppIies and to theìr
industriaI activi ties.
79. r Theretore, the task of the Union with regard to commercìaL poticy wìLt
I
, be tuofold:
on the one hand, rapidLy to establish common trade eglg4gggg1lS by
using methods anaLogous to those advocated above for the compLetion
of the system of internaL freedom of movement (see paragraphs 48 and
49);
l- on the other, to start to develop a genuine common commerciat pgllgy
I
r !{hich organizes the cooperation of the ttlember States in g!! sectors oI
I internatìonaI economic retations in which this proves to be profitabIe:
II it is therefore necessary to state clearty the fiel-d of competence of
I
, the union in this fietd, to adopt Legislativety the broad Iines of the
I
, 
measures envisaged and to entrust the executive body with their admini-
I st rat i on.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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B. THE CARRYING OUT OF COMMON SECTORAL E9tIqIE§
80. The unification of the economìc area of the Union is necessary but not
sufficient. It must aLso provide a basis for the devetopment of ggliyg
gggpglgligg betueen economic operators in the various countries. This
cooperation takes the form of ggg4g1_pglLglgs to be carried out in aLI
sectors in uhich the Community dimension makes nationaL measures more
effect i ve.
81. Five major sectors ìn which the Union shouLd pursue or initiate such
poticies may be distinguished:
- energy;
- research/deveIopment/ innovat'ion;
- industry/technotogy;
t ransport / te Lecommuni cat i ons;
agri cuLturel
1. Energx
8?. Thirty years after the sìgnature of the
the beginning of the oiI crisis, there
aLthough the nature and the seriousness
on the contrary, a poLicy wh'ich should
ECSC Treaty and ten years after
is stiLI no common energy po[ìcy,
of the energy problem make it,
take pglggity for Europe.
83. The original cause of this situation is the fact that the Treaties do
not provide for ely_gqngle!_ggqegleOge-q1_lhg-9gOqgOflX'in this fieLd;
this gap has been made worse by the faìture of the Commission to take
steps; the Comm'ission has been unable to propose in due time the
necessary basic reguLations to create a comprehensive Community poLicy;
the ltlember States, which uere put under pressure and taken by surprise
by the crisis, formutated, rlith difficuLty, different or even divergent
national. poLicies without reference to common soLidarity or interests.
lThe other common poLicies of the Union which are not tinked to a specifìc
economic sector (regiona[, sociaL, envìronmentaI and cuLturaL poticy) are
anatysed in Mr Pfennig's working document on'poLicy for society' (PE 80.245).
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r,4 
- lhe Cornnun iU ttalg1pg1y i s there'l ()rr. \/(,r y t imi ted
- ggg! : since the crcatìon of the intcrnat market, achievements have
been Iimited to financiaL aid (for coking coat, 'tor research and for
certain forms of investnent); trade outside the Community remains
to a great extent under the sote jurisdictlon of the trlember States;
no conmon strategy corresponding to the ney market conditions has
been determined and specific proposats for common action are stagnating
in the Councìt (contingency reserves, coal exchanges for poyer stations,
and so forth).
- lgglgg!_qlglgI : the activities of EURATom are stitl. totatty marginaI
to the devetopment of the nuclear potential. of the llember States except
for the (considerabLe) aid to the financing of investments thich have
not however had any coordinating effect; certain Community competences,,
aLthough formal.ty Laid dovn in the Treaties, have been Iittte exercised
or not at att because of the hesitancy of certain Member States
(particutarty as regards controI and suppl.ies); a modest aid programme
for uranium prospecting has not had any noticeabIe effect;
- g!!_Ald_!e!glg!_ge§ : numerous stud'ies made and resotut.ions adopted
s'ince 1973 have been unabte to organize comprehensive common action
to deal uith externaI pressure, which has however been dramatic;
dect.arations of sotidarity at a poLiticaI Levet, have not Led to any
Coormunity poticies rith regard to suppt'ies, prìces or the use of the;e
fuets. lf there rere a fresh oiI crisis the Member States routd be as
Lacking irr common means of defence and adaptation as they uere in'1973.
- !g!_gtglgy_:9Ct!g§-qnq-90eg9y:§eyl0g : irr the ahsence of common
strategies in this sector, which triLL be cruciaL rith regard to the
future energy situation in the Community, some specific measures have
been taken with great difficuLty with tlre airn of supporting natior rI
financrng efforts in certain sectors (prìvate and'demonstration'
projects); the decision-making procedure used in this ìnstance
(unanimous the majority votes by the CounciL at each stage of the
grant of this aid and rigid imposition of ceitings on toans) augurs
il.I for the effectiveness of these neu measures.
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85. I It is ctear that the Cornnunity'patrinony' in the energy sector qgg§
I nqt_!herelsre_ssn§!t!s!g-en-sdesss!9-9as!s-e!-eg!ien-!er_gh9_Uo!9!.l---------I This is a typical case in uhich a Eyisig!_91_!be_It9e!!gs is
I
i necessary so as to estabtish ctearty the Legitinacy and the principte
l of the gg0g!rcogg of the union in the rhote scctor to deLinit the
I areas of excLusive and concurrent coìpetences, to organize the de-
I
r tailed rays and means of the coiilon policy to be inptemented and to
t
i determine the responsibiLities for taking initiatives, decision-
I making and administration of the various Institutions"
I
I
r 0n these pol.itical foundations, once they have been taid, it rit[
I
1 be possible actuatty to irnplenent, graduaU,y but according to ptan,
rl
i the various aspects of an 'energy strategyil for the Union. 0n this
I netr basis the Union yitL be abLe to deat yith the financing probLems
I
t (by means of the budget or toans), of coordination yith other policies
I
r (industriat, research and commerciaL) and of rvarying participation'
II (see paragraph 26 above) from one l{cmber State to another, and so
I
, forth.
2. Eggeecsh.-deyelgeoeo!/iEngye!is!
87. one hesitates to state that there is a'common research policy',
stitl. tess a'common devetopment poIicyr. Expressed in financiat
terms, Community activities in this sector represent onty 1.51 ot
the totaL publ.ic expenditure of the fllember States and on[y 16I of the
appropriations rhich they atlocate to internationaI cooperation in the
fietd or .esea.chZ. These activrities are concentrated in the energy
sector (727,), in particutar the nuctear energy sector, the industriat
sector «9ll), the environment sector (8I) and the rau materiats sector
(2',1) 
.
lSee the [tlemorandum of the Commission of the European Communities drarn upin 1981 in connection vith the mandate ( devetopment of an energy strategyfor the Community ).
Zsee the lrlemorandum of the Commìssion of the European Communities drarn upin 1981 in connection vith the mandate ( scientific and technotogicat researchin the Conmunity - proposats for the 1980's)
86.
- 
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88. Although it is an objective of the Euratom Treaty which takes priority 
(Article 2>, only the ECSC Treaty lays down detailed rules for financia 
aid to research. B~!~!r£b_i§_OQ!_m~o!i20~9_io_!b~-~~£-Ir~!!~ (except 
by reference to the agricultural sector, Article 41) and it was not unt· 
1974 that a very general Council resolutionf made it legitimate, on the 
basis of Article 235, to formulate specific, limited measures, as shown 
by the figures quoted above. 
89. In this sector one is therefore confronted with a situation analogous 
to that of energy: !b~_1!f~_Qf_!_9~0~r!!_!~9!1_Q!ii!_!o9_!b~-b~!i!20f~· 
gf_~~mQ~r_§!!!~! genuinely to take part in common action; however, 
research, in the same way as energy, constitutes one of the conditions 
for economic progress, the advantage and even the need for cooperation 
are just as clear in this case, as all the official statements have, 
moreover, acknowleged, and the procedure for common action does not 
seem to present insurmountable difficulties. 
90. ~ in the energy sector, the prerequisite for a genuine common policy 
of the Union in the field of research is a r~~i!iQO_Qf_!b~_Ir~!!i~§ and 
the adoption of a fresh 1~9i!1!!i~~-fr!m~~Qr~: this common action must, 
on the one hand, be made legitimate and its authority established and, 
on the other, the tasks and competences must be clearly divided between 
the Member States and the Union; finally, it is necessary to ensure 
that the competences conferred upon the Union are exercised in accordanc 
with rapid, effective procedures. 
91. On this basis it will be possible progressively to establish a genuine 
'European scientific area' in which the Union will provide information, 
guide and coordinate activities and provide corresponding financial 
support. 
L. 
1It should be noted that this resolution provided that no field of action 
concerning science and technology may be excluded a priori. 
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3. IEds§!rv-snd-!qshns!ggy
92. At Community Level, industriat poLicy may be defined as g!!_gggsgrc§
encouraging the organization and operation of industry on a European
sca[e; these measures may be grouped together as foILoys:
- creation of the rCommunity industriaI arear (internaL market, competition,
pubLic contracts, etc.);
- deveLopment of appLied research and technotogy;
- common commerciaL poLicy for the import/export of industriaL products;
- taking into account industriaL requirements ìn regìonal and social
poLicies;
93.
- gglj.gn with regard to production strategies and structùres.
Atthough this generic concept of industriaL poticy is not found anywhere
in the Treaties, a more or Less express Legat baéis may be found therein
for each of the components Listed above, with the notable exception of
àction wìth regard to production and structu.".1.
The actuaL ìmpLementation of an gyele!!_i0dgSgCle!_peligy is stiLL at
the drafting stage: the various poLìcies rrhich might be included in it
are incomptete and it ìs not envisaged that they yiLL be combined for
industriaI purposes. Above at[, active and direct intervent'ion by the
Communìty in industriaL activities is strongLy contested by certain
Member States for reasons based both on economic doctrine and on economic
nationatism.
For this reason lhg_qg44g3ily-pelligg4y in the fieLd of industriaI
poLicy in the strict sense is timited to a few specific measures in the
data processing, textiLe, and boot and shoe sectors, and so forth, which
are moreover chiefLy intended to promote research in these sectors. It
is moreover tretL-known that a proposaI for a reguLation on Community
intervention in the reorganization and reconversion of industriat
sectors affected by the crisis (1978) ras rejected by the Councit.
1
'0nLy the ECSC Treaty provides for aid for the reconversion/reorganization
of the coat and steel industries.
94.
95.
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Community rstrategies'have, it is true, been outLined by the Commission
in certain specific sectors (textites, chemicaLs and automobìLes) but
they do not seem to have Led to actuat industrìaI cooperation projects.
96. These uncertainties are in strange contrast with the ggliggsngsg_gf_lhg
glisis which has affected Europe for 10 years or more: the distressing
Loss of whoLe industriaL sectors is accompanied by the Laborious appearance
of nerl sectors faced with the superior, agressive power and competitiveness
of Japan and the United States; the risk of deindustriatization or industriat
cotonization of the most vulnerable Member States is a threat to the whoLe
Communi ty.
97. Indgsgr!e!-es!tgy-Es§!-!herslqre be-p-pi!!er-e1-!9e!e[ie_9!te! .
98.
It riLL first of atL be necessary to establìsh the need for and the
Legitimacy of such a common potìcy, possibty by revìsion of the Treaties.
Next, it rliLL be necessary rap'idLy to strengthen the various measures
contributing to its impIementatìon, particutarl.y rthe industriaI area,.
Above a[t, it wil.[ be necessary ctearly to give the Union power to
initiate, coordinate and possib[y gìve fìnancìat assistance to supra-
nationaL gggpefglign, CggCgenttelig4 and e4elge4elien_efeiscts, r,hi Lst
observing the princip[e of subsidiarity and having regard to the autonomy
of undertakings; nationaL industriaL strategìes in the ygliggg_§gglgl§
(vhether they originate with the state or major prìvate groups) wiLt
be compared with one another and their compatibìtity/compLementarity
witL be verified. This type of action uiIL necessariLy be very ftexibte
and very varied so as to correspond to the actuaL facts of industriaL
Iife: however, it is essentiaI that genuine ggliyg_lndg§ll]e!_gggpglel1gn
lis organized at Union scaLe and under its aegis.
4. Ilsosper!-end-!s!es90Es!tse!190§
99. ArticLe 3 of the EEC Treaty provides that'the activities of the
Community shaLL include ... the adoption of a gg44gn_p9!]gy_in_!hg
§phgl9-gj-lgengpgC!'. A specific titLe of that Treatyl contains
lOnLy the agricutturaL sector is Likewise the subject of a speciaL titLe.
_ 48_ PE 83.3261fin./C-
11 articLes (ArticLes 74 to 84) vhich restate the objectives of the
formulation of a common poLicy 'appLicabte to internationat transport
to or from the territory of a Member State' and estabLish the principLes
of the openness of the l4arket and of non-discrimination (by tariffs, con-
ditions of transport or State aid); these provisions are appLicable to
transport by rai [, road , and inland waterway but may be extended to
sea and air transport.
The ECSC Treaty prchibits aLI discrimination through prices and other
conditions in the transport of coal and steel.
100. ALthough the High Authority (afterwards the Commission) has to a very
great extent succeeded in applying the provisions of the ECSC Treaty,
the same does not appLy to the Councit of the European Communities
which has not onLy faited to take gny_spggiJig_Egggglgs with a viey to
creating a common transport poticy but has onty imptemented very
partiaLLy the provisions reLating to the openìng-up of the market and
non-discriminationrlrhiIe seè.and air transport has remained atmost entireLy
outside the fietd of Community action.
101. rhìs !g!!$g-!g-gg!1 is certainLy the most spectacuIar of
aIt the shortcomings of Community integration. The reasons for it are
first of att of a tegal nature: the EEC Treaty does not lay down specific
objectives for a common transport policy (apart from the question of non-
discrimination) and its vho[e devetopment ìs dependent upon the agreement
of the CounciL, which must sometìmes be unanimousl however, they are
also of a politicaI and economic nature: the direct or indirect
invotvement of the pubLic authorities (raituay end airLine companies
and so forth), the very different chanacteristics of natìonaL situations
and systems, sectoraI protectionism and so forth.
1
'By resotution of 16 September 1982
against the CounciI for faiture to[ack of a common transport poticy.
ParLiament decided to bring an action
act (ArticLe 175) in the matter of the
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102. A common transport poLicy is hovever ctear[y an gssg!!ig!_JgC!hgC_g!g0g4!
of the unification of the European economic area: great differences
betveen or discrimination in nationaL conditions of transport may have
a more dissuasive effect on trade rithin the Community than tarìff
barriers. The transport sector has, moreover, consìderabIe economic
importance (on average 6I of the GNP of the ttlember States); ìt is an
integrat part of the production process and has a strong inftuence on
the Latterrs competitìveness; it is directty Linked to the industriaI
and agricutturat sectors vhich are or rlitI themsetves be subject to a
cornmon poLicy.
|-
103. : At the stage of Union, a common transport poticy must therefore be
I formuLated and put into effect with as much speed as is compatibLe with
] the necessary adjustments: an amendment to the Treaties may be envisaged,
| ìn particular to define preciseLy the objectives and the scope of such
I
,a policy. Houever, the institutions of the Union must above atI determine
I preciseLv the rsspgslive-sgops!gnss§-eod-Iiglds-eI-egltytly-9!-!!s-§!e!s§
I
Sqnd_the Uniqn and ensure that, once the task of the Union has been ctearLy
!aetinea, the Latter performs it diLigentLy.
Ic!ggguusnige!isns
104. The rtetecommunicationsr sector, understood here as a means of transport
of information, reLates at the same time to ctassicaI activities (post,
tetephone and so forth), to modern activities (radio, teIevision and
so forth) and to revolutionary activities (sateLIites and teLematics).
105. IhiS_Seg!et-i§_09!_Ee0!i90gd_io-!he_Irse!tqs and is onIy directty
affected by the prov'isions relating to freedom of movement and non-
discrimination (openness of pubLic contracts). The Community patrimony
merety consists of a 1980 Commission recommendation on the harmonization
of standards and the procedure for pubtìc contracts.
106. This is however a sector, wh'ich, by its very nature, is the subject of
very intense cooperation betreen the Member States and worLd-yide in
the form of bitateraL or multilateral agreements which are in some
cases very Long-standìng (for exampte, the postaI conventions);
-50- PE 83.326/tin./C.
these activities are most often controLted or administered, directLy
or indirect[y, by the nationaI authoritìes which are themsetves con-
tracting parties to these internationaI agreements.
1o7. It is remarkabte to note that !!g_§gEEg!i!r is not a preferentiat or
even a prlviLeged area as regards cooperation betyeen lrlember States;
internationaI agreements are conctuded and administered without
reference to the Community context even though the teIecommunications
betveen Member States are more intense than with the rest of the worLd
and even though the industriat aspect of these activities (infra-
structures, production of equipment and research) is considerabte
and its cutturaL iqportance (notabty tel.evision) is ctear.
1 08. t=It tlou[d therefore be advisabLe to provide for the graduaI development,
the Union, of a common tetecommunications potìcy
activities of the Member States in this fieLd
to be organized more ratìonatty and therefore more profitabty, stiLt
on the §asis of the principte of subsidiarity. An express reference
to this poticv in the lceg!y-e1-!hg-unl9E might be envisaged and, on
this basis, the union's tegislative body couLd, at the appropriate time,
draw up the generaL outLines of the cooperatìon project envisaged.
5. Agciggllgce
109. This sector has two advantages: a sotid LegaL basis (the Treaty and
regutations) and the fact that resutts of its activities are on the
uhoLe positive (food security, growth in productivity and so forth);
the achievements in this sector are considerable even if certain aspects
of them are contested. Therefore the probl.ems which arise in this
connection, as far as the union is concerned, reLate more to the
gdiggl4gn! of the poLicy rhich has been impLemented than to the
extensìon of competences.
110. These adjustments have been the subject of recent reports by the
Commission and ParLiamentl and they may therefore be referred to
nithout going into the contents.
vithin the context
vhich youtd enab[e
lResotution of Par[ìament of
agricutturaL poticy (0J No.
possibLe improvements to the common
he
of
th
17.6.1981 on
c 17?t32).
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111. In certain cases, such adjustments couLd be made rapidLy Uilhin-ghg
!raqsugr!-el-lhs-eris!ins-Essbenl§CIe-eI-!hs-qeouen-Aelisg!!sce!-Ee!isv
(control of costs and of surptus production, fixing of production targets
and making producers responsib[e for output in excess of these targets,
specìaL protection for farmers in difficuLties, taxation sf imported
oLeaginous products, and bringing agricutture in the Mediterranean
regions up to standard.
112. In other cases, on the other hand, these adjustments are Linked to
the dgye!9p4gn!-91-e!heC-pe!ig!gg uhich are at the moment onty embryonic
(improvement of production structures, devetopment of agricutturaI
exports either within the context of a common commerciaI policy or
within that of a poLicy of food aid, and devetopment of agri-foodstuffs
industries).
113. FinaLLy, in certain cases organizations of the market in certa'in
spec'ific sectors must be ggOglglgd or §g!-gp (fisheries, forests,
potatoes/atcohoL).
114. More generaLty, a Eggg-ygligd-gppfggg! and one vhich is better adapted
to the different characteristics of the various kinds of production
shoutd be taken. It is for exampLe cLear that the mitk and m.i[k products
sector (rhich has no notable externaL outtets) raises probtems which are
very different from those of the cereaLs sector (where there ìs a vast
wor[d market). It wiLt. therefore be necessary to try in particular
better to adapt European production to the wortd agricuLturaL situation
(prices, quatìty and quantity) whiLst achieving the internaL objectìves
of the CAP (Community preference, stabiLity of prices and'incomes of
producers, avai Labi Lity of suppties).
115.. It is cLear that these adjustments, aLbeit necessary, raise difficuLt
probtems for the Community and that there are no comprehens'ive nego-
tiations at present in view, which woutd enable them to be resotved.
Ihe_fe!e_end_!h9-!eg!_e!_!he_Unien ui LL be specificaIty to resotve
this situation and to make it possibte to reform and strengthen the
common agricuLturat policy uithout risking catting in question the
foundations of its achievements.
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II. THE ECONOTIIC COI{PETENCES OF THE UNION
116. Having defined the generaI outlines of the tasks which the Union witL
have to pursue or inìtiate in the economic sector, it is no!, necessary
to enquire as to the nature and extent of the gg4gglg4ggs necessary in
order to carry out these tasks.
For this purpose the foLtowing wiLL be anaLysed in turn:
- the division of fieLds of competence between the Unign-and-ttre-Ee0her
§tatet
- the respective role of the various lnsllluliqns in the exercise of
these competences.
It should however be noted that the issue of competences is anatysed
in detaiI in two other workìng documents dravn up by the Committee on
Institutionat Affairs: from the legaL point of vier in Mr De Guchtrs
document and from the institutionaI point of viey in Mr Zecchinors.
The rapporteur of this uorking document coutd therefore do no more
than restate the outlines drawn (or envisaged) by the tyo other
rapporteurs and try to situate the economic competences of the Union
yithìn them.
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A. IltE_-D_Lv_LtL0J!._0-L_LLE_L-D-t_0_[_c_0]U-qtEltc_E--B-E-tt{EEJ!.-Tl!E--ulUL0JLrUtD--TJIE-
TEEEEE-§]AIE§
117. In accordance trith the principte of subsidiarity (see paragraphs 31
to 34) the Union yì[t exercise on[y the compctenccs conferred upon
it: a[[ tasks rith rlhich it ìs not expressLy entrusted vitI
continue to come undèr the jurisdiction of the Member States.
It ìs therefore necessary to determine first of a[[ the Union's oun
Iie!d-eI-geope!eoes -
118. The variety of the economic tasks of the Union (see paragraphs 8 and
25) means that the Union shoutd have, in order to exercise its com-
petences, many different means of actìon trhich in particutar corres-
pond to the different degrees of integration in the sectors concerned.
It v'i[[ therefore be necessary, secondty, to specify the various
plgggdgtgs by vhich the Union may glgggise its competences.
1. Ihe-!nienls-Iie!d-eI-eeqpe!!nee
119. The principle of subsidiarity ìs the basis for the definition of the
overatl porers of the Union but it atso enabtes the extent of the
mutuaI competences of the Unìon and of the Member States to be
measured in the various sectors of activity.
120. In fact, according to the sector ìn question, the Union riLI have pouer:
- either to act alone (rexclusiver competence)
- or to act in cooperation with the Member States (rconcurrentr competence)
- or to take no action as long as its competence has not been estabLished
('potentiat' competence).
0n the basis of this threefold distinction, an attempt may be made
to determine the nature of the competences of the Union vhich are
necessary in order to carry out the various economic tasks Iisted in
Part I of this documentl.
T-------------
'This classification is at this stage onty intended to be an indication and an
itLustration: it uitl. be necessary to decide later on yhether it is appropriate
to drar up a methodicaI catalogue of the various competences.
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(a) grg!s§lyg-sggpe!9as99
121. There are fieLds in which in order for action to be effectìve the
union must act instead of the trlember states, in other words it
must itseIf take the necessary decisions which uiLl. subsequentty
be imptemented by the Member states. These are generaL[y fietds
in uhich it is essentiaI that the rules or activities shoutd be
uniform or those in vhich integration has reached a stage at rhich
they must be managed at Union teveL.
The fotLoring fieLds might be involved:
122. . ffge_ngy94g0!-9l_gggdga_pgCggng_e1g_9eptle!: the Union must have
exclusive competence tlith regard to atI measures concerning the
openness of the internaI market, even uhere those measures have
repercussions on the nationaI economic activity of the llember
States (for exampLe technicat and pubLic heaLth standards); this
pover to adopt legjslation in no ray prevents the union from
taking into account special. difficuLties in certain sectors
(openness of nationaI civiL services or nationaL measures of
exchange controt caused by the present shortcomings of the EMS).
This exclusive competence seems in fact to be the onLy means of
guaranteeing genuine and lasting market unity: despite 25 years
of effort, the community has onty obtained unsatisfactory, poor
resuLts owing to the resistance or passivity of the nationaI
authorities.
123. gg4pgllllg4_pgllgy: it is advisab[e for aU. tegistation on
competition (retating to the private and pubLic sectors) to be
entrusted exclusivety to the Institutions of the union, since
experience has shorn that Legistation which Has too ìncompIete
or too generaI vas not sufficientty effective. The ìmpLementation
of the sole legistation of the Union may be gradual so as to aLloy
economic operators to adjust themse[ves to it.
ggg4g1_gg44glglg!_pgligt: the regutation of trade outside the
community riLL be under the exctusive jurisdìction of the Union;
this concerns not onty customs duties and tariff quotas but atso
the mechanisms Iinked to internationaI trade such as commerciaI
1?4.
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credits, guarantees and insurance, insofar as these mechanisms might
distort the conditions of competit'ion between Member States.
InternationaI comnerciat negotiations viLL be exclusiveLy conducted by
the instltutionr of the union rhich wiLl. aLso be responsible for signìng
or ratifying agreements on behal.f of the Member States; the Union ritI
represent and bind the trlember States at internationat meet'ings or orga-
nizations of a commerc'iaL nature.
1?5. . 9tse0l.ze!1gn-e1-!h9-esclgg!!gre!-!end-!igheriesl-qeCle!S: the excIusive
nature of the competences of the Union in this fiel.d'is dictated by the
Community tegìslation atready adopted as much as by the principte of sub-
sidiarity. The present state of integration of the agricutturaL markets
as rleLI as the results xhich have been obtained lead to strengthening and
confirming the unity of actìon of the Member States through the Union;
this strengthening xitI moreover enabte the prevention of any setbacks to
'integration in the form of nationaL unitateraI measures adopted for the
occasìon.
(b) ggnggtrg!!-g9qpq!9n999
126. In [g:!_e_1oj1o]Lr_c_ sgg!gl:, the union must onLy glqgg the competences and
decision-making pohrer with the Member States: the resuLt of the princ'ip[e
of effectiveness witL in fact be that a considerabte proportion of economic
responsibiLities wiLL be Ieft at State Leve[ (or possìbLy regìona[) whiIst
the Union exercises the generaL functions of guidance and/or controts certain
aspects onty of the activitìes in questìon.
The fields in wh'ich these concurrent competences witI be exercised might be
as fotlows:
127. . !ege!_ICe4elgg!_91_gndef!e!ing:: the Union ri[[ draw up a speciat statute
for'European undertakings' (which may be used for fore'ign companies) which
uitL form an optiona[ [ega[ framework for firms wishing to operate at
European leve[; ìt witI proceed with the harmonization of certain provisions
of nationat economic tegisLation (commercia[ [aw, tax Law, the Lan of indus-
triaI property and so forth) ìnsofar as such harmonization can faciLitate
cooperation and trade and equatize conditìons of competition.
§!9l!:!gIq_999098j.9-p9!tgy: the Union witt have pol,er
convergence of the macro-economic regutatory poticìes
to promote the
(budgetary poIi cy,
PE 8s.326/ f in./c.
128.
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credit and prices poLicy) of the ltlember States by establishing short or medium-term
(quantified) objectives; its permanent task yiLL be to assess the compatibil-ity of
nationaL short-term economic poticies with these common objectives; it witL be abLe
to make any budgetary or financiat support yhìch it gìves subject to adherence to
the common guidelines. t{ithin these limits, and as long as they observe the prin-
cip[e of non-discrimination, the ttlember States wiLL retain controt of the instruments
of economic poIicy.
09!g!egy_pe!igX-!E[§l: in this fietd the Union wiLI exercise a partial but deve-
Loping competence; as the Ettls is Iinstitutionalized', certain instruments and
mechanisms of monetary pol.icy (reserves, ECU, interventions in respect of the
currencies of third countries) wiLt be managed jointty at Union leveL; the finaI
objective, which it witL be possibLe to achieve fotlowing a series of automatìc,
irreversibte stages, witt be that of advanced unity which may go so far as the
creat'ion of a genuine common currency whìch is excLusive or paraLLeI to the
nationaI currencies.
lfOgngie!_pgligy: the Union wi[[ develop its own tending and b-rrowing activities
ulith the aim of financing certain specific common poL'icies (in particu[ar the en-
couragement of productive investments); this deveIopment witt necessrtate greater
cooperation between the nationaL pubtic financing bod'ies and some transfer of their
transactions to the leveI of the speciaLìzed'institutions of the Union.
gllggne!-ggglgqig-IglglignS: (exctuding pure[y commerciaI relations, see paragraph
124 above): the Union riLL pLay an increased role in the fieLd of economic coope-
ration vith third countries, particutarLy insofar as this cooperation is an exten-
sion of the common internat policies of the Union (energy,'industry, agricutture and
so forth); it w'iLL be able for example to encourage outtìne cooperation agreements
between the Union and certain major States or groups of States and ensure that
speciaL agreements signed by Member States are in accordance with those guideLines.
Uttimatety, the Union may have sote power to sign certain types of agreements.
gAgIgY: an overatI competence wiLt be conferred upon the Union in the fieLd of
energy policy, but it wiLI be exercised according to rules which riLL vary from one
sector to another as to the degree to Hhich they are specific and binding (coa[,
nuctear energy, oit and so forth) and from one problem to another (exploration,
expLoitation, reserves, energy-saving and so forth); this is one of the cases'in
which the princìpLe of subsidìarity must be apptied pragmat'ica[[y, the Union chiefLy
performing a coordinating function but having the power to take common action in
certain cases.
t.
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1 33. Igggglqh: the Union nust atso have a comprehensive competence in this sector and per
form a generat function of coordination of the nationat programmes. Houever the Unic
uitI a[so have porer to initiate specifìc programmes, controL their progress and pro-
vide part of the finance for them, especiat[y rhere they exceed scientìfic or financì
means at national Levet; the Union vi[[ atso be abLe directLy to administer speciatiz
research centres uhere this proves to be more effective.
lnd_u§lly: the Union yi Ll. f irst of aLI have a uide or exclusive competence to create
the common'industriat area'1 for this purpose it wiLt, as far as necessary, harmoniz
the IegaI framevork (internat market, competition, pubLic contracts, taxation and so
forth). It tritL however also have power to develop an active industriat poticy, in
other words to initiate or coordinate common action by the Member States or industrie
groups in retation to invgstment, production or reorgan'izat'ion strategies; uItimate[)
the Union uiLl. be able to draw up, by major industriat sectors, cooperatìon ptans uhi
witL provide points of reference for nationaI operators.
lleAspg1!: the Unionrs competence, uhich has atready been taid down and even prog-
rammed in the EEC Treaty, must be confirmed, specified and extended to the sea and ai
sectors. In addition to the issues of harmonization and n-r-discrìm'ination which comr
within the exclusive competence of the Union (see above, internaI market), the Union
witt have pouer to coord'inate infrastructure poticies and potìr,es for the regutatior
of traffic betreen ftlember States and in retation to third countries; it wi[[ be abLe
to devetop and give financiaI assistance to specìfic projects of common interest on
the basis of overatI or specia[ plans and programmes.
134.
135.
136. lglgggq4g1iggligOg: the Union witI exercise a competence analagous to those Iaid dor
ìn respect of the industriat and transport sectors; the openness of nationaL pubLic
contracts wiLt be particularly necessary in this case. In the same uay, it wi[t be
ab[e to initiate or participate in common programmes in certain peak sectors.
137. . qgllggllggg: the agricutturaL ggidgOgg poticy remains b,ithin the joint competence of
the Union and the Member States but the Union rì[[ have more direct means of giv'ing
incentive to nationaI reorganization measures, for exampte by tinking guarantee
mechanisms to the conversion/adaptation of production structures in accordance rith
common guideIines.
(c) p9!s!!1n!-geEsE!go9e§
138. In certain fieLds the uttimate conferring upon the
may be envisaged but this must be the subject of a
tives of the governments (possib[y of the European
By the very nature of the Union, there are houever
faLt, even for an interim period, outside at [east
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Union of more extensive competences
specìaI decision by the representa-
Counci L) at the appropriate tìme.
very few economic sgglgls uhich coul
its partiaI competence.
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139. It might however be envisaged that after a certain period of time the Union shouLd
acquire, in some sectors, a dj.fgg!-Cggglglgty-ggqpglgggg where the size of the probtems
is such that totaL unìty of action by ftlember States is ctearty desirabte.
This competence coutd be exercised by SggngfgS Linked to the Community executive
body but exercising their act'ivities autonomousLy under the controL of the
Union's poL'iticaI authorìty. Such Agencies might be set up in the transport,
teLecommunications, aircraft, space and nuctear sectors, for exampte.
?. 9e!er!ed-cs!es-1er-!he-erergise-e1-!he-Unrqnls-sqEpe!s!ee
140. It is essentiaL that there be a variety of suitable means of action correspondìng to
the different types of competence of the Union in the economic fieLd. It is not a
matter of legaI categories but of gglgg!_plgggdglgs whìch uitL enabte the Union to ptay
a more or less dìrect and complete part ìn the various sectors.
141. BriefLy Listed by ascending order of integratìon, those means wiLt be as fottows:
(a) glglgpgg-91_inlglqglj.gn between the Union and the Member States and among the
Member States themsetves: it must be a matter of course'in atI sectors in which
the Union has any competence at at[;
{b) lgqAg!_ggnsglleligng: expIanations and comparative assessment of intended nationaI
measures;
(c) gggq!!09!19!: formaL consuttations with the aim of making nationat measures com-
patibte and complementary;
(d) gggpgggllgn: advance fixing of a common objective and active coordination of
nationaI measures with the aim of achieving it; if necessary, the Union may share
in financìng;
(e) common_ggllgn: the carry'ing-out by the Member States of spec'ific timited action
decided at Union Levet; the Union may share in financing or exctusive[y finance i'
(f) ggqqg4_pglj.gy: carryìng-out by the Member States of a series of coordinated actì-
vìties decided by the Union; appLication of the principtes/rutes fixed by the Unìon;
the Union may share in financing or exclusivety finance it;
(g) dffeg!-C9!l9n/p9!igX-gI-!hg-9nj.gn: formutated, carried out and financed by the
Iatter with its ovn means (institutìons, staff and budget).
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14?. Apart from these cLassicaI means for the exercise of its competence, the Union
might envisage !19-ngl_!ypg§_gI-eg!lyl!y which are more fLexibl.e and therefore
LikeLy to be better adapted to specifìc circumstances:
143. l1!gfib!gl-gg!!gn or action in which the particìpation of the ttlember States
varies (see paragraph 26 above): the Union yiLL be able to take part in
certain activities or pot'icies in which one or severat tllember States uitI
however be unab[e to particìpate or uliLt particìpate at different tevets
because of serious objective difficutties. This action ulou[d remain fuLty
integrated withìn the institutionaI and decision-making frameuork of the
Union; it rou[d be exceptionaI and temporary; the ftlember States which were
not partìcipating would undertake to join the others yithin an agreed period
and utoutd, in the meantime, refrain from adopting any measures incompatibIe
vith the smooth functioning of the 'ftexib[e actiont.
lEeLatedl_Aglign: the Union rliLL be abte to authorize and, if necessary,join in European or internationaI ventures undertaken by certain ltlember
States outside the strict tegaI framework of the Union (for exampte,
Ariane, Airbus, CERN and so forth) (see para.34 above) insofar as that
action does not repLace a formal competence of the Union; if the common
interest and theprìncipLe of subsidiarity justify it, that action may
subsequentLy be integrated in a common poticy of the Union.
Houever, it is necessary carefuIty to appraìse yhether it is appropriate
to make a distinction between these trro types of action as neu !ggg!
gglgggllg§; it may in fact prove preferabLe to use generaL provisions
(perhaps modetted on Articte 235 of the EEC Treaty) for this purpose.
144.
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B. DMSION 0F PoI,ERS BETWEEN-IHE
-;-------- IN§IIIUIIqN§-9E.IEE-UNI9N
145. t|t.ithout prejud'ice to the LegaL and institutionat structure which
wiLL be proposed by the other committee rapporteurs, it may be
useful. to anticipate the generaI framework of the diy]gfgO-9l-P9!9t§
betyeen the executive body and the legislative body as regards
the exercise of the economic competences of the Union.
146. As stated above (paragraphs 22 and 23), present Community orga-
nization Lacks the necessary dynamism and effectiveness to carry
out more numerous, boLder and more extensive economic tasks and
to ensure that this ìs done rapidLy and permanent[y.
14?. A fresh decision-making procedure is therefore proposed beLor
which emphasizes the poLitìcaI function of the !gg!9!g!iye-DgdU
and the 'governmentatr rote of the qlqqqltyg-bgqY.
1. Peuers-eI-!he-!egis!elrve-bedv
148. This body must perform a pure[y poLiticaI function centred around
the concept of authorization and controL; it must:
(a) destde_lhe_genela!_IUle§ - for exampLe in the form of 'outtine
[egistation' - which define the objectives and the means of
action/poIic'ies to be foLtouled. These rules may be more
specific in the case of new poticies (for examp[e, energy)
or where the subject-matter is of particutar poLiticaI
importance (for examp[e the EMS). This rote is performed
chiefty ìn the fieIds of 'concurrent competences'.
(b) 99!!I9!_!he-r4p!eqen!e!ien-91-!!9§9_tg!es by the executive
body and particuLar[y ensure that the objectives and the
decisions impLementing them are inconformity wìth one
another. For this purpose the Legislat'ive body may have
the fotlowìng:
. a poHer of veto over the 'implementìng decisibns (and,
by tray of except'ion, a right to subst'itute itself for
the executive body);
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. a poh,er of potiticat sanction (censure) over the executive
body.
?. Beuecs-eI-!!e-erses!i.ve-ledx
149. This body must be the reat 'government'of the Union, in other
words the authority which frames and proposes the generaI outLines
of poticies and ensures as a vhote that they are'imptemented by
v'irtue of wide autonomy of action; it must therefore:
{a) Qgq!!_e0d_ptqp9§9_!h9_99!qlq!_Ig!gs for the tesistative
body (in certain cases, the Latter may have its ovn pouJer
of initiative) - chiefty in the fietds of rconcurrent
competences' .
{b) !Ap!gq9!!_!hqsq_Ig!gs by vìrtue of its own autonomous
decisìon-mak'ing pouer. In the fieLds of'excLusive
competences', the freedom of action of the executive
body 'is partì cutar[y extensìve (for exampLe, internaI
market and commerciaL poticy) and it 'is not necessarity
Linked to rules of the Legìstative body.
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CONCLUS IONS
150. The purpose of this working document has therefore been to outline the economic
tasks and competences of the Union.
A ctear need has emerged from this anaLysisr 25 years after the signing of the
Treaty of Rome, for the Community's economic machinery to be adapted to the ner
nature and demands of the wortd economy; it ìs atso ctear that, because of
the grave difficuLties now facìng the European economy, this adaptation witI
have to be as far-reaching and rapìd as possibte.
ALL this involves, on the one hand the revivaL, reorientation, or creation of
sectorat poticies with a view to a more votuntarist and more diversified approach
to the probtems under consideration.
Houever, changes to the dgg!gj.gn:Eg!!!g process, trithin a
framework, aIso seem necessary; the rapporteur therefore
going uiLL heLp the Committee on InstitutionaL Affairs in
the constitutionaL fie[d proper.
new 1q9!1!y!!ene!
hopes that the afore-
its cons'ideration of
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1.
I.
§enera!-ssrysr
The six draft reports dea[, rith varying emphasis, rìth the po1iticat
substance and the institutions of the future Union. A summary of these
documents contained in a general report riLL then give the overal.L vjew
of the proposaL submitted by the Committee on InstitutionaL Affaìrs.
This summary is necessary because it provides the required connection
between opinions on substance and institutions. This connection is
again essentiaL for severaI reasons:
(a) trle cannot expect Community citizens to enthuse about a purely institu-
tionaL project or support it rithout knoring rhat poLicìes, and
the substance thereof, uiLL be implemented by institutiqtof the
future Union. This connection bettreen institutions and poticies
-works both ways. l'lìthout poticies to be impLemented there is no
need folinstitutions, trhi Le the poLicies cannot be impLemented
u,ithout eff icient institutions.
(b) A further reason for the need to describe the substance of the
aims of the union, and here, in particuLar, its objectives reLatìng
to poticy for society, may be found in the negative manner in
which proposaLs for closer cooperation betyeen the nations of Europe
have hitherto been promoted: it has aLrays been submitted that
Europe must face up to old and neu chatlenges: threats from the
East, partnership with the USA, techno[ogicaI and economic competition
from the USA and Japan, from the newLy-industriaLized nations and
even from Third bJorld countries. Even the rcason given, that a
Europe capabLe of spcaking rith one voìce gains in pouer and importance
is an eLement of reaction to chaLLenges originating outside Europe.
This negative description cannot suffice as an incentive for creating a
European Union. If our citizens are to be yon over to the union.
cause, they have a rìght to knov the vatues and objectives which
wiLL be given priority in this Europe.
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The criticisms and the frequentLy effusive professions of fa'ith
ìn Europe may be assessed aga'inst a positive descriptìon of the
future Un'ion. t.le may hope to be abte to put an end to a certain
dìsingenuousness on the part of poL'iticaL powers jn the Member States
in this way.
(c) Nonethetess, we must admìt that a pos'itive description of the poLicies
aspired to cannot incLude many practicaI detaiLs if ìt is seen
as part of a venture designed to result in the drafting of a text
whìch could serve as a constitution. Concrete poLìcies can only
be described by the'institutjons set up on the basis of the poHers
aLtotted to them. ALthough the deLineation of powers must therefore
of necessity remaìn brief and abstract, the background documents
used ìn drafting the text of the constitution must cLearLy show
the image which the authors have of the Union. In the concise
and clear draft constitution to be drawn up, the definitions of
poLiticaL objectives wi tl. be set out prìncipaILy in the peambLe,
the- introductory articLes and the articles setting out the Various
competences.
The theme of a poLicy for society'is - together with that of economic
pol.icy - the most s'uitabLe for demonstrating what the future Europe wi LL Look L'ike.
The image which arose in l,lestern Europe durìng the EnLightenment of the
State as a free, constitutionatr partiamentary democracy is the common
poLiticaL Legacy of the democracies whìch have evoLved in Europe and the USA.
Their basis was and remains the conviction that every ìnd'iv'iduaL has
invioLabLe and inaLienabte basic rights. The fundamentaL expressions of these
are human dignity, the right to tite, treedom from bodi[y harm and pro-
tection from arbitrary decisìons by the State, the free deveLopment of
personaLity, equatity before the taw, freedom of speech, opinion, beLief
and reLigìon, the right of assembLy and associat'ion, the right to ol,n
property, freedom of movement and the rìght to a fair triaL. From the
recognition of these freedoms derivès the ob[ìgation of each indiv'iduaL and
the obLigatìon of the commun'ity to enabLe everyone to ['ive a decent'Life, an
obLigation whiclrrsince the tast century, has been attributed to the State
to a greater extent in Europe than in the USA. Freedom from need and from
De.-Lhw.-/'ip - 66- PE 83 .326/ f in. / C.
10
fear neverthetess was and remains simiLarr.y the aim and basis of
4
denocracy' .
The above vaLues are at the heart of the conmon basic conviction of
the citizens of the European Union. The different emphases and forms
given to them in the programmes of the potiticaL forces is an expression
of pIuraLism, democratic Legitimation, the instìtutionaL division
of powers and the recognition of the majority principLe jn the race
for the spirituaI and poLiticaI Leadership of society.
Common to a[[ these programmes is that they have extended the concept
of freedom from fear to the whoLe of l,lestern Europe with the support
of their citizens. In other words, the association of the trlember Statesjn the Union guarantees peace between them and is based on the renunciation
of any armed aggress'ion. At the same t'ime, it offers atL European countrìes
the opportunìty to accede if they accept the union's values. cLoseLy
connected with that is the conviction that in future the common vatues
can onLy be reatized wjthin the franerork of a European Union.
A new po[itica[ va[ue in the European Union, the concept of federation,
has thus been added to the conventional vaLues of democracy as understood
in l{estern Europe and North America. Linked to it is the concept that
the citizenrs freedom, atrareness of performance and responsibiIity shoutd
devetop in a Union which provid:s ansbrers throughout its tcrritony to the new
economic and socia[ Jatlenges existing ìn aLL the tlcmber States. The.Europear
union a[so has the opportunity to ensure that it is recognized by the
peopte Iiving within its borders by virtue of the fact that it opens
up netr avenues of sociaL peace and sociaL justice throughout the Union.
The objective is an internaLLy and externaLLy peacefut society of free,
responsibLe peopLe enjoying equat opportunities and actìng together
in a democratic European Union.
1
' see the PreambLe to the US constitutjon: ,promote generaL prosperìty,
maintain the bLessings of freedomr and the Four Pojnt Dectaration
made by Presìdent RooseveLt jn 1941
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In the Long term the Un'ion can onLy achieve internaL peace if it
ensures that tiving conditions are more or Less comparabLe in aLL the
Member States. t.lhere the t{ember Statesror areas thereof, are capabLe of
act'ing effectiveLy, they shouLd take on this task. tthere the performance
of the areas - LocaL authoritics, district associations, regions - and
then of the Member States is inadequate, the Union must assist (subsidiarity
principLel
The spheres in which this viLL be necessary are described betow.
They form the constitutionaL frameuork for a future Union poLicy. The
sectors are sociaL affairs, regionaL poticy, environment, consumer
protection, education 66( research and cuIturaI affairs.
In each case, after the description of the positive objectives
which wi[[ be set out in the specific fieLds below, it must aLso be
demonstrated why the objectives described can only - or more efficientLy -
be carried out at the LeveL of the Unjon as a whoLerand uhy a corresponding
division of competences between the Union, the Member States and
subordinate LeveLs (for exampLe, regions) is proposed. Since ue yish to
draw up as brief and as cLear a draft constjtution as poss'ibte, we must
pLace the emphasis for the fieLd of policy for society in the description
of the objectives. A very detaiLed description of how these objectives triIL
be transtated into concrete policy cannot be given here, as is the case,
for example, in the existing Treaties for the areas of coal and steet,
agricuLture, transport and nuctea'r energy. 0n the one hand, this uoutd
invoLve a mixture of constitutìonaL norms and ìndividuaL practicaL provisions
as'is typicaL, moreover, of the existing Treaties - and on the other,
it wouLd be impossibLe to comp[y with the requirement to be cLear and concise
There must aLso be a certain amount of flexibitity, since the text must be
such that active poLicies can be pursued w'ithin this framework for some time
to come.
12
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2. Qefloi!l.en-eI-!he-!ecui_lee!!gx-Ier_gsgielx,
The term rsocietyr cannot be defined in the traditionaI sense.
It can therefore onty be evolved and described and not be arbitrarìty
fixed for the sake of supposed ctarityl. If by'poLicy'we understand
a conscious infIuencing or directing of sociat processes, then.it becomes
ctear that even the compound'poticy for societyr cannot be terminotog.icatLy
def i ned.
Recognizing the need to approach it by description, we may take
one of severaL starting points:
The Tindemans repo.tz states that Europe 'must bui [d a type of
soc'iety which is ours a[one and vhich refLects the vaLues whìch are
the heritage and the common creation of our peopLes'. Some Later paragraphs
set out 'in greater detajL what. form the rminìmum consensus of opinìon
beth,een the democratic forces 'in Europe on the nature of the changes
required'hJiLt takgrbut in the context of the task we have undertaken
here, th'is seems too aLt-embracìng.
It therefore appears necessary to break down the termrpol.icy for
societyrinto subdivisions which are normaLLy subsumed in it. These
individuaI poLicies wi LL therefore be considered in as systematic a
manner as possibte. The sum thereof, with aLL the detaiLs il,tustrated,
can be rega rded as ' po L'i cy f or soc i ety' .
Theodor tl. Adorno in rEvangeLisches staatstexikon', Kunst, Herzog,
SchneemeIcher (Ed.) Second Edition, 1915
2 
,uLLetin of the European Communit.ies, SuppLemen t 1fi6rp.1?
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II.
1.
ASIc FRAIUIEWORK AND OBJ ECTI
Iraoeugr!
- The European Union is the democratic, constitutionaL and sociaI
federation of the states indissoLubty united in the Union with
a corresponding constitutionaI system.
- The subsidiarity princip[e impLies on the one hand'that the
Union shaLL onty undertake those tasks whìch can be executed
more effectiveLy in common than by the tlember States separate[y,
or those, the executìon of whìch requires a contribution from
the Union', and on the other tthat the Union shaLL act onl.y'in
cIearLy deLineated areas'1.
rThe Community patrìmony - comprising the exist'ing tars and poLìcies
of the Communities, poLiticaL cooperation and the European Monetary
System, as HetL as aLL bodies or institutions set up within the
Communjty context - shaLL remain in force unLess and untit altered
by new taws or poLicies of the Union'2.
Since it 'is expressLy stated that the Community patrimony wiLI
remaìn jn force, the foLLowing sections wiLL not summarize the current
body of LegisLation in the Community but take it as read. It wiLL only
be referred to in exceptionaL cases where the need for amendments or a
further deveLopment can be understood onLy in rcLation to its historicaL
ba c kg round .
Doc 1-30518?lA, reso[ution on the European ParLiament's position
concerning the reform of the Treaties and the achievement of European
Union, 0J No. C 238, 13.9.1982, p.?5 tt.
i dem.
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(a) Aims of sociaL poLicyl
For a Long time, sociaL poticy2 h,as regarded as a tist of additìona[
measures taken to suppLement the more or Less successfuL economic poLìcy.
And it is true that the number of tasks undertaken by sociat poLicy depends
on the success or faiture of the economic poLicy. The sociaL weLL-be'ing
of the citizens of the Union depends essentiaIty on common economic prosperity
guarantee'ing futL empLoyment and the sharing out of its benefits3. Even in
the Union the prìnc'ipte wiIt stiLL appLy that it is impossibLe to distribute
more than has been produced and that no one may Live at the expense of the
subsequent generation.
An independent sociaL policy of the Union, the vaLue of which has been
recognized since 1972 as be'ing equaL in importance with the objectives of the
free market economy, is based on the principle that if the sharing out of the
benefits of joint[y generated economic prosperity is undertaken soLeLy by the
Member Statesrin the Long run - as far as the whoLe Community is concerned - this
w'iLL Lead to a socjatLy unjust distribution and to a breakdown of internaL
sotidarity'in the Union, and even worse to distortions of competition, because
of the differing socjaL potjcies pursued by the ttlember States. The impLications
of this neur approacb'are considerabLe and large[y exceed the basic concept.
The decLaration,r,ede on behaLf of the EEC at the Paris Summit of 1972 that
'v'igorous act/on in the sociaL fieLd is as important as the achievement of the
Economic an.d' Monetary UniontappLies to the Union insofar as it must pursue
an indeper/Cent sociat poLicy in addit'ion to an independent economic and
moneta,'i'p.oticy.
1Fo..n overaLI summary of socìat pol.'icy priorities, see parLiament's
resotut'ion, OJ No. c ?87r 9.11.1981 p. 87 (tabLed by Mrs Cassanmagnago Cerretti
h,ith request for urgent debate)
2_
-For a survey of the communityrs current sociaL policy see'The sociat
po[icy of the European community - European Documentatìon - 3/1991
3 Tinderans report, BuLLetiry SuppLement 1 /16, p. ?4
??
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The constant improvement of the Living and working conditions for all 
the citizens of the Union, as set out in the Preambles to the ECSC and EEC 
Treaties, Article 2 of the EEC Treaty and Article 1 of the EAEC Treaty, 
is one of the more general objectives of the Union's social policy. This 
task may be broken down into the following three categories 
Caa) the establishment of a European framewor~ for social security and working 
conditions, 
Cbb) the establishr.1ent of a Europe-an framework for the social dial9gue between 
employers and employees in the Union 
Ccc) the securing of worker participation in decisions affecting working 
life. 
<aa)Social security and working conditions 
<1> Social security 
The Union requires a consensus on social justice, based on the fight 
against pove~iand a uniform system for minimum social welfare. 
That includes the abolition of any discrimination between employees 
from the countries of the Union on the grounds of nationality. The 
Union must also ensure that when a citizen of a Union country moves 
house and settles in another Member State, he is granted the same basic 
rights for himself and his family in his Legal and social Life and 
the same working conditions which apply in that Member State - either 
on the basis of its own or of the Union's Legal system. That applies, 
for example, to accommodation and to social and educational care. 
The right of residence for citizens of the Member States must not 
depend on evidence of employment. Efforts must be made to create 
full Union citizenship, to be conferred on nationals of the Member 
States, which, on-the basis of Union Law, grants certain rights to 
every citizen of the Union. 
Comprehensive cooperation and collaboration in the field of.social 
welfare must contribute to the abolition of discrimination between 
men and women. Corresponding rules must be Laid down for the protection 
") 
of the family"" and to cover sickness, maternity, invalidity, old age, death 
1
see the Boyes report, Doc. 1-386/82; Parliament's resolution, 
OJ No. C292, 8.11.1982, p. 47 
2
see the Cassanmagnago Cerretti report, Doc. 1-1196/82 
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and unemptoyment. The uphoLding of cLaims estabLished ìn the country
of origin and the poss'ibi tity of cumuLat'ing sociaL securìty periods and
pension insurance payments must be guaranteed. Thought might
be given to the introduction of systems for pre-retirement
pensions and unempLoyment benefits on a common basis.
Citizens of countries not beLonging to the Union shoutd receive
equaI treatment excLusiveLy in-acordallc_e-3_i_!!r__Ug.i_o11-L3r.y, especiatLy on the
basis of agreements concLuded by the Union with other countries.
,|(2 ) HeaLth'
The basic objective of enabting aLL citizens to Live as fu[L a
[ife as possibLe at work and at home aLso entaiLs tasks for the
Union in the health care fìe[d, stiLL on the basis of the
subsidiari ty princ'ipte.
The Union must contribute to the ìmprovement of heatth care in the
lvlember States. That invotves mutuaI heLp in the event of disasters,
major catastrophes, epidemics and other exceptionaILy serious itLnesses.
A Union-wide campaign must be waged against the abuse of substances
harmfuI to heaLth, especiaLLy drugs, tobacco and aLcohoL. Informat'ion
campaigns to prevent iLLnesses caused by poor nutrition must be
coordinated. Improvements must be made to the protection of empLoyees
against occupationaL diseases of aIL kinds (noise, dangerous
substancesa etc.) by effectiveLy preventing or controtLìng the dangers.
The harmonization of measures to protect workers and the pubtìc agaìnst
ionizing rad'iation of aLI k'inds, on which a start has atready been made,
shouLd be continued.
Joint criteria must be Laid down in respect of the rights and protection
of the disabted. At atI events, disabLed peopte must be offered the
possibi Lity of rehabi Litation and, wherever possibte, empIoyment.
lSee in this context the CLwyd report, Doc.1-86E/80; Partiament's resotutìon,
0J No i tt, 6.4.1981, p. 27 tf .
32
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( 3) Working conditions
EEp!exuen!
FuLL empLoyr.ntl is the most urgent objective of
sociaL poLicy. Success in the fight against unemp[oyment wìLI
be decisive for the survivaL of the existing democratic sociaL
.?
system
1Do.. 1-3O5tE?tA, resoLution on the European ParLiament's position concernìng
the reform of the Treaties and the achievement of European union, 0J No. C 238,
13.9.198?, p.?6
ZS"e in this context the Satisch report, Doc. 1-164181, ParLiament's resoLution,
0J No. C.?60,1?.10.1981, p. 48 ff.; the CaLvez report, Doc. 1-365181,
ParLiament's resoLutionr 0J No. C ?601 12.10.19E1, p.63 tf.; the Ceravolo
report, Doc. 1-4?51E1, ParLiament's resoLutionr 0J No. C ?60, 12.10.'1981, p- 54 ft-,
and ttePapaef stratiou report, Doc. 1-6461E?, 0J No. c292, 8.11-8?, p- 43.
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A basic distinctìon may be drawn between the creation of new
34 jobs and the maintenance and possibLe rcdistributton of ex'isting
jobs :
In periods of Low or even negative econom'ic growth rates, not
enough new jobs are created without the introduction of specific poLiticat
framework conditions or incentives to repLace jobs Lost by rationaIization
or pLant cLosures. That atso appties to jobs required to cope with
increased demand resuLting from demographic t,rd-ncis or as a
consequence of increasing emancipation. An active empLoyment poLicy
must be pursued to combat this trend. It must combine every measure imagìn-
ab'Le, since anY restriction t{ouLd resutt in the overaLt target not
35 being met. The creation of stab[e, 'i.e. competitive, jobs must be g'iven
top prjority, in particuLar in backward areas. At the same time,
the geographìcaL and vocationaL mobiLity of the workforce must be
encouraged. The estabLishment of new undertakings to manufacture neul
products and provìde services (e.9. environmentaI technoLogy, energy
and micro-processors), preferabLy in the form of smaLL and medium-sized
undertakings, must be encouraged, SpecjaL attention must be given to
LocaL initiatives which create jobs.
Ihe maintenance of existing jobs and production capac'ity must
not Lead to the ossification of the current economic structure. 0n the
36 contrary, it shouLd faciLitate the requisite structuraL adjustments. That
presupposes that the undertakings are organized on a competitive basis.
The poLicy pursued by the Union must provide framework conditions for
restructurìng.
In the case of the redistribution of existing jobs, severaL
37 poss'ibiLities come to mind whjch must be investigated and assessed as
'instruments for ìmproving the empIoyment situation: the distribution
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of Lòour, in the form of job sharing, the adjustment of and reduction in
working hours (fLexibIe age Limits and/or earLy retirement, temporary
work, part-t'ime empLoyment, reductions in the working week), depend on
the uLt'imateLy inescapabLe premise that they must not jeopardize competitiv'ity.
Although sociaL poticy is not a simpLe function of economic poLicy, ìn this
case their objectives are cLoseLy dependent on each other.
In the aILocation of jobs, speciaL priority must be g'iven to the
frequentLy underpriviLeged groups such as young peopLel , ,o^"n?, m'igrant
workers, the disabIed, oLder empLoyees and the Long-term unempLoyed.
Vigorous efforts must be made to aboLish overtime, unrecorded economic
activity and the excessive recruitment of temporary empLoyees.
Vegq!isne!-!reining
The importance of proper vocationaL training is constantIy increasing.
It ìs a prerequisite both for the attainment of individuaL equaLity of
opportunity as regards access to the Iabour market and for the sat'isfaction
of the increasing demands made 'in professionaL Ljfe. The Union's future
depends on young peop[e being property trained and quaLified. The Union
must therefore ensure that aLL young peopLe have access to proper practicaL
vocationat tra'ining l.'inked to the work experience. InitiaL trainìng,
setected in accordance with job counsetLing which takes account of pros-
pective market requirements, shouLd Lead to a job whìch is as appropriate
as possibLe to the individuaL's capabiLities. In particuIar, it is in this
area that the Union shouLd concentrate a Large part of its currentLy modest
financiaL resources for sociaI expenditure.
Ad j ustment to neh, techno[og'ies and other reasons w'i L L a Lways make
retraining and further train'ing necessary. In-service training, further
training and Union-wide recognition of dip[omas and certificates are
important for appropriate productivity in competitive jobs and for easier
reintegration after the loss of a job.
See in this context ParLiamentts resoLution on youth unempLoyment,
OJ No. C 125, 17.5.1982, 9.74 ff . (Resotution tabLed by ftlr Brok and
others with request for urgent debate)
Zsee in this context the Maij-Weggen report, Doc. 1-8?9180; ParLiament's
resoLution, 0J No. C 50, 9.3.1981, p. 35 ft.
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Jobs and remuneration
The humanjzatjon of working conditions initiatLy incLudes measures
to combat the.isk of accidents at work and occupationaL diseases.
campaìgns to make workers safety conscious and further progress .in
occupationat medicine wi Lt bear fruit at the workpLace itseLf.
The introduction of new safety techniques to prevent accidents and
improve the work'ing environment must invotve the empLoyees because
'it is they who are using the new technoLog.ies.
The implementation of equaL pay for men and Homen and the abot.ition
of discrimination (for exampte in systems of professionaL cLassification
and career structures) have not been achieved and must therefore be
pursued further. The recognition of the right of empLoyees to
institute IegaI proceedings in cases of discrimination is one of
the instruments required.
(bbtr Framework for the sociaL dialogue
The transfer to the Union of some poHers of decision in economic
poLicy matters refLects a step which Large firms took long ago. The Union must
therefore ensure that the sociaL diaLogue between emp[oyers' and emp[oyees'
associations on the one hand and Union institutions on the other takes pLace
1
at Union IeveL'. That impLies that the Union wiIL estabLish framework
conditions which enabte Union-wide autonomous coLLective agreements to be
concIuded and atso g'ive emptoyers'and empLoyeest organizations the opportunity
of conducting Union-wide negotiations on working conditìons, reductions in
working hours, hoL'idays and other matters.
The coL Lect'ive part'icipation of the sociaL partners 'in the socio-economi c
dec'isìon-making progress of the Union must be improved. That impL'ies not onLy
a'id for their information and training estabLishemnts at European LeveL,
but aLso a consoLidation of the practice of consultation between the Economìc
and Sociat Commìttee on the one hand and the European ParLiament and representat
of the Member States on the other. The sociaL diaLogue wouLd aLso be improved
if regional. interests were directLy represented on the Economic and SociaI
Commi ttee.
1 ---
'Tindemans report, BuL l.et in, Supptement 1/26, g. ?s
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(co) t{orker part'icipation
Efforts to create a more humane and just society catL for solutions at
Union leveI to the probLem of uorker participation. The practicaL expression
of this inctudes procedures for informjng and hearing empLoyees. That appt'ies
'in particutar to transnationaI undertakings. It witt aLso take the form of
rutes on vorker participation in decisions affecting rorking Life and on
the statutes of the undertak'ing. It is essentiaL for the Union to create 
_
equivaLent Legat provisions for the impLernentation of uorker participatìon
which, as a resuLt of divergent poLitica[, historicaL and phiLosophìcaI view-
po'ints, has not devetoped in the same uay or to the same extent in aLL the
flember States. 
1 
'
{b) Nlss-g!-rsgiene!-pelrgyz
The et'imination of regionaL imbaLances3 is referred to in the preamb[e
to the EEC Treaty as an òUjective of Community poticy and uas recognized
as long ago as the earLy 1970s as a priorìty task in attempts to achieve
European unification4. RegionaL poLicy ìs a touchstone for genuine and
effective- soLidarity between nations5. Its aim is a comprehensive structuraL
poLicy based on pIanned promotion of investment and infrastructure projects.
Approprìate Liv'ing, working and market conditions must be created ìn the Less-
favoured regions to combat the concentration of migrant workers in traditionat
ìndustrial areas and to fiLt the Union's peripheraL areas with new Life by
heLping them to heIp themseLves (seLf-made deveLopment).
It is cLear from a consideration of regionaL problems and of the impact
of the poL.icy to be pursued that the peopLe concerned and the bodies
representing them at regionaL and LocaL LeveL must be activeLy ìnvoLved in
regionaL poticY.
G;-;;;-;;;;, sen report, Doc . 1-86?/ 81 i Part i ament 's reso rut i on
in 0J No. C 149, 14.6.198?, P.44 f't,
'tee in this context the comprehensive survey and List of regionaL
objectives contained in the De Pasquate report, Doc. 1-61/8?
ot 11 May 1 982
, poLicy
47
4é
3Doc. 1-305tI?tA, resoLution on the European parLiament's position,
0J No. C 238, 13.9.1982,
tin.L dectaration of the
Buttetin of the European
5see in this context the Tindemans report, BuILetin, SuppLement 1/76
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The regionaL disparities notcd in the 1970s have by now increased even
further, despite the efforts made by thc Community since 1975. It is thus
more necessary than ever before for the Union to have its own independent regionaL
1polici'. AtL the regions must be guarantecd an adequate and baLanced
degree of deveLopment. The ner methods used to reduce the prosperity gap49 between the varìous regions must contribute to a more efficient territoriaL
utiLization ìn tine with the Union's sociaL poLicy assumptions. The Union wiLL
provide a frameuork for European regionaI pLanning. This rliLL pLay a prominent
role in the common basic assumptions, the harmony and the Links between the future
pLans and measures rhich yiLL continue to be targe[y differentiated and decentraL'iz
The eLimination of regionaL imbalances is a sine qua non for a continuation
of and increase in the degree of economic integration. To this end, an exact
anaLysis of regionat information must first be nade so that an inventory of the
50 -,., 2resources and needsolthe various regions may be draln up-. Uith permanent accounl
being taken of the regionaL impact of other policies (such as the agricuLturaL,
industriaL and research poLicies), and vith Comnrunity aid being concentrated
on the most backward arear3,,h. priority tliLL be the creation of new
1 S." the Commission's report on European Union, ButLetin, SuppLement 5175
2 S"" the Delmotte report, Doc. 1-E?5tE1, ParLiament's resoLutionr 0J No. C 66
15.3.19E?, p. 34 tf.
3 S". the Faure report, Doc. 1-64E1E1, PatLiament's resolutionr 0J No. C 66,
15.3.19E?r 9.?1
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productive jobs1. Prudent management of the Labour market at regìonaL
LeveL and the joint utiIizat'ion of aLL the promotion instruments - funds, Loans,
nationaL 'incentives - wiLL be geared towards maximum empLoyment. Loans
shouLd be made more avaiLabLe than ìn the past to provide financiaL resources.
Al.t financiaL resources, wherever possibLe, shouLd be gìven directLy to the inves-
tors. Apart from the services sector, encouragement shouLd be given to economic
sectors with tabour-intensive modern technoLogies which are suited to LocaI
devetopment potentiaL and the expLoitation of LocaL resources. Positive adjustment
measures (restructuring, adaptation, innovation) shouLd have priority.
The European Communìty of the 1950s and 1960s ulas a Large Mediterranean
rcountry' 
. FoLLowing the en[argement to jncLude Greece, and with
the prospective accession of Spain, the Union must take greater account of the
51J t spec'ific situation of the t{editerranean countries than was the case in the originaL
concept'ion of the CommunityZ. The Union's regionat poLicy wiLL therefore
take account of these specìfic probIems of the Mediterranean structures.
The respective growth potentiat and adaptabiLity of the regìons must be
mobiIized and utiLized in indjviduaL regionat deveLopment pLans. Above aLL, the
knowIedge and skiLIs of the jndìgenous poputatìon, aLternatìve.energy sources,
5,2 ,environmentaI resources, the Latent capacity of undertakings (in particuLar, smaLL
and medium-sized undertak'inqs, craft t."J.. and tourism in rurà[ areas) must
be ut'it'ized. They must be prov'ided wjth the requisite software in the f ieLd
of information, research, technicat aid, market research, etc.
1 S." in this context the chapter on regionaL poLicy'in the report drawn
up as a fo[Low-up to the Mandate of 30 May 19E0: A new'impetus for the
common poLic'ies, ButLetin, Supptement 4lE\
2 Su. the Pòttering report, Doc. 1-736tE1, ParLiament's resoLution, 0J No. C 66,
15.3.198?, p. ?6 tt.
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(c) Alns-e!-g9!§sggr-Pe!isx1
Consumer poL'icy aLso inctudes matters rhich concern the qual,ity of
Life of every singLe citizen of the European Community. The protection
53 and perception of consumer interests are therefore a matter of conccrn for
aLL.
The Union uiLL increasingLy impLement the functamentaL rights of the
consumer aLready Laid doun by the Community. These are,
(aa) protection of the consumer's heaLth and sa{ety,
(bb) protection of the consumerts economic interests,
54 (cc) ìmprovement of the consumer's LegaL position - assistance, advice,
redress in the case of damage,
(dd) the Union Hi[[ aLso promote consumer information and education and
hearings of consumers.
Ad (aa)
Common standards forming a basìs for the control of the quaLity and marketing
55 of goods witL provide genuine protection against possibLe abuses and dangers.
This aLso invoLves the rapid exchange of information on dangers arising from
the use of certain products.
Ad (bb)
The aboLition of non-tariff barriers to trade and the harmonization of the
conditions of competition for manufacturers and deaLers wiLL improve the56 consumer's economic postion, In particuIar, the harmonization of rates of tax
- without invo[ving a generaL increase - wil.L make it possibLe to draw up
reLiabLe price comparisons. A campaign wiLL be naged against any misteading
of the purchaser as regards the nature, identity, quaL'ity or composition
of products. Minimum standards wiLL be Laid doyn in respect of guarantees
for consumer durabtes.
Ad (cc)
The estabLishment of rules governing LiabiLity for defective products and57 misteading advertising and generaL protection against frauduIent contracts
wiLL improve consumer protection in the Union as a who[e.
lSee the 0'ConneLL report, Doc . 1-450tE0, ÈLiament's resotution, 0J No. C ?g'1,
16.10.1980, p. 39 tf .
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Ad (dd)
A greater number of consumerinformation of f i ces w'i t L be made avai Labte.
Information in the media (especiaILy on teLevision) must be improved.
5g TechnicaL measureE, such as better rutes pvernìng LabeILing, tiLL make it
easier for the consumer to sèLect goods from the rìde range avaiLabLe.
Account witl. always be taken of the point of view of the consumer - and of
other pressure groups - when decisions are taken within the framework of other
poLicies. Consumers are invoLved in the market economy by virtue of the
deci:ion yhich they take as purchasers or customers and which consequentLy
determines thei r Iiv'ing conditions. In addition, consumers ui LL be
represented in a pressure group at Union LeveL.
3. [9n-eod-Nq!ste
(a) Aims of environmentaL poLicyl
The conteìt and objectives of the Community's act'ion programme on environmentaI
protectìon wi LL aLso be val.id f or the Union's environmentat poLicy. Responsibl.e
conservation and rehabiL'itation of the naturaI environment and of naturaI
resources in order to achieve sustainabLe devetopment2 are thus to an increasing
extent the concern of a sensibLe environmentaL poLìcy.
Since the env'ironment of one country is necessariLy atso the environment of
its neìghbours, efforts to maintain a decent environment is the task of the
Union'in so far as ìt.invotves protection against damage or subsequent re-
generation which (a) might occulin a simi[ar manner throughout the Union or
(b) might occur in more than one Member State or (c) is transported from the
Unìon or into the Union. That aLso invoLves cooperat'ion within internationaL
organ'izations concerned with envìronmentaI probtems.
60
61
1se" in this context
resotution, 0J No.
resoLutionr 0J No.
2 Do. . 1-305 / 821A, oJ
the two reports by ilr Atber, Doc. 1-276181, ParLiament's
C 327 14.1?.19E1, p. E3 ff. and Doc. 1-21918?, Partiament's
C 18?, 19.7.1982, p. 90 f f .
No. C 328, 13.9.19E2' p. 26
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The practicat va[ue of environmentaI protection rtiLL aLways be assessed
in the Union as part of a detaited overaLL vjew and jn retation to other -
poss'ibLy competing - objectives. EnvironmentaL poL'icy wi LL therefore be
cLose[y tinked to other sectors - industriaL and agricuLturaL - because economic
deveLopment and protection of the envìronment must contribute together towards
improving the quatity of Life.
In the past, insufficient account was taken of environmentaL interests
because the vaLue of the environment was not properLy recognized. If
we regard man, nature and the envi ronment as a s.ingle ent.ity; then each
component has its vatue. The Union wiLL therefore do its utmost to make good
any damage aLready caused and to restore and maintain heaLthy Liv.ing conditions.
For the making good of any damage causedrthe'pottuter paysr princip[e
wiLL be apptìed from the outset as far as possibLe. Uniform penalties
based on Union taw wiLL be'imposed on those damaging the environment.
past experience teaches us that the pureLy defensive nature of a
poL.icy of making good any damage caused is inadequate, partty because in some
cases the damage caused is irreparabLe, partLy because even temporary damage
is unacceptabLe, and finaLLy because the subsequent restoration of nature and
naturaL resources is generaLLy more expensive than preventing damage. A
preventive environmentaL poL'icy and pLan w'iLL therefore be drawn up. The
possibLe impact of other politicaL and technicaL decisions must be taken
into account from the outset. This appties to many aspects, such as
structuraL pLanning, regionaL pLanning and the granting of authorization for
.industriaL construct'ion. To th'is end, the instruments for assessing technoLogici
effects, testìng compatibiL'ity with the environmentl and environmentaL approvaL
certificates wiLL be utiLized-
The Unionts environmentaL poIicy aLso covers prov'ision for the
utiL'ization of avaiLabLe resources. Top priority shouLd be given to the
rationat and protective use of space and naturat resources. The uti Lizatìon
of renewabte raw materiaIs and the recyct'ing of waste products are vitaL.
EnvìronmentaL poLicy is a structuraL poLicy which must be pursued further,
ì rrespective of short-term economic fLuctuations. Differences in
T;;; the Weber
No. C 66,
report, Doc. 1-5691A1/rev., partiament's
15.3.1982, p. 78 tt resotution,
pE 83.326/fin./C.
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environmentaL requirements resuLt 'in barriers to trade and distortions
of competition and, for that reason,'if for no other, must be harmonìred.1
The pursuit of a conservationist and preventive environmentaL poLicy is
part of industriaI innovation and creates'add'itionaL jobs. In this xa1 it
coincides with sociaL poLicy objectives.
EnvironmentaL nuisances and dangers are not confined to one particuLar
country, nor do they stop at the Unionrs externaL frontiers. ConsequentLy,
the Union wiLL cooperate act'iveLy at internationaL LeveL. Apart from
acceding to existing 'internationaL agreements, it wiLL vigorousty pursue the
concLusion of more far-reaching conventions and take up and soLve specific
probLems with the neighbourìng countries concerned.
(b) 4nlqc!-ere!ee!i9n
The Union w'iLL pursue an independent animaL protection poLicy to
the extent necessaryfor reasons reLating to trade and competition or on
mora L grounds.
len-and-sg!!gre
(a ) Aiqs-eI-edgge!ien-end-reeearsb-rn-!be-lie!d-eI-hssen and moraL sciences
1.
It
research
essent i a L
the fieLd
is
'in
for
of
the Union to pursue a poLicy
human and moraL sciences for
on education and on
three reasons:
the Union has its(aa)'in order to ass'ist
own 'ident i ty,
become aware that
(bb) ìn order to enable citizens to seLect freeLy their type of employ-
ment, a job or a train'ing centre anywhere in the Union, and
(cc) order to guarantee research of Union-wide sìgnificance in the fietd
human and moraL sciences.
4d-!eei
In the courses taught in aLL schools and colLeges, a common core must be embodied
c'it i zens to.
'in
of
lsee the motion for a
of the Group of the
Doc. 1'?39182
resoLution tabLed by ilr Mertens and others on behaLf
European Peopters Party (Christian-Democratìc Group),
PE 83.326/tin./C.
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showing the history of European civiLìzation and the European Unjory whose
educationaL objective is to demonstrate the common cuLturaL vatues of aLL
citizens and, beyond that, the specifìc potiticat values of the union.
ld-!qÌ
The freedom of aLL citizens of the union to se[ect their type of employment,
which aLso entai Ls f reedom of est$t ishment and genu'ine f reedom of movement,
are mutuaLLy dependent.
It presupposes the union-wide vaLidity of dipLomas,
cert'ificates and other evidence of formaL quaLifications and the recognition
of periods spent in schoo[, higher educationaL ìnstitutes and in training
which exceeds that laid down in ArticLe 57(1) of the EEC Treaty (mutuaI
recogn'ition). Efforts shcuLd aLso be made to estabLish a minimum standard
for training (see ArticLe 128 of the EEC Treaty on vocationaL training).
The basic princ'ipte shouLd be that every certificate of format quatifications
which ìs recognized in the home country for admission to a train.ing course or
a prof ession wi LL aLso be accepted in another trlember State, unLess Union
Law Lays down other provisions.
In order to ensure a Union-wide min'imum standard for professìonaL traìnin9,
the tra'ining'institutes (universities, trade corporations, etc.) shouLd be
requì red to deveLop, 'in conjunction with the Un'ion, common or comparabLe
training programmes which aLso Lay down mutuaL recogn'ition of periods spent
study'ing or train'ing. In the schoot sector, these tasks wi LL be the responsi-
bìLity of the appropriate ministries in the Member States.
In addition, Union pol'icy on education shoul,d contribute to other Union
tasks such as
the guarantee of equaL opportunity for aLL cìtizens of the union and
their chiLdren as regards unrestricted access to aLL types of educat'ion and
tra'inìng;
7',1
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77 (?1. the securing of an aHareness of nationaL identity among migrant
workers;
78 (3) equaL job opportunities for h,omen;
79 (4) promotion of muLtiLinguaIism;
80 (5) preparation for new cuLturaL deve[opments in the Union in professionaL
Life (m'icroeLectronics, data processing);
81 (6) satisfaction of information requirements in educationaL and training
matters of Union-w'ide s'ign'if i cance;
82 (7) promotion of exchanges of schooIchiLdren, studentsnapprentices and
young workers with'in the f ramework of a European Youth Organ'izationl .
Ad (cc)
The technicaL research sector faIts w'ithin the terms of reference of the
rapporteur on the Economic Union, Mr Moreau. Research in the human, moraI
and sociaL sciences, however, is covered by the policy for society and ìs
83 p..ticùLarty important for the character of the Union's concept of sociaL
po['icy vatues.
In this context, advanced educationaL estabLishmènts such as the European
Un'iversity Inst'itute'in FLorence, the European Foundatjon in Paris, the
European SchooLs and the Centres in BerLin and Dublin wi tl. Lead thc uay 'in the
84 formation of European awareness, ìn the Union-wide recognition of dip[omas and
other evidence of formaL quaLifications and hence in the ìmpLementation of the
jnd.ividuaL's freedom of establishment and freedom to seLect his type of empLoy-
ment. In so doing, they w'iLt cooperate w'ith comparabIe nationaL institutions.
It.is essential. to incorporate the aforementioned institutions entireLy'into
the Un'ion's organìzationaI structure, aLthough the requisite academic freedom
85 must oe guaranteed for the European University Institute and the European
Foundat i on.
In the sphere of education and the promotion of research of
86 Union-wide sìgnifìcance, it is recommended that the executìve heads of the
Union and the Member States cooperate on a formaL basis.
1 See Mr Bock tet 's draft report, PE 74 .E71 I rev .
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(b) Arss-sI-Lnleroa!1en-ps!1gx
The guarantee of Union-yìde freedom of information is essentiat for democracy
in the Union. The quatitative variety of information, opinions and ideas is
essentiaL for baLanced dcveLopment in the Union urhich is based partty on the
principLes of pLuraLism, freedom of decision and individuaL participation-
The Union must facititate an extens'ive, Union-ride exchange of ìnformation
and access to information for its citizens. In this connectionrit has a
responsibitity to guarantee a comprehensive supp[y of ìnformation and
max'imum competition by means of a variety of organìzationaL formsl.
Appropriate Union reguLations must be introduced to eLiminate obstactes
to the circuLat'ion of information throughout the Union. That entaiLs the
aboL'it'ion of aLL barriers erected on monopoListic arounds (e.g. in teLe-
commun'ications), fiscaL grounds (e.g. neuspapers) or for reasons reLatìng
to tariffs, transmission, frequency or satettite technoLogy. The union
could promote cooperation between radio and teLevisìon companies on a
Unìon-wide prograrr"2.
{c) {!qs-el-sg!!gce!-pe!!gy3
The cutturaL unity of Europe predates its fragmentation into nation
states.
For centuries, cuLturaL deveIopment transcended nationaL boundaries and
s'im'itar obstacLes as a matter of course and Linked cities and centres of
cuLture with each other despìte aLI divisive infLuences.
The undisputed European d'imension of cuLturaL affairs draws its weatth partLy
from the variations in as trelI as from factors common to national and
regìonaI aspects. Ethnic and cuLturat diversity4 rJithin a common European
civi L'ization wi LL be maintained and protected.
The task of ensuring th'is devoLves principaLty on the Member States which
are aLready working together in the Council. of Europe for the maintenance
of the European d jmension in cuLturaI af f ai rs. In add'it'ion, the Union couLd tak
action ìn the foLLowing areas:
1F'inrL Dectaration of the European summit in paris, paragraph 1, Buu.etin
10/197?: Free movement of ideas)
'Tindemans report, BuLLetin, suppLement 1l16; see aLso the Hahn report,
,Doc. 1-1013/81, Partiament,s resolution, 0J No. C Bl,5-r!.199L p.719 f+-
See in this context the resoLution tabLed by llr Broeksz, Doc.542175'
ParLjament,s resotution, 0J No. C 79r 5.4.19?6r 9.6; the Amadei report,
Ioc.325178, Par[iamentis resoLution, 0J No. C39' 12.2.1979, p.50 ff.
4and fActivìiies of the European Comminity in the CuLturaL Sector',311980
see Doc. 1-305t8?, parLiament's resoLution, 0J No. c z3gr 13.g.19B?, p. 26
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(aa) Representation of both inward and outward-tookìng cuLturaL
deveLopment within the Union and promotion of cutturat exchanges.
This task shouLd be the responsibìLity of the European Foundatlon
working ìn conjunction with comparabLe institutions in the l,lember
States. ExceptionaIty, it might be possibLe to grant aid for the
maintenance of cuLturaL assets of Union-wide significance. The
Foundat'ion shoutd atso promote cutturaL cooperation beyond the
Un'ion's borders, for examp[e, w'ith the ACP States.
(bb) The promotion of cutturaL understanding between the citizens of
the Union.
For this purpose, the estabLishment of a European youth exchange
1programme' is particutarty to be recommended.
(cc) Improvement in the situation of persons active'in the cuLturaI
sector in the Unìon.
The major aspect here is the harmonizatìon of copyright law in the Union
and freedom of movement for the cutturaI assets therekry created2.
ee Mr Bock [et's draft report , PE 74.871 I rev.
ee the Prout report, Doc. 1-556/80, ParL'iament's resotution
J No. C 28,9.2.1981,9. EZ tf .
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INTRODUCT ION
As the end of the 20th century approaches nehr centres of power are emerging
in a vorLd that is becoming both increasìngLy compLex and increasing[y inter-
dependent. The varìous aspects of externaI reLations (pol.itica[, economìc,
dipLomatic, security, etc.) are cLoseLy interwoven.
At the same time the main divis'ions that have characterised wortd retations
s'ince the second rlortd Har - between the Eastern and Western'camps'
and between North and South have certainly not been reduced by the oiI crisìs,
and in some respects have u'idened. The European Community ìs in a unique
position to contribute to the attenuation of these divis'ions, and thus to the
safeguarding of peace.
In the fieLd of North/South reLations, Europe's trade with the Third t'lorLd
disptays a higher degree of ìnterdependence than does that of any other poh,er
in the industriatised North. The Community exports more to the Third WorLd than
to the USA, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe combined, and absorbs some 402
of the Third hlor[drs exports. Its economy depends on the sotvency and deveLop-
ment of the Third l'JorLd. In buiLding on this convergence of its interests, and
given its morat ob[ìgations towards its former coLon'ies, the Communlty can contrl-
bute towards the estabLishment of a nore just internationaL order.
In East/hJest reLations the Commun'ity, through its geographicaL situation
and its trade ['inks, again occupies a key pos'ition, and its abi t'ity to pIay an
effective rote in East-t.lest reLations couLd be crucìaI for the preservation of
peace.
In other areas too, Europe's tegitimate'interests requ'ire it to p[ay a key
roLe on the wortd scene. This is particuLar[y true of the Communityts'interest
in mainta'ining a stabte wor[d monetary system and in preserving an open tradìng
system.
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In such fietds, Europe is becoming increasìngLy abrare of yhat these
interests are and of the need to work together to attain them. The
development of European poLiticaL cooperation and the use of the Community,s
economic instruments of foreìgn poLicy test'ify to this. As this process
devetops, the effectiveness of Community action in the worLd, and the degree
of inftuence that Member States wiLt be abte to exert, wiLL depend
on their abiLity not on[y to work together but atso to use to maximum effect
aLL the instruments of foreign poLicy at their disposaI in a coordinated and
coherent manner Hithin a common frameuork of decision-taking. This is the
subject of this working document.
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES
1. A common poLicy
A common foreign policy covering both polìticaL and economic aspects,
}lhich are becoming increas'ingLy dìfficuLt to separate must form an integrat
part of the European Union. In a un'ion of states and peoptes sharìng
common vatues, and common economic ano poL'iticaI interests, and faced uith
simi[ar externaI chaILenges, the presentation of a united front to the
outside is an invatuabLe asset.
I|loreoverr'i t is inconceivabLe, in the Iong run, that a community of
peoptes vith common trade poL'icies and a common foreign potìcy should not
have a common poLicy for at Least some aspects of securìty. security
pot'icy and foreign potìcy are inseparabte, and in a union the security of
each Member State'intimateLy affects the security of the other Member States
and of the Union as a whote.
In appLying the principLe of subsidiarity to externaL poLicy, com-
petences and powers shouLd be attributed to the Unionrs institutions in
areas where the Member States acting aLone cannot have as effective a voice
as would the Union acting as one, or where the absence of a common polìcy
woutd make itjmpossible for the Union to pursue the objectives of .its
internaL deveLopment or to contribute to internationaL actions of interest
to the Union.
The Union's competences in dea['ing with the outside worLd must there-
fore be adequate to deat with the externaL aspects of aLL po[icies that
are attributabLe to it internaLIy, and atso certain fietds where a jo'int
poL'icy wouLd be justified even if there Here no compeLLing reason for
estabLishing a common poLìcy internaLLy within the Unjon.
This cLearty impLies the adoption of a common position
out of jo'int action, not onLy in trade questions but atso in
fieLds of foreign poticy in which joint dipLomatic efforts,
tation in internationaL organisations, and joint act.ion,
and the carry'ing
those poLiticaL
common represen-
in conjunction
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or severat[y - are necessary to aLLow Europe to play a rote in the world
commensurate wi th ì ts potent i a L .
2.'Unity
For att matters with'in its competence, the Un'ion must be ab[e to speak
with one voice. There shou[d be no question of separate actions by Member
States that would undermine the po[icy adopted by the Union as a whoLe. If
a matter faLLs Hjthin the competence of the Un'ion, it must be conducted by
the Union as such. The instruments and mechanisms for carrying it out must
accordingLy be avai tabLe to the Union.
3. Cohe rence
(7)
The various instruments of externat poLìcy must be organ'ised as a
coherent whote. This ìmpLies that there must be common decision-making
bodies for aIL aspects of externat reLations (economic and poLitica[) for
which the Union has competencer, ensuring that they are conducted in a com-
ptementary manner. The Union must be represented externaLLy by spokesmen
accountabLe to it.
(8)
4. Effect i veness and Accountabi L'i ty
The decision-making bod'ies of the Un'ionrs externaL po[ìcy must be ab[e
to act promptly ìn the interests of the Union as a whole. At the same time,
decisions must be taken by poIiticaL[y responsibLe bodies, with cLear Lines
of accountabi Lìty. The distribution of tasks and pouers ':r,ong di fferent
Union inst'itutions must be cLear and prec'ise. Decisions must also be sub-
ject to democratic, parIiamentary controL.
II CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
Two qu'ite distinct methods of foreign pot'icy coordination h.ave been
devetoped - one covering matters subject to the three Community Treat'ies,
(9) which are governed by Community procedures and come under the competence of
Community'institutions, and the other covering aLL other foreign poLicy
matters and known as European poIiticaI cooperation.
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(11)
(12)
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1- Matters under Community competence
A number of articles in the EEC Treatyl gìve certain competences to the
Community for deaL'ing with externat reLat'ions, notabLy in the fieLd of trade
and commerce, where excLusìve competence is given to the Community for
estabtishìng customs tariffs, conductìng a common commerciaL poticy towards
third countries, and, in aLt matters concerning the common market, con-
cLuding agreements with third countries and acting within internationaL
organi sat i ons.
In practice, these articLes have been put ìnto operation wjth a con-
siderabLe degree of success'in which the Commission, ìn its executive and
negotiating roIes, has ptayed an important part. A common customs tariff
has been estabLished; the Community'institutions have assumed their respon-
sibi L'ities f or part'icipation in 'internationaL economic organ'isat'ions; and
the Community has adopted agreements with third countries which, over the
years, have deveLoped from being pureLy commerciat to encompass wide areas
of econom'i c cooperation (fori nstance, the agreements brith Mediterranean
countries and ASEAN). Atso, deLicate issues such as steeL exports to the
USA have been handLed by the Commun'ity.
This deveLopment t.las greatLy faci Litated by the decision2 of the
Court of Just'ice 'in 1971 stating that the externaL aspects of aLL matters
reguLated by internaI prov'isions of the Community are aIso subject to Com-
munity competence.
The Commun'ityts externaL role has aLso developed as a resutt of its
respons'ibi tities for fisheries under the CAP. tlhen territoriaL t.laters were
extended throughout the worLd to 200 m'iLes, the Community found itseLf
deaLing w'ith a major proportion of traditìonat fishing grounds. Its
1l.,icLes 3, 113, 116, ??E, ??9, 230, 231 and 238
2orr* Case 22t70 EcR 1 g71, 263
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action in protectìng them, negotiating
countries and bargainìng for access to
important aspect of externat poLìcy and
Union into de facto recognit'ion of the
of its negot'iating poHers.
lslreygser!g
agreements on thejr use with third
other fishing grounds'is itseLf an
has, ìnter aLìa, forced the Soviet
Community's existence and the reaLìty
Since the Community has exc[usive competence in most of these areas,
it ptays a teading role on the wortd scene. It is the worLd,s largest
1trading btoc'; it defines its autonomous poLic'ies, not onLy'in the com-
merciat fie[d, but aLso in some other fieLds of economic poLìcy; ìt has
conctuded agreements with countries on aLL continents; through its borrowìng
and Lending actìv'ities, it has a major infLuence on HorLd cap'itaL markets;
and it enjoys grow'ing prestìge 'in internationaL organisa t'ions, where its
actions as a singte unìt have become increasingLy effective. It has begun
to devetop a European'economic diptomacy', in uhich the Commission has been
able ùo pLay an effective part. This has at the same time reinforced the
position of the Commun'ity institut'ions, and the importance of the Commun'ity
internationaLLy. Through instruments such as the Lome Convention, the
Community has been abte to exert an incontestabLe inftuence on'inter-
nationaI retations and make an originaI contribution to soLving a number of
worLd probLems.
§[9r!99,1!]!s!
NevertheLess, the Community's economic instruments of f",.eign puticy
are inadequate in a number of ways. FinanciaLty they are tjmited to a
fraction of the amounts at the disposaL of Member States, whichr'in using
their resources separateLy, often compete and underm'ine each othersl
poLìcies through, for instance, competitive credit poLic'ies. Moreover they
have not been apptied as the treaties intended. Member States have atso
continued to sign theìr oun cooperat'ion agreements with thìrd partìes, (most
notabty with the state trading countries, many of whom refused to recognise
13+lt of totat wortd trade is accounted for by the Community or lg.l"AexcLurJing
intra-Comnrunity trade (19E0)
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the Community for a Long tjme). 0n occasion Member
to foLLov divergent poLicies that undermine those of
States and the Community as a whole.
States have continued
their feLLow Member
( 16)
( 18)
In addition, the communìty's posjtion in the worLd is weakened by its
inabiLity to deveLop common poLic'ies wìthin its borders, ìn matters such as
energy, industriaL poIicy and, above aLL, monetary unìon. The European
Monetary System has not yet deveLoped the capac'ity to enabLe the communìty
to pursue effective poLicies in the wor[d context on such matters as
interest rates and the re-cyc[.ing of petro-currency.
Làs', but not Least, atthough there is in princìpLe a reLativety ctear
division of responsibi Lities between the commission and the counci L, this
division has been bLurred ìn practice and the counciI has reta.ined respon-
sibi Lities that shou[d properLy beLong to the commission. The powers of
«7) the ParLiament have been insufficient to guarantee democratic accountabi Lity
and controL, notab[y regardìng the ratification of agreements with third
countries, and controL over certain financ'iaL operations. This is par-
ticutar[y apparent in the faìLure to incLude the European DeveLopment Fund
in the community budget, and the Lack of politicaL control on the poLicy
decisions over European Investment Bank Loans to third countries.
9sye!eesel!
DeveIopment poLicy ìs one of the more strik'ingLy poLiticaI aspects of
the externaL poLicy matters under Community competence invoLving high-Level
negotiat'i ons with many developing countr.i es on .i mportar: aspects of the
North/south diaLogue, and'incLudes instruments such as financiaL ajd, food
a'id, speciaL disaster aid, credits to certain non-governmentat organì sat ions,
deveLopment programmes, stabi L'isation of export earnìngs, and other poiicy
instruments that cannot poss'ibLy be considered as pureLy economic or
technicat. It i tIustrates the difficuLty of any attempt to separate
'economic' and,poLiticaL' matters.
A devetopment pol'icy of adequate volume and quaIity should be an
essent'iaI part of the Communityrs roLe in the worId. Few major industria[-
ised countries today faiL to recognise that they not onLy have a moraL respon-(19) sibi Lity towards people whose materiaI conditions are immenseIy inferior to
their own, but that an effective development poL'icy'is in the interests of
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the deveLoped worLd. This is particuLarLy the case for the Community, whìch
buys aLmost haLf of the Third tlorld's exports, and setts more of its own
exports to the Third tlorLd than to the USA and the USSR combined. This inter-
dependence must provide the stjmuLus to buiLd an effective devetopment pol'icy
which wiLL be a safeguard of peace and an assurance of the best prospect for the
return to growth and prosperity in the Commun'ity.
The Communityrs development poticy has a number of achievements to its
credit. Its centrep'iece, the LomE Convention,'is the most far-reaching
agreement yet between industriatised and deveLoping countries. The opening of
Communìty markets not onLy to commodities but to manufact'rred products from ACP
countries, the STABEX system for stabiLis'ing the export earnings of devetoping
countries, the European Development Fund (EDF), and other aspects open the way
not onLy to cooperation but to genuìne partnership.
The Communìty's competence to estabLjsh tariffs means that ìt, rather than
the Member States, is aLready responsibLe for an ìmportant aspect of North/South
cooperat'ion. However, the buLk of deveLopment aid is prov'ided by the Member
States separatety. 0fficiaI deveLopment a'id and Loans under the LomE Convention
(21) amount to tess than one-e'ighth of the Communìty countries totaI offic'iaL aid,
and, as much of this nationaL aid is'tied'to contracts rrith the donor country,
the common market for goods and services is distorted, the rec'ip'ient country ìs
unabLe to take fuLL advantage of the aid granted and the formation of a common
deve[opment poLicy is retarded..
Even those instrutrrents which come uncjer Cornmunity jurisdiction suffer from
a number of deficiencies - ìn particuLar the inadequacy of cheir funding.
For exampte STABEX resources ran cut ha[f-way through the year in 19E2. In(22) addit'iorythe EDF is not part of the Communìty budget and thus escapes any
effect'ive parLiamentary controL.
In order to play a
economic resources and(23)
the European Comounity
poLicy woutd be a major
role in this area consonant with the size of its
t,.r expresilts comrnon interest effect'i.vety,
npeds a comorehensive common oolicv for deveLooment. Such
etement in a common European foreign potìcy.
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A measure cf success
0utside the areas of commerciat poLicy, devetopment policy and
fisheries poLicy deaLt with by the Commun'ity inst'itutions, Lie the other
fieLds of foreign poLicy. GraduaLLyl a tooser paraLLeL framework known
rather curioustyz as European PoLit'icaI Cooperation has grown up to deaL
tJith them. Consist'ing of cooperation at an intergovernmentaL teveL among
(24) tne r'lerdoer States, it is separate f rom the instr t./rtonaL f ra,nework of the
Community, though the meetings of Foreign Ministers often take pLace in
conjunction w'ith meetings of the Counci L. In additìon the Commission
participates in meetings and a diaLogue uith the ParIiament is maintained
through the presentation of an annuaI report, quarterLy coLLoquies w'ith
the PotiticaL Affairs Committee, and ParLiamentary Questions.
EPC has aLtowed the Community to adopt
of important'issues, (such as the confLict
strengthened Europe's voice in the worLd.
a habit of working together. In the words
State for Foreign Affairs, UK):
'Now in some areas of diptomacy our pot'icy'is formed wholLy within a
European contexti and in no area is the European 'infLuence compLeteLy
absent. The fLow of information between the foreign ministries of the
Ten is formidabLe.3
1
'EPC was deveLoped jn successìve stages starting with the Luxembourg
1e,p_ort adopted by the Fore'ign Min'isters on 27 0ctober 1970 ('Dav'ignon Ir)fotLowedry the Copenhagen report adopted on ?3 JuLy 1973 (,Davignon II,)
and, finaLLy, the London report adopted on 13 0ctober 1981 ('Carrington').
?
-The maìn components of foreign po['icy are externaI economie retations
and security. The former, ìtsetf increasingLy'poL'iticaL,, is deaLt 91ith
by the Community, not EPC. The tatter has onLy recentl.y been inctuded in
EPC, and onLy as far as its strict[y potiticaI aspects are concerned.
?
'ArticLe in Internationat Affairs Vol.5l, No.3, Summer 19g1.
j o'int pos i t i ons on a number
in the Middle East) and has
Member States have deveLoped
of DougLas Hurd (Minister of
(25)
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Hoh,ever, aIthough cooperation has improved sLowLy, and has undoubted
achievements to ìts cred'itr'it has not Led to the creation of an effective
European foreign poLicy ìn aLL areas where the Member States have common
'interests. It has remained a system through whrch the Member States
coordinate and harmon'ise those aspects of the'ir foreign poticies concerning
which there is consensus among them. There are no common instruments to
carry out agreed poL'icies. There is no common secretariat to provide con-
tinuity and prepare dossiers and neither the Commission nor even the CouncjL
secretariat has been asked to carry out this task (though there have been
proposaIs for a separate poL'it'icaI secretariat which wouLd be no more
Lìkel.y to grve the Commun'ity a singLe voice in fore'ign affaìrs than any
other purety advisory intergovernmentaL group has been abte to do in the
past, and wou[d maintain - or even strengthen - the confusìng
separation of competences that now exists). 0nLy recentLy has a procedure(.26)
for speedy action been adopted. EpC procedures are:
-'... operated by Foreign Min'isters and their officiaIs, whoin sp'i te of thei r European vocat'i on, are condit'i oned to
furthering their oh,n country's objectives and interests in
foreign affairs. This fact imposes a fundamentaL Limita-
tion on the potentiaL degree of coordination which is
possibLe in the interests of the Ten or the Communìty.
Even if the poLiticaL wi LL to achieve coordination exists
on the part of severaL Member States, the Hho[e operatìon
of the procedure Leads to decisions ach'ieved on the basis
of the [owest common denominator of natìonaI interests,
IargeLy as 'interpreted by foreign min'istry of f iciaLs.'
Since coordinat'ion is so frequentLy very difficuLt EPC has therefore tended
to react to events rather than try to shape them consc'i ousL' or tak,"
initiatives, and to deaL with difficuLt questions onLy when'it can no Longer
ignore them.
lvloreover, on matters be'i ng deaLt t.Jith jointLy'i n EPC, Member States
continue to take major foreign poLicy ìnitiatives by themseLves, often
without the prior consul.tation Hith feLLow Members of the Ten to which the
Member States committed themsetves when adopting the Copenhagen report.
(27) Such actions not onty undermine the part icutar poLicy 'in quest.ion, they
lessen the effectiveness of EPC as a whoLe and encourage th'ird part'ies to
try to divide the Member States from one another on other policies.
1
'BLUMENFELD report on EPC, para.7, Doc.427/77
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At present, desp'ite its undoubted achievements, Epc is insufficient
to stem the continued decLine of Western Europe's infLuence in the wor[d,
or to aItow the Community effectivety to define and pursue its common and
increasingLy specific interests. In the words of Dougtas HURD:
rtrle have made a start; we have made decLarations of princ.i pLe;
but decLarations of principte are not enough unLess you have
the resotution and ulheretlithaL to back them up in actuaL practicaI
d'ipIomacy'.
3. Inseparabi Lity of the tHo frameworks
. 
0f the two frameuorks within which the Ten deaL joìntLy with externaL
matters, the Community method has in practice had greater success than EpC.
Horever, this separation of so-caIted'pol.iticaL' matters and'economic,
matters, is impossibte to maintain. The recent h'istory of the Community
abounds with exampLes of overtap between the European Community and EpC
frameworks: trade retations vith the Soviet Union fol. Lowing the invasion
of Afghanistan and the imposition of martiat Law in PoLand; commerciaI
retations with Israet, the Arab States, ASEAN, china, Argentina; financiaL
aid to third countries; embargoes and sanct'ions; security of suppLies of
rar materiats; the cSCE fottow-up conferences; and deaL.ing with the
American embargo on European supptiers for the siberìan gas pìpeL.ine.
One particuLarLy striking success of the use of Community'instruments
to achieve a potiticaL end was the role pLayed by Sir Christopher Soames,
Vice-President of the Commission ìn PortugaL'in 1975 where the economic aid
he negotiated on behaLf of the community in a d'ifficuL situation was
cruciaI in strengthening the f orces of democracy iJt a cri t ical. stage of the
Portuguese revotution.
- 
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fn" impossìbiLity of separatìng the two frametrorks from each other
was demonstrated, most recentLy, in the case of the economic sanctions
'imposed by the Community aga'inst Argentìna foLLowing its armed invasion
of the FaLkLand IsLands. In this instance a decision adopted in the
EPC framework to impose t.'ade sanct'ions on Argentina had to be impIemented
in the Community framework by teg'is[ation based on a Commission proposaL
(j1) to ban new contracts f olimports f rom Argentina. The only joint instruments
of foreign poLicy are in the Community framework. EPC has no instruments
of its own; it must use either those of the Community'institutions, or
those of the individuaL Member States.
(32)
Trr',- re has surely come to end the separation or ine rwo frameworks
for action by the Ten, as urged'in the Tindemans report. EPC and the
Community's responsibi Lities shouLd be brought into a s'ingLe framework,
thus providìng a degree of nationatisation and coherence Lackìng ìn
externa I re Lat i ons so t a, .1
4. Secur i ty
'No foreign poLicy can disregard threats, whether
actuaL or potentiaL, and the abiLity to meet them.
Security cannot therefore be Left outside the scope
of European Unionr.
(Leo Tindemans, Report to the CounciI on European Union,
1975) .
Security is not onLy a matter of mì Litary defence: security aLso
depends, cruciaLLy, on deveLoping'internationaL structure.- and c-eating
an internat'ionaL cLimate in which conflict between natiorrs can be soLved
' peacefuLLy. The Community, in bring'ing together former enemies and
(33) creating a new system of [aw among nations, sets an example to the worLd
in this respect. The deveLopment of trade and cooperation particutarLy
}Jith Third WorLd countries, forms an integraL part of security poLicy.in
this wider sense.
With regard to the mi['itary aspects of security, it must be remembered
that the Member States are not at present in the same sittration as regards
1'This woutd make sense
have in the field and
Counc i L .
without prejudice to the powers that
the method by which decisions wou[d
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existing defence organ'isations. IreLand, for instance, is a Member neither
of the Attant jc ALLiance nor of l,lestern European Un'ion (WEU). Denmark and
Greece are not members of WEU. Francera member of NATO, no Longer par-
tic'ipates in its integrated miLitary command structure and Greece is currentty
reviewinE its position in NATO.
!eseere!i.e!-9!-§9esr.u-§e-!qr
NevertheLess, Member States have aLready cooperated on security questions
for a number of years, notably in the preparation of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, wh'ich deatt in considerabIe detaiL with
mìt'itary aspects. In the framework of EPC it has been impossibte to maintain
a distinction between'potiticaL' and'securityr aspects of foreign poticy,
when discussi ng, folinstance, the MiddLe East, Afghanistan, or the FaLkLands
(35) cris'is. The need for cooperation'in certa'in aspects of security tras
recognised first in the Dectaration on European Identity of the summit meeting
of 14 December 1973 in Copenhagen and secondly in the report of the Fore'ign
Ministers adopted in 1981 (the'Londonr report) in which it was agreed to con-
tinue to discuss rpotiticaI aspects of security'.
Unde:" the Euratom Treaty, the Community aIready deats yith the sensitive
(36) issue of the suppty of nucLear materiaL to third countries.
It has atways been recogn'ised that, as the process of European integrat'ion
deveLoped, the need wouLd arise to deaL jo'intLy with security'issues. In the
words of the White Paper presented to the Irish ParLiament by the lrish
Government 'in ApriL 1970:
(37) 'It is recognised that, as the Communities evolve touards
their potit'icat object'ives, those participating in the
new Europe thereby created must be prepared to assist, ìf
necessary, in its defence'.
Member States have not onLy cooperated on externaL aspects of security
but aLso on its internaL aspects. The European CounciL at its meeting in
ApriL 197E agreed that'high priority must be g'iven to intensifying co-opere-'
(3E) tion among the Nine to defend our societies aga'inst terrorist vioLence.'
Ministers of Justice have met, both within the EPC framework and informaLty,
setting up working groups and exchanging informat'ion on the respective
- 
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efforts to deaL with a common probLem: terrorists not ìnfrequentLy
prepare their activities in one Member State, carry it out in another, and
retreat across an internaL Community front'ier. A joint approach and
common resoLve to face up to this threat are essentiaL. The basìs for
further cooperatiort in this fieLd was Lajd down in the 1979 DubLìn Agree-
ment on the applicat'ion between Community Member States of the CounciL of
Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and in the 1980 Convent'ion
Concerning Cooperation in CriminaL Matters. These have yet to come into
force, Lack'ing agreement by one Member State each. The French President,
M. MITTERAND, proposed that the Commun'ity shoutd examine further possibi L'ities
of cooperation in combating terrorism, fotLou'ing the bomb outrages in Paris
in the s\,lrrtiner of 19E2, and this tras begun at a meeting vi Just'i ce r{rnisters
in the CounciL in Luxembourg on 24 - 25 October '1982.
Pressures for cLoser e99P9r9!1e!
There are indications that Member States are notr feeling the need to
discuqs further aspects of security together. There are a number of
reasons for this:(1) Europe is becoming'increasingLy conscious of ìts own interests in the
worLd and the fact that these do not aLways coincide w'ith those of its part-
ners. Security poIicy'is no], discussed w'ithin EPC not just because it is
vìrtuaLty impossibLe to separate ìt from otheli ssues, but from a growing
ahrareness that, if they are to avoid being mere spectators of superpower
poLit'ics, Europeans must discuss these ìssues together.
(?) t'lember States have d'iscovered the potentiaI dangers o'competìng with
each other in arms exports. At present, the arms'indust, res of the Member
States compete with each other in seLLing abroad, part'icuLarLy to Third
Wortd countries. Thi s not infrequent Ly proves a reck Less and unsound way
of mak'ing money and winn'ing friends.l But restraint and care in thìs
form of trade cannot take place unless there is a common potìcy or at Least
common gu'idetines. In their absence, any restra'int or caution exercised
by one Member State on arms saLes to part'i cuIar countries or sens.i t.i ve
regìons can be s'impLy undertnined by other Member States anxious to deveLop
a neu export market. Pursued without regard to the interests of other
'See draft FERGUSSON report on arms supplies and arms saLes, currentty underpreparation in the Pol.iticaI Affairs Committee. This ment'ions, inter atìa,
the exampte of Argentina, to whom severaI Member States had suppL.ied weapons(for instance two destroyers and 9 Canberra bombers from the UK, an air-
craft carrier from the NetherLands, two submarines from Germany, 32 Mìrages
and Super-Etendard ai rcraft, 42 hel i copters and mi ssì Les, ìnc tuding Exocet,from France) 
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(40)
Itlember States, arms exports cou[d become a major source of friction in
the community. If Europe is to pLay a role in controLLing and ending
the arms race, it must be abLe to act as one in this area, and to reach
effective agreements vith the usA and the ussR. If the Union uere to
have a common erms sates poticy without the capacity to negot.iace agree-
ments on common categories of ctients, ìt wouLd risk see.ing other powers
take over the markets it reL'inquishes. I'Jith such capacity, ìt couLd
become a major factor in Limit.ing the arms race.
(3) There is a pressing need for standardisation in armaments. Unfortunate-
Ly the practicaL achievements in this fieLd have been negLig.ibLe, given the
magnitude of the probLem. Arms production forms, for better or for worse, a
major part of industriaL production and is an important souice of empLoyment.
As such it cannot be ìgnored in formuLatìng a Community industriat poLicy.
At present, tack of standardisation invoLves both a very great waste of
resources (thus infLatìng defence budgets) and excessive dependence on sources
outside the Communi ty for mi L i tary and parami L i tary equipment . The f requent
cìttt for the estabLishment of a European Arms Procurement Agency testify to
1this need.'
Furthermore, the Lack of a common market and common procurement withjn
Western Europe is one reason why arms manufacturers in the Community seek
export markets in third countries to cut unit costs by Longer production runs,
often a vital means of meeting the cost of nationaL defence. SpeciaLization
Lrithin a common procurement poL'i cy wouLd produce ecorromies of scaLe that
would minimise dependence on exports. In the words of the DANKERI repcrt or,)
Arms Production':
| 
. . . together, the European count ri es of the At Lant i c
ALLiance provìde an arms market Large enough for
economic production that wouLd be ìndependent of
exports to the Third I'JorLd, thus enabLing such exports
to be terminated or Limited to those deemed to be in
the interest of Europe according to a commonLy def.ined
externaL poL i cy.'
lSee tindemans report, and numerous ParLiament reports (Normanton, KLepsch,
Btumenfetd, Ettes, Fergusson)
zReport to tdEU in 1977
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This wouLd reduce the pressure upon Member States to compete with each
other in seeking to increase arms saLes in Third tJorLd countries. Con-
sequentLy ìn the words of the draft FERGUSSON reportl.
rIt might he pcssible for the Community to adopt a detached
and more infLuentiat pos'ition in respect of Lowering
(41 ) tension in sensitive areas of the wortd, and in contriving
the reduction - the'de-escaLation' - of LocaL confticts
and di sputes. I
(42)
(44)
III PROPOSED COMPETENCES AND POI,JERS
A comparison of the above anaLysis of the current situation wìth the
princ'ipLes and objectives outLined in section one shows a number of areas
yhere changes are necessary if coherent and effect'ive poLicies are to be
drayn up and applied. These changes outLined beLow are intended to form
(43) the basis for the proposed changes to the Treaties to be drafted'in the
third phase of the work of t'he Comm'ittee on InstitutionaL Affairs. For
some of these changes, as indicated beLow, a trans'ition period - of five
or ten years -' wiLL be required.
Cohe rence
So far security has been brought into the scope of EPC in a piecemeat,
atmost surreptitìous way. Sooner or later it wiLL be essentiaL for the
Menbc- 1ì."'es to recognise openLy that the security e'' each cf them is
inextricabLy tìnked with that of the others just as it is aLso inextricabLy
tinked with other aspects of foreìgn poticy, and that at Least some aspects
of security must be the subject of a common po[ìcy.
The two exist'ing processes for deaLing w'ith externaL reIations should
be brought together in the European Union into a sìng[e framework. The same
set of institutions shouLd be responsibLe for decision-takìng'in aLL spheres
of externaL polìcy even if the exact distribution of power between them and
the procedures by which they take decisions witt vary from one sector
1'Draft FERGUSSON report, currentty under discussion in the PoLiticaL Affaìrs
Commi ttee
1.
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of pot'icy to another, as a function of the degree of ìntegration reached
and the retative importance of the role of the Union and of the Member
States in that sector. Thi s wi L t requ'ire Treaty arti c Les bring'ing the
various aspects of externaI poticy'into the competence of the Union and
defining the pcHers of each institution w'ith respect to the different
poticy areas.
2. Types of competence
The Union shoutd exercise different Ievets of responsibitity according
tc the n- ure of each poticy sector. Broadty, thrcL t)'pes of competence
can be defined:'excIusìve', rconcurrentr and'potentiatr competences.
(45) These terms were used in the Commission's 1975 report on European Union.
In areas subject to excLusivq competence poticies are determined by
the Union. In areas of concurrent competence both the Union and the
(46)
Member States deaI with the mattelin question, rlith the Union as such
deating only with certain aspects of the matter or defining a framework
within which Member States wouLd act separateLy. Areas subject to
pgteQtiaI gompgtence are those which couLd in due course, foltouing a
decision by ltiember States be assigned to the Union, but which it is not
feLt appropriate to entrust to the Union from the outset.
By way of iLtustration, the Community at present has:
(47)
- excLusive competence in the fieLd of tariffs (though with a
unanimous decision required for permanent uhanges in tariff
Ievets),
concurrent competence in the fieLd of reg'ionaL poLicy,
potentiaL competence in the fieLd of sea and air transport.
- 
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3. Competences of the Union concerning the predomìnantLy
economic aspects of externaL reLat'ions
The articLes of the EEC Treaty concerning the common commercìaL poLrcy,
tariffs, and trade agreements are LargeIy sufficient as they stand now.
They attribute excLusjve competence in these areas to the Community, which
shoutd aLso be attributed to the Union. HoHever, in certain fields of
externaL economic poL'icy, the Member States have fa'iLed to observe the
spi rit of the Treaties and have undertaken ind'ividuaL Ly tasks wh'ich the
(4g) Treaty clearly 'intends to be undertaken jo'intLy. AdditionaI articLes
should make cLear beyond aLL doubt the excLusive competence of the Union
in the foLLowing fìetds:
trade credit poticy, incLuding
possibi Lity of estabIishing a
tlt.e negotiation and concLusion
with third countries.
internationaI negotiations and the
European Export 8ank,
(49)
(50 )
of trade and cooperation agreements
At the end of the transitìon period development should become a common
pot'i cy, i.e. there wouLd be Unìon competence, and aL L a'i d, whether f or LomÉ
Convention or other deveLop'i ng countries, wouLd be given'i n the framework of
a common deve[opment poL'icy. The Union shouLd adopt common positions in
the 'North-South diatogue' (eg. UNCTAD and other bod'ies).
Eelerg-e1-!!s-I!:!t!s!te!!
In aLL these areas, the Commissjonl shouLd tre responsìbLe for the
generat management and execution of the po[ ì c'ies of the Un'ion, shouLd par-
ticipate in its oh,n right ìn aLL internationaL conferences antJ organ'i sations
which it deems to be approprìate, and propose new initiat ives.
ExternaI agreements and treat'i es shouLd be negot'i ated by the Conr-
miss'i on on the basis of a mandate g'i ven by the Counci L on a prop^saL of
'For simpticity the current names of the institut'ions are used in this
report. Th'is does not prejudice the future ìnst'itutionaL structure of
the Union.
(51 )
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the Commission, after consuLtation with the ParLiament. ShouLd the
CounciL vish to depart substantiaLLy from the opinion g'iven by the Par-
Iiament, either institutìon shoutd be entitLed to open a conciLiation
p rocedu re.
Agreements and treaties shouLd be conctuded by the Commission and
ratified by the CounciL, acting by a quaLifìed majorìty, and the ParLìament.
Thìs procedure shoutd come into operation foLtowing a transitìon period of
ten years.
Partiament and CounciL slouLd, as budgetary authority and as part of
the budgetary procedure, be responsibte for the voting of the necessary
(53) cred'its incLuding the European DeveLopment Fund, that shaLl. be part of the
budget of the Union. ParLiament shouLd monitor and supervise the work of
the Commission.
4. Competences of the Union concerning predominantLy
potiticat aspects of externaL reIat'ions
(52 )
(54)
(55)
Neh, treaty articLes are necessary to give competences to
this area. They shouLd bring into the framework of the Un'ion
of EPC and strengthen it so as to permit its devetopment into
foreign poLicy, in accordance with the foL Lowing guidetines.
concurrent competences shouLd be attributed to t';e union
States in aLI matters of foreign poLicy. ALL major areas of
invotving a cLear and direct Union 'interest shouLd be subject
poLicy carrìed out by the Union.
the Union in
the 'acqu'i s'
a COI'lmOn
and the Member
foreisn pol.iry
to a common
The Union shoutd endeavour to establìsh a common position on aLL'issues
being deal.t with in the United Nations, CSCE f oI Low-up conf erences, or othc.'r
Iarge internationat tora; and on internationaI confLicts and disputes.
The Union shoutd be abte to formutate proposaLs for the resotution of uorLd
confIicts and take initiatives contributing to worLd peace.
(56)
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However, in accordance with the principLe of subsidìarity, there does
not have to be a Union positìon on aLL topics. Matters which ìnvoLve
excLusiveLy the'interests of a singLe Member State shoutd remain the
responsibiL'ity of that Member State. In att areas where the interest of
more than one [tlemoer St?te'i s invo'-ved but where the Union does not have a
common poticy, or is in the process of working one out, the minimum
obtìgation pLaced on Member States shouLd be a requìrement to consutt the(57) Union and the other Member States before taking any net.l in'it'iat'ive; where,
however, immediate act'ion was requ'ired it rrouLd be suf f icient f or a Member
State to inform the Union and the other Member States before taking such
action.
Powers of the Institutions
( 58)
Foreign poL'icy conducted by the Union shouLd be administered by the
Commission act'ing on policy defined by the CounciLl and under the super-
vision of the European ParL'iament. The Commission may act as spokesman
of the Union for aLL matters where there is Union interest and shaLt do so
in matters deaLt with as a common poticy.2
The CounciL, acting on a proposaL from the Commiss'ion, the Partiament,
or at teast three Member States, shouLd [ay down poL'icy guideLines and
give mandates to the Commission. This shoutd appty not onLy for particuLar
po[icies but aLso for determining competences. If a consensus is not
achieved within a reasonabte or necessary tirne, decisìons shouLd be taken
by a quaLifjed majorìty. However, jn order to defend a vjtat nat'ionaL
interest reLevant to the subject under disucss'ion, a Member State may request
that voting be postponed, giv'ing its reasons both oraLLy and in writing,
such reasons to be pubLìshed. Abstentions shouLd not prevent a decision
be'ing taken. ALternat'iveLy, in order to reach agreement on spec'ific
(59)
1
'hlhich w'iLL, of course, be inf Luenced 'in determin'ing this by the
desiderata of nat'ionaL parL'iaments.
2
-0thers (eg. the Tindemans report) have suggested that, as h,eLL as the
Commission, individuats or specific Member States couLd be asked to
represent the Union. The tendency for poLicy to be implemented by
'a person empowered to do sor rather than by a Community ìnstituticnis dangerous to the extent that no s'ingle person or government can
reptace an institution, particuIarLy the Commission as an objective
honest broker of Community affaìrs.
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(60)
(61)
(62)
matters, the CounciL may with the agreement of the other Member States,
grant exceptionaI exempt'ions to the Member State or States concerned.
The Council. may act as spokesman of the Union for aLL matters subject to
jo'int competence or oay designate the Comm'ission to carry out this task.
The decisions of the CounciL taken in accordance with these procedures,
witL form the basis of the foreign poLicy of the Union. The European Par-
['iament may, at any time, put forward proposaLs to the CounciI for new
poLicies or for changing existing policies. The Counci L shaLL be obLiged
to consider Part'iament proposaIs, and after hearing the Commission, to take
a decisìon. In cases of divergent viewpo'ints, a corrci tiation procedure may
be opened at the request of either institution-
In internationaL potìticaL organisations such as the United Nations
as in internat'ionaI economic organisar.ions - the Commission shoutd
coordinate the action of the Member State's deLegations for att matters in
which the Union has a common potìcy, and shouLd act as the spokesman of the
Union on such matters. DipLomatic act'ivìty in capitaLs of third countries
shouLd be coordinated. In capitaLs where there are Commiss'ion detegations,
they shouLd be responsibte for the work of coordination, and they shouLd
continue to represent the Union for aLt matters subject to its competence.
In many capita[s, and in particuLar those where not att the Member States
are represented, it wiLL be advantageous to estabLish jo'int embassies to
deaL with matters of common interest.
Financiat resources necessary for the imptementation,:rf fore'ign poLicy
should form part of the budget of the Union.
_ 
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(63)
«4)
(65 )
5. Competence of the Union concern'ing security aspects
of Externat retations
In the artictes of the nerl Treaty concerning the poIitìcaI aspects of
externaI relations, there shouLd be a section rlhich recognises the inter-
dependence of the Member States'in the fjetd of security and Laying dorrn
that they may attribute competences to the Union in this area as they see
fit. The union uouLd thus have potentiaL competence for securìty1.
The new Treaty shoutd ìncorporate into articLes the terms of the Agree-
ment on the anpLication of the European Convention on the suppression of
Terrorism, and the convention on cooperation in criminat Matters.
The roLe of the various institutions and the distribution of powers
among them shaLL be the same as described above for potiticaL aspects of
externaL poLicy. The individuat ministers sitting in the Counci L wi L I vary
accordingIy, and may incLude ministers responsibLe for security.
1M.a,".. for which the Union cou[d, under thìs procedure, be g'iven con-
current competences incLude:
the adoption of common posit'ions
atL other muLti LateraL taIks and
arms control and disarmament, as
works to whìch aLL or many Member
the standardisation of armaments
European Arms Procurement Agency;
'in CSCE f oL Low-up conf erences, and
negotiations on security, cooperat'ion,
weLL as uithin internationaL frame-
States beLong;
and the possibì Lìty of estabL'ishing a
- the estabLishment of a European D'isaster ReL'ief Un'it;
- coordination of navaL patroLs protecting the f ishìng grounds, raw
materiaIs suppLy routes, and seabed resources;
- the grant'ing of a European Union LabeL when two or more Member States
provide troops as part of an internationaL peace-keep'ing force.
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6. Accession and Assoc'iat'ion
DeaIing rith apptications for membership constitutes an essentiaL
function of externaI retations. The accession of new Member States to
(66) the Union shoutd be conditional upon the appLicant states fulfiLting the
essentìat requ'irements of pLuratist democracy and respect for human
rights.
G7)
Accession treaties shou[d be negot'iated with the appLicant state by
the Councit and the Commission. They shoutd require ratification by the
national par[ìaments of atL the l'lember States and by the European Par-
I i ament .
(68)
One rloutd Like to pose simitar conditions on human rìghts for Associa-
tion Agreements but this rlouLd cLearLy be impracticat. A potiticaL judg-
ment as to whether countrìes quaLìfy for Association woutd thus have to be
made by the ìnstitutions of the Union in each indìviduaL case.
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I
1. Finances are merety a means of carrying out the tasks assìgned to the Union;
they are therefore predetermined by those tasks. l.
?. They must atso be adapted to the principaL features of the Union and in par-
ticutar to the proposed leveI of poIiticaL and economic ìntegration.
3. At the same time, the finances of the Union must compLy wìth certain specìfic
standards derived from a number of basic princìples and objectìves such as: democ-
tacy, ìndependence, equ'ity, eftlciency, controL, etc.
;4. tle must therefore formuLate a kìnd of'doctrine'for Union finances whose
apptication to the various eLements of the financiaL systeml is deaLt with ìn the
second part of this document.
5. This doctrine is derived from a certain deductìve, politìcaL concept of the
rUnion'but is also based on experìence gaìned in 30 years'operation of Communìty
finances and from subsequent analyses and proposats for reform put forward in
various quarters2.
6. It is not possibte to g'ive deta'ited consideration to every anatysis and
proposat in the framework of this document. lrJe shouLd, however, refer
to the work carried out by ParLiament in the field of budgetary
reform since 1970:
- Spéna[e (1970) and Lange «975) reports on the revision of the Treaties
- Co'intat reports (976, 1977 and 1978) on the interinstitutionaI diaLogue
on certain budgetary questions
- Lange report (979) on convergence and budgetary questions and Pfennìg report
(1981) on the future of the Community budget
- SpineLtì report on the Community's oxn resources
(- Joint decLaration ParLiament/Councit/Commissìon (982) on 'improving the
budgetary procedure)
1th" tinances' of the Union are taken to mean aLL the mechanisms contrìbutìng to
the financ'ing of its activ'ities: resources, expendìture, budget, budgetary
procedure, pIanning, ìmpIementation of the budget, controt, ìmptement'ing
provisions, borrowing and Lendìng.
2tn,hìs context see the foLLorlìng documents, whìch are conta'ined'in the coLtection
of texts retating to European Union pp 393-415
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1. qsqeqte!rq-linenges
7. This is the basic principLe underLying aLI pubtic financing systems. The
Union's finances witI be tevied from its citizens and wiLL be used in their
interest: their representatives must therefore maintain the greatest possibIe
degree of controt over these finances.
6. If the Union is granted lfngngfg!_Uqgpgndgnce from the Member States,
dgqgqfglfg-gglllg! can onty be exercised by the Union's ParLiament.
9. The role of the European ParLiament must therefore be predominant where
the author.izatìon coLLection of revenue and expend'iture 'is concerned
and the deci sion-making procedures w'i[ [ have to be adapted accord'ingLy.
2. Autononrous fìnances
?0.. The specific and ìndependent nature of the tasks/terms of reference of the
Member States on the one hand and the Unìon on the other must be reflected in
djstioqt and separate fìnanciaI systems.
11. It ìs ìmpossibte to conceive of any form of direct supervision of Union finances
by the Member States. However, the institution representing the Member States
within the Union must work with Partiament in regutating joint finances.
12. This independence does not exctude aLL forms of coordination ìn the regutatìon
of national and Un'ion finances. It the Member States and the Union intend to pur-
sue a common economic/conjuncturat poL'icy, it shouLd be poss'ibLe to base jt, in
particutar, on a coordinated budgetary/fiscat pot.icy.
3. Finances adapted to the tasks of the Union
13. The defjnition of the tasks ass'igned to the Union wiLL determine the vo[ume of its
finances - and not the other way round. For exampte, if the Union is g.iven major
responsibi Lity for structuraL poLicy (investment) and/or conjuncturaL poLicy
(campa'ign agaìnst unempLoyment), it shouId have adequate financìaI resources at
its disposat.
14. If the (progressive) aItocation of tasks to the Union and the Member States
is set out cIear[y and preciseLy, there shouLd be no probLem in the subsequent
atLocation of finances. It wouLd therefore be usefut to make provis.ion for a
period'icaL and systematic review of the aLLocation of respons'ibiLity to the states and
the union respectiveLy - joint measures may sometìmes complement nationat measures, and
'sometimes be separate or specific.
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75. A clear-cui aLtocation woutd aLso eÀable finances to be used more rationatty,
thereby avoiding a[[ duoIication both in poLicies and approprìations. In most cases,
the transfer of responsibiLìty from the Member States to the Union wou[d be ac-
companied by a corresponding financiat transfer and thereshouLd be no increase in
the citizens' or/eraLI tax burden.
4. Eespsnsrble_Irnenses- -
16' The Union wiLL not develop in a perfect worLd cut off from economic reaLìty.
0n the contrary, it wi r. r. have to take account of-qet!g!_!rgnd§ 
_(menetary, 
_ 
soslal-ele-)
--:----:::----:---. '- :-''' --
in att the Member States - hence the need for some coordinatìon of nationaI and
Union f inances referred to above. The vitat,,economic pr.incipLes of budgetary aus-
terity - or indeed revivat - at nationa[ leveI shouLd be reftected in the'i'inances
of the Union.
1?. In view of the progressive nature of the constructìon of the Union, it must
retain a certain degree of independence in order to make prov'ision for the financing
of the new tasks which are assigned to it.
5. Eouitabte finances
18. Equìty is another basic princìpIe of atL publ.ic financing systems ìnvotvìng
eìther a group of states or a targe group of citizens.
19. The relative economic wealth of the Member States of the Union tlit[ remain
equal - for a time at least - and the financing method chosen must not aggravate
existìng disparities. It might possibLy heLp to reduce them, in particuLar by
veiohtino the transfer of resources from the citizens of different Member States.
20. Furthermore, the di rect orindi rect ef f ect of important measures ìmpLe-
mented by the Union wi[[ create the conditions needed for greater convergence
of the levels of economic devetopment in the varìous Member States.
?1. However, Union finances shoutd not be used as an ìnstrument for purely
financiaI equaLization betveen the states as th'is youtd have no lasting effect
on structuraI economic convergence. Any constrictive and arbitrary system
based on the princìpte of a fair return woutd be contrary to the fundamentaI
objectives of the Union.
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?2. The Union shoutd uLtimate[y ensure that the principLes of equ'ity and progressjon
in tax matters are extended to the regionat leveL and to each cìtizen so that
everyone contributes to the joint undertaking g999ld!ng-!9-[]-g-AE-heE-Eqe1§.
6. Efficient, transDarent and proqressive finances
Z3t The Union must have at its disposaL a first-cLass financiaI systr.m suited to
its specific needs.
24. Firstty, the system shouLd be ef f icìent: the product'iv'ity of expendrtur: rri Lt
depend above att on the quaLity of the poticies which are ìmpLemented, but bad
financiaI ruIes (inftexibi tity, sLowness or Laxity) couLd compromise the impLemen-
tation of good po[ìcies. Furthermore, the Union shouId Limit unproductìve expendìtui^e,
e.g. admìnisirative expenses. A systematic anaLysis (of the cost-benefit type) of
expendìture shoutd be carried out in the context of the budget and the measures
in question changed or aboIished where necessary.
?5. The sy$tem shoutd atso be simpLe and transparent: the Ievyìng of resources and
the a[location of appropriations shou[d be as transparent as possibte to secure the
understandìng, confiCence and su;:port of the peopLe. Financing procedures must atso rnake
it possìbLe to avoid aLL obstruct'ion (particuLarty as a resuLt of inter-institutionat
rivaIry) both in the adoption and in the implementation of the budget.
26. Finat[y, the system shou[d be fLexibte and proqressìve: ìt shouLd enabLe varìous
formulae to be appLied (e.9. recourse to borrowing/ tending). Its devetopment must
not be hampered by pre-set, restrictive and arbitrary Limìts, whether ìn the form of
ceiLings on resources or the'indexing of expenditure. However, some form of frame-
work would be usefuL in heLpìng to control the increase in overatL financiaL re-
sources.
7. Finances undef controL
ZZ. It is essentiat to exercise control over the ìmptementat'ion of finances
(coupted with precise and ptausibte sanctions) in order to ensure that expenditure
is regutar and management sound and to gain the confidence of pubLic op'inion. This
impLies, for exampte, that the Union's supervisory bodies must have djrect aqqess,
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brhenever necessary, to atL retevant operations/accounts not onLy within theinstitutions and other bodies of the union but also within the nationat
agencies rlhich cot[ect revenue or disburse expenditure on behatf of
the Union.
2g. PoLiticaI control over finances shouLd uLtìmateLy be exercised by the insti-
tution which represents the citizens l,ithin the Union. TechnicaI controI shoutd
be exercised by an independent body but one which coutd be made to answer to the
institution responsibLe for poLiticaI contro[.
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ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE UNION ' S FINANCES
29. Under the new system, the Union's finances wì Lt comprise in pract'icaL
terms a corpus of ruLes, mechanisms and procedures whìch wiLt be formutated
and subsequentLy apptied by various bodìes.
30. It is therefore 'important to determine how these ru[es, mechanisms,
etc. bri LL sat'isfy the principtes and objectives outtìned above. Since
our first concern is to estabLish a constitutionaL framework for the
deveLopment of the Union's finances, this anatys'is must remain faìrLy
generaL except that particu[ar attention must be gìven to the division
of responsibìLit'ies between the Union and the Member States and between
the various Institut'ions within the Union.
31. This anaLysis wiLL be based, either strictLy or LooseLy according
to each individuat case, on the existing Commun'ity financiaI system and
wiLL therefore take the form of overatI proposats for reform or innovation. Some of
these proposaLs wh'ich appLy at the 'constitutìona[' Levet (e.g. powers
regardìng the creat'ion of ourn resourcès, arrangements for voting on and
àOopt'ing the budget, etc.) and wi LL be taken up .in the generaL resotùtion
subm'itted by the Committee on Internat'ionaL Affairs before being.incorporated
in a form sti'tL.to be.determ'ined - in the new draft rreaty.
II.
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1 . Resources
32- (a) lCeeligo-etg-Egdiligetien: The existìng Treat'ies (viz. ArticLe 201 of the
EEC Treaty) stipuIate that the creation of new orln resources (or substantiaL
modificatìon of existìng resources) is decided by the Counci[, acting unanì-
mousty, (after consuLtìng the European Partiament) and subsequentLy ratified
by the Member States. The current system of own resources'is governed by
the Decision o't 21 ApriL 1970 taken on the basis of th'is procedure. Any
modification of this dec'ision would have to be ratified by the Member States.
33.
34.
35.
This system is scarceLy compatibLe u'ith the Union's neecl for independence and
democracv. The system governing the Union's finances can onty be decideci
by its own'inst'itutions. F'inanciat independence ìs a vitaL pre-requisìte
for the genuine 'independence of any organ'ization or grouping. Furthermore,
the Last word on this matter must be given to the body which represents the
democratic consensus within the Union, ì.e. ParLiament.
Partiament has expressed this opinion on many occasionsl and in 1969 and Later in
1973 the Comm'iss'ion presented f ormaI proposaLs f or the revision of the
Treaties to ensure this independence and democratization.
iire creation anr. baSic ,i,odif icatiòn of the Un'ion's resources
- i.e. its tax system - CouL'd therefore be dec'ided in accordance with the
fotLowing procedure:
- the Commirsion2 draws up a proposal when it deems fit (this proposaL
couLd be timed to coincide ulith the five year programme referred to
in paragraphs 89 to 96.
- The CounciL gives its opinion on this proposaL, act'ing by quaLìfied
majority - modifications rejected by the Commissìon may onLy be
adopted unanimousLy;
The Last occasion was its resotution of 9 ApriL 1981 on the Community's own
resources (0J No. C 101 oI 4-5.1981 - Spinetti report).
In order to sìmpLify matters, the current names of the'inst'itutìons have not
been changed in references to the Union. Thìs does not, of course, prejudge
the future institutionaL structure of the Union.
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36- (b)
37. (c)
38.
- ParLiament takes the finaI decis'ion and acts by quaLified majority -
furthermore, aIt amendments rejected by the Commission of the CounciL must
receive at teast hatf the votes of the Members of the AssembLy. No amend-
ment may be adopted if the CounciL expresses'its unanimous opposition.
- dec'is'ions taken by ParLiament are binding on the other institutions and
on the Member statesl.
Ifgsfng-gl-EgygOgg: It is essentiaL that Union resources shouLd be abLe to
devetop freeLy so that they can be adjusted to the Level of required ex-
2penditure.- The Un'ion must therefore have at [east one type of'ttqg]
Igyqngg,at its d'isposaL to enabLe ìt to ensure the batance of revenue in
its budget at aLL times. The choice of this revenue w'iLL have to be
made by the Union institutions: it coutd be, for exampte, the current
system of VAT without the ceiting and subject to various improvements3
ihe freeing of own resources wiLL be coupled with the introduct'ion of a new
procedure aimed at improving the pLanning of measures and poticies to be
imptemented by the Union on the basis of a common agreement betLreen the
Union Institut'ions and in conjunction wìth representatives of the Member
States (see paragraphs 86 to 96 betow). It coutd be introduced graduaLLy
'in stages and invoLve trans'itionaL measures.
Iypg-gl-fg§gglgg§: It witL be the task of the Union institutions to take
any decisions either according to the procedure referred to'in paragraph
35 above or the normat tegisLative procedure to mod'ify the resources which
'i t rnay inherit from the present system and to create neh, resources. t.le
mìght, for exampLe, cons'i der introducing neu tevies - or transferri ng nat.i onat
Levies to the Union - in conjunction wìth the creation of new policies (in
the energy or industriaI fieLds, for exampLe).
Finail.y the Union couLd examine the possibìtity of Levying a portion of
direct taxes on naturat persons - harmonized in advance - in order to
adapt the tax burden more effect'iveLy to the financiaL capacìty of the
taxpayer.
1
'This proposed votìng procedure is given by way of exampLe at this stage.It must ìn part'icutar, take account of the suggestions made by the
rapporteur on the Un'ion Institutions.
r the present
cannot deveLop
customs dut i es
restricted by a
3see 
.esotut ion
system, sone resd:rces are determined by external factors ard thereforern Llne trttn tlnanctng requlrements 6s ìn the case of
and Levies); others are adjustabLe in theory but arepre-set cei Ling (e.9. VAT).
ot 9.4.1981
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39. However this may be, it is essentiat that Union revenue take the form
of genu'ine ohrn resourcesr'i.e. Lev'ied direct[y from naturaL or IegaL
persons and be independent of the dec'isions of the Member States.
Their scope shouLd be as wide as possibLe, they shouLd offer a contiouous,
h'igh LeveI of return and they shoul.d exhibit an adequate degree of
transparency and adm'inistratìve simpL'ic'ity.1
(à) lglgb!ìng: Own resources are currentLy based on economic activity (on ìmports
in the case of customs duties/tevies and on production for VAT). This means
that there is no eLement of proqressìon yhatever the reLative weaLth of the
indivìduaI Member State may be. In certain circumstances (high teveL of
investment and/or exports), this system coutd even favour the most prosperous
Member States.
The principte of equ'ity referred to above Leads us to consider a system of
tax weiqhtinq based on the actuaL contribution capacìty of the Member States.
In this connection, we mìght propose that transfers of VAT payments be Linked
2to € sca[e derived from each country's per capita GNP This k'ind of modì-
fication to the current system would have to be decided by the Union inst'i-
tutions in accordance w'ith the procedure referred to:in paragraph 34 above.
However, the Iimits of this we'ightìng must be cLearLy specified:
- this shouLd not be a system of redistribution: the main purpose of Union
resources wiLL be to finance its actìvities - economic convergence must
be achieved by the'impLementation of common poLicies;
- the direct and independent nature of Un'ion resources must not be tampered
with: there must be no return to the system of nationaL contrìbutions based
on spec i fi c shares.
The future constitution of the Union shoutd be abte to encompass this weight'ing
principLe whiLst Leav'ing the task of defining it to the appropriate ìnsti-
tut i ons.
40.
,41 .
42-.
h3,
Commission Memorandun of 23.11.78
Commission proposaL of 23.11.7E on the Community's
report of 9.4.1981 (see above).
ouln resources and Par L i ament's
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45.
4,+-. (e) 9!!gf_1gg!gCgS: l,lithout going into the detai Ls of atL the f eatures of Union
resources at this point, it 'is possibte to specify ttdo features derìved
from the prìnc'ipLes set out above:
- ALL resources paid irnmedìateLy, directLy and in fuLL to the Union: the present
system is gnsatisfactory in this respect since in some cases Communìty
resources pass through the nationaL budgets and are, ìn aLL cases, entered
in the accounts of the nationaI treasuries to be made availabLe to the
Community as and when they are requìred.
The Union must have more'independence in this fietd, e.g. by settìng up
a specì fì c 'treasury department' .
It shoutd atso be estabtished that, contrary to the present system, any
annuat budget surpluses remain the property of the Union (and are not re-
pa'id to the Member States) .
- The specific nature of resources: It wouLd be desirabLe for any possjbte future
reverue paìd to the Unim to be ìdentifìed as such by its citizens (as is the revenue
of Locat or regionaI authorìties in some Member States) - even if the
type of assessment (e.g. VAT) is atready used by the states/natìonaI auth-
orit'ies.
2. Expendi ture
47. (a) 9gn!tg!!jng_inqlgqsq§: Under the Communìty system, increases in expendìture
are subject to tt.lo restrictions: the ce'iLing on avaiLabLe resources and the
maxìmum annuaL rate of increase 'in non-compuLsory expenditure-
Such Iimìtatìons are inconceivabLe in the context of the Unìon, which shoutd
have free use of the funds needed to finance the tasks aLtocated to it'
Horever, the prìncipLe of financ'iaL ìndependence must be appLied iitn a
cLear view of the objectives to be achieved and the economìc constraints
to be observed. Three measures wiIt be applìed in this context:
46.
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48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
- !he-dl§!rlbs!te!-eI-!es!s-end-gsrcssesndrog-flnenste!-lsrdsns-bstwsen
the Union and the Member States witL be carried out at intervaLs accordìng
to the arrangements discussed betow: in this way, the med'ium-term increase
in Union expend'iture can be covered by overaLL estimates to be used as a
guidetine for the annuaL budgetary decis.ions;
- aLL proposats for Union decìs'ions (operation of exist'ing poLicies or
'introduction of neh, poLicies) shouLd be preceded by deta.iLed f!1qaglq!
q§!lEe!9§ to ensure a good return on investment and correct pLanning of
expenditure in cases where the financiaL imptications are very considerabIe,
the Union must ensure that this net.r exoendìture is compatibte with the
muttiannuaI f inancìat programme;
- a ggldgllng-lfggfg for the overatI increase in expenditure wiLL be es-
tabLished at the beginn'ing of each financ'iat year to provide a yardstick
for deci sions retat'ing to the budget for the f of towing f inanc'ia L year;
this rate wìtL be fixed with reference to the muttiannuat objectives but
atso to the econom'ic and financiat situation in the Member States.
The Legistative authority w'i LL take this rate into consideration before
reaching decisions whjch have fìnanciaL impLications for the financiaL
year in question.
«Ul !ll!g!g!gy: The Unio,r must not onty controI the overaLt increase in expen-
diture but must atso ensure that financiaL resources are used effic'ientIy,
i.e. it must ensure that the aìms of the poticies ìmpLemented are achieved
at the [owest possibLe cost. In order to do th'is, it must begin by 'intro-
ducìng a modern cost-benefit anatvsis system to enabLe it to measure ef-
f icìency w'ith prec'ision.
Furthermore, the annuaI budgetary procedure must 'incLude a
ination of +! items of expend'iture and not merety of new i
budget .
detai ted exam-
tems added to the
53. Last but not [east, the maìn expenditure programmes correspond'ing to the
major common poLìc'ies must inctude a periodic revision cLause makìng it
possibte to re-exam'ine, at reguLar intervats, not onIy the poL'itìcat ad-
visabiL'ity of expenditure but aIso its eff ic'iency. These programmes wiLL
have to undergo fairLy radicaL modification, being either continued wìth
a different tevet of expenditure or suppressed, on the basis of the results
of this re-examinatìon.
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54.
55.
56.
57 (d)
58.
(c) Qp919!fgOg!-ng!gre: tJithout wish'ing to prejudge the tasks to be assigned
to the Un'ion, bJe can assume that its main roLe tri tL be to formuLate, di-
rect and finance poLicies whose day-to-day management wiIL be chiefLy mdertaken
by the nationaL administrations. These may incIude cycLicat measures(e.9. in the agrìcuIturaI and sociaL fieLds) or structuraI measures (as
in the industriaL or energy sectors).
Union expend'iture wi tL, generaLty speakìng, be operationaL
'i n nature, i.e. it wi LL be used to f inance the measures which are .i m-
pLemented and not the human and materiaI infrastructures needed to carry
out those measures. Adminìstrative expenditure wì LL very Iargety be borne
by the Member States and/or the territoriaI authorities concerned.
The Union budget wiLL therefore be essentiaLLy an intervention budqet whose
admihistrat'ive expenses must be reduced to a min'imum (probabLy around 5'1,
as in the Communìty budget).
§pggl.If9_nelglg_91_U1l.9n_gIpgndflyCe: With the (notabLe) exception of the
EAGGF Guarantee Section, most of the Community's expenditure currentLy
takes the form of co-financing with the nationaL budgets (Regionat F.:nd,
SociaL Fund, EAGGF Guidance Section, etc.); the Communìty,s share in these
jo'int financ'ing projects is generaILy a minority one and is occasionatLy
tess than 102. This often Leads to theorig'inaLity of the joint poLicy in
question being weakened and its aimsrdi[uted'as a resuLt of the - poss'ib[y
very dìfferent - priorities of the nat'ionaL poticies.
The Un'ion shouLd therefore make every effort graduaLLy to take over
majority or even excLusive financing of the tasks assigned to it under
the principLe of sub.sidiarity. This wi LL probabIy 'invoLve greater
speciatization and concentration of some joint measures but it wi LI
enable us to ensure that the poticies pursued by the union are more
specific and more efficient.
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59.
60.
{e) Qiglgibglign: One of the Union,s main objectives wiLL be economic conver_
gence, i.e. between the
various Member states and the various reg'ions. In order to achieve this,
specifìc poLicies wiLL be ìmptemented and these wiLL inftuence the devet-
oprrent of economic structures. The financinE of these potìcies wì LL be
arranged by means of transfers of resources to the Iess-favoured states/
regions' The combined impact of these transfers and the we.ight.ing of own
resources (see above) shouLd normatty enabIe these states/regìons to show
a budget surptus.
It witI therefore be unnecessary to have recourse to budgetary equatization/
compensatìon mechanisms such as those which have been ìn existence in the
Commun'ity since 1975/80 (financiaL mechanism and supptementary measures).
If a pers'istent budgetary disparity were to occur between the budgetary
contributions paid by c'it'izens and the overaLL benefit derived from
their membershìp of the union, it wouLd indìcate that convergence poticies
were not operat'ing correctLy and these wouLd then have to be stepped
up or revised. However, correction by means of the budget aLone shou[d
be avoided as it wouLd make no Lastìng contribution to reducing
d'isparitìes ìn deveLopment
ot
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6?.
63.
64-
65.
66.
3- Esdeet
ta) Qyggg!!_yglgqg: The vo[ume of the Union budget witt, of course, be deter-
mined by the nature and the scope of the tasks ass'igned to'it. The sup-
press'ion of att arbitrary ceiLings on resources and expenditure routd
enab[e this automatìc adjustment to be made whiIst certain mechan'isms (see
paragraph 80 beLour) w'iLt enabLe us to controt increases 'in expenditure.
The Union budget wiLL ìnevìtab[y be more substantiaL than the Community
budget, which current[y represents onty2.7% of the totaI of the Member
States' budgetsl
This inevitabte groh,th wiLL be Limited by the fact that some of the Unionrs
neul responsibi Iities wi LL be primari Ly concerned with coordination and
harmon'ization (e.9. on short-term economic poticy, foreign poticy, protec-
tion of human rights, etc.).
Furthermore, this growth witt LargeLy be offset by the fact that the Union's neu,
expenditure wit[ [argety tgqlqgq nationaL expendìture, the Member States
being reIieved of the burden. In some cases, transfer of expenditure to
Union IeveL witt make it possìbLe to reduce overaIt expendìture considerabty
by eLimìnat'inc CupLicat'ion, by rationaLizing and by econonties of scaLe
(e.g. in the research, energy and ìndustrial sectors).
The budgetary burden witt onLy be
compLeteLy new sectors in which the LeveI
low or negLigibLe. Th'is coutd atso appty
used to reduce d'isparities -in devetopment
increased if the Union enters
of Member States' act i v'it i es i s
to Union expenditure which is
between states/ regìons.
67. The total ìncrease in the volume of
I netee.Qs_ I !_!h q_eyete!! 
_ ! e x_bsr den
This condition is in Line uith the
the Member States that the current
(roughLy 5O'l on average) shoutd not
the Union budget shouLd pg! Lead to an
- direct or indirect - on its citizens.
concern expressed by the governments of
LeveL of pubtic Levies on production
be excèeded.
EEC budget for 1982 = 21,600
2.7
1.5
0.88
m ECU
Z of the tota[
% of total nat
Z of the totat
of the nationaI budgets
ìonaI pubtic expendi ;ure
of nationaL GDP
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68.
69.
70.
71.
Bearìng these factors in mind, we
Lowìng the creation of the Union,
it represents a sum equivaLent tcr
States' budgetsl 
.
can estimate that in the ten years foL_
its budget coutd expand graduatLy trnti L
rouglhly 101 of the totaL of tire iìernbc-r
It shouLd be noted that this increase wiIL be set in the framework
of the muttiannuaL financiaL ptanning mechanism referred to below
and in which aLL the inst'itutions and aLL the Member states wiU.
have a rote to ptay.
tb) [g!3-lgg!grgs: The union budget ,r.a, of course, compLy aLL the more strictIy
with the basic principLes of pubtic finances (transparency, genu.ineness,
annuaLìty, spec'ifìcity, etc.) as it wi Ll. effectiveLy be ìndependent.
Two of these prìncìptes are of particu[ar ìmportance for the Unìon budget:
9glgngg of revenue and expend'iture: ArticLe 199 of the EEC Treaty stiputates
that the revenue and expend'iture shown in the budget shaL L be 'in baLance',
which excLudes a priorì any defic'it to be financed by borrowing. This
rute offers obvious financiaI and pcLiticaL advantages (particuLarty as
regards pubLic op'inion in the Member States and the internationaI capìtat
markets which Lend money to the Community) but under certain circumstances
it is an inftexìble etement which proves too restrìctive. It is perhaps
not equitabLe to finance the whote of the Union budget using resources
'proper' : i.e. excLusiveLy fiscaL resources whereas the budgets of aLL
the Member States are forced to make use of the mechanisms of the nationaL
debt. It wouLd therefore be appropriate to make provisìons enabting the
Union to comptement its tax revenue by means of lgtlgUlng under prec'iseLy
defined conditions.
rt shouLd be noted that this type of budgetary borrow'ing shouLd remain
separate from the Union's other borrowing and tending activ'ities which
are 'intended to f inance speci f i c measures outs'ide the scope of the budget
as such (see paragraphs 106 to 109 beLow)
1tn 
,his context see the 1977 estimates of the McDougaLL working party
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72. - ~Di1~_Qf_!b~-~~Q9~!: All Union revenue/expenditure will be grouped together 
in a single document and will be subject, under identical conditions, to 
a single authorization procedure. This principle has gradually become 
established within the Community <with the exception of the finances for 
the~~~~ and_~Qf). It must be fully confirmed at Union level to ensure 
the transparency and clarity of presentation necessary for sound financial 
management • 
73. A third essential feature of the Union budget will be coordination with the 
Member States' budgets: An information/consultation procedure will be set 
74. 
75. 
up between the appropriate authorities of the Member States and of the !Inion 
to ensure coordination in the preparation of their respective budget docu-
ments. This will form a basis for a harmonized budgetary policy (cyclical 
measures) for the Member States and will also ensure compatibility between 
the'overall increase in national finances and that of the Union budget. 
Finally, it will facilitate the practical application of the principle of 
the subsidiarity of Union expe~diture, in that progressive transfers of 
financial burdens from the national budgets to the Union budget will thus 
be made clearer and simpler. 
(c) EQ!i!if~!_rQ!~: The budget will play a central political role in the life 
of the Union since it will provide an unparalleled opportunity for giving 
an overall assessment of and drafting a comprehensive action programme on 
---------- -----------------
common policies. Above all, the volume and distribution of financial re-
sources will determine the rate of completion of various measures specified 
in Union legislation/regulations. The vote on the budget could also provide 
an opportunity for introducing certain ad hoc measures or for modifying 
the development of certain policies. 
The problem of ~~~Qr9io~!iQQ_~~!~~~D-~~Q9~!_Q~fi~i2D~-~o9_!~9i~!~!i2o ___ _ 
(a particularly controversial issue in the Community) will be resolved by 
the fact that the legislative and budgetary authority will be one and 
the same. The same institutions will exercise jointly and with comparable 
decision-making powers the power to enact regulations and enter appropriations. 
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4. Budqetarv procedurel
(a) !q!!y_g1_gfpgndl!glg: The distinction between compuIsory and non-compuLsory
expenditure, on which the who[e of the EEC budgetary procedure ìs based,
must be abolished. It essentiaLty provìdes a basis for the atLocation of
the respective budgetary poh,ers of the CounciL and Part'iament and is not
based on any objective criterion.
There wiLL be onLy one type of expenditure at Unìon levet. The a[Location
of powers to att the institutions concerned wiLL be organized in the form
of success'ive majority conditions to be appt'ied in exactLy the same tray to
a L l. budget i tems.
However some expenditure wiLI continue to be unavoidabLe as a resutt of
existing LegisLation or rights acquì red by third part'ies (rents, automatìc
guarantee mechanisms, internationaI agreements, etc.) and the budgetary
authority must autho-ize them to avoid Legat proceedìngs.
76.
77.
78.
79. (b) AOOUe!_Iglg_gl_lnglgg§g: Under the Community system, a statisticaI maximum
rate sets an automatic ceiting on the'increase ìn a given category of ex-
penditure (non-computsory). This rate may onty be exceeded with the formaL
consent of the Counci L and Partiament.
80. The annua[ ìncrease in the Union budget wi[[ not be subject to this type
of timit. However, a quideLine fìoure for the overatt increase in the
budget wìLL be estabtìshed prior to the start of each budgetary procedure
by the Commission in conjunction with the Councì L and Partiament2. This
rate tli LL take into account not onl.y the statìst'ics retating to prev'ious
financiaL years but aLso the forecasts for the economìc and financiat sìtu-
ation in the Member States and the financing needed to proceed with the
'imptementation of the Union's exìst'ing/new projects.
81. It witI therefore constitute a !9l99!-l]gglg for the gygtggg-Ie!g-91-l!9l9e§9--
and wi Lt be essentiat[y statìsticaL and non-bìnding. The dfg!! budget
must not exceed this rate, which wiLL also be used as a guìdetine for the
deIiberations of the budgetary authority wìthout hav'ing an over-
rid'ing inftuence on its poLit'icat dec'isions (see aLso paragraph 86
u"t!9
1rh" pro."dure for the adoption of the budget
mechanisms which we can on[y outtine at this
Zsee footnote 2 on page 8.
must be governed by very precise
poi nt .
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8?. (c) qlel!-Dgdgg!: The initiative and responsìbitìty for drawing up the draft
budget wìLL tie with the lqnUf§Sfgn. The budgetary authority witL therefore
have to estabIish ìts pos'itìon vis-à-vis the proposats submitted by the body
which seems best ptaced to understand the precise nature of the Union!s
chief interests and to defend them impartìaLLy.
83- (d) Vglg-gn-lhg-bgdgg!: The budgetary authority wì[L be abLe to amend the draft
budget under the fottowìng conditions:1
84. - the Commission's draft budget wiLL be submitted to the !gg4c!!, which may
amend it by simpte majority, provided that such amendment does not resutt
in a net increase in expend'iture, and otherwìse by quaLifìed majorìty
The Councit must in aLI cases vote by quatified majority when adopting an
amendment to which the Cornmission is opposed;
85- - the draft budget amended by the Councit is referred to_!qr!teqgO!. which
may amend it by simpte majority, provided that such amendment does not
resutt in a net increase in expenditure, and otherwise by quaLified ma-jority. ParLiament must, in atL cases, vote by quaLifìed major.ity and
by haLf of its Members when adopt'ing an amendment to trhich the Commission
is opposed- An amendment may not be adopted if the Councit'votes aga.inst
it unanimousty:
86- - if the overa[t totaL of expenditure voted by partiament exceeds the
annuaI rate of increase taid down by the Commission, the Councit qAX
9pp999-!h9-qdqp!190-91-!!s-!9dsg!-!y-e-steotE99§-y9!q; parLiament
wiIt then modìfy the draft budget according[y;
87. - on completion of the procedure, EgflleEgn!_Ilnelly_edoplg_the budget
and arranges for ìts pubLicatìon;
88. - representatives of the three institutions w.iLL join to form a pglEgngn!
Dgdge!gcy-9q!9!!le!l9n-p9Ey for the duration of the procedure (i.e.
from the fixing of the guìdeline figure to the adoption of the budget);
lSee footnote 1 on page 10
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89..
90. Thìs ptannìng w'iLt ch'ief Ly be concerned with the progressive divìsion of
tasks/responsibiL between the Union and the Member States. It wiLt
therefore be essentìaLLy poLiticat and further consideration wi LL be gìven
to it in another sectìon of the report by the Committee on Institutìonat
Affairs. However, the financiaI aspects of such pLannìng must be outLined
in this document.
91. Medium-term forecasts for the act'ivìties of the Union shoutd be combined
rìth f_i11anc_'i_aL__e_s_t_r1qa_t-e_s_ providìng usefuL informat'ion for the budgetary
authorities of the Member States and the Union on the volume of resources
to be made avaitabLe and the amount of expenditure to be injected ìnto
varìous sectors in which the Unìon is active.
.92. These estimates wi LL aLso be used as a fLexibLe' reference framework when
estabLishing the budget each year throughout the period in question- 0n
the poL.itìcat IeveL, this type of framework wouLd faciLitate the agreement
of the budgetary authorìty and contribute to the process of taking'responsib[e'
decisions on the financ'iat LeveL.
5. lluttiannuaL f inanciaI oL.anninq
{a) QliqgllygS,In order to ensure the conscious, detiberate and coherent de-
ve[opment of the Union, it wiLL be desirabLe to'introduce a system of
medìum-term ptanning for its activities. l
93.
94. The,outgoing'Commission woutd gather together the bas'ic data'in the form
of a statement covering the preceding five years and suggestions for the
. 
foLLowing five years. This document, which woutd be submitted to Partiament
at the end of its mandate, couLd be used by the potìtìcal groups when draw-
. 
ing up their programmes for the campaign preceding fresh elections to the
AssembIy.
1 See paragraph 9 of the resoLut'im * l.ri.,rrrffiir snaLl be Laid down, and in acc-
"9. Fiom time to tìme - at interr
ordance with appropriate procedures invoLving the Union and the Member states
- 
the tax resources shaIt be apportioned betueen the union and the states
accordìng to the Unìon's tasks and obL'igat'ions. lilithin the Limits of this
apportionment, the union and the states shaLL independentLy assess their
resources and draw up their budgets"
{b) lqggllge!-gqlglgggg1!§: The ptan couId cover a perìod
would be desirabLe for it to correspond to the period
(and that of the Comm'ission) ?
of
of
f rvS_:gar: and , it
Par L i anìent rs trtandate
2see footnote 2on page 9
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95.
0n taking up its duties, the netr commission woutd immediatety draw up a pro-
posa[ for the five years ahead on the basis of this data. The main task ofthis proposaI woutd be to assess the financìat.impact of the programme,
taking each poli:y ìn turn, and thereby to determine the totat volume of
financing requi red.
96. The five-year programme woutd be the subject of consuttations with the
Flember states and particuLarLy with the reLevant bodies in the nationaL oar-
Liaments. Once any changes have been made, it wouLd be submitted to the
Ar"c-i! for its opìnion before being adopted by the newty etected European
Partiament.
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97.
98.
99.
100.
6. 0ther aspects of Un.ion fìnances
ta) !qp!ggg!!g!190-91-!hg-Dggget: once adopted, the Union,s budget wiLL be
imptemented independentLy and di t'igentLy by the commiss.ion, which lJ j LI be
responsib[e to ParIiament for its management - and indeed the whoLe of
its operatìon.
The budqet ru[es and the various potìcies wiLI enabLe appropriations to be
used freeLy and quickLy. The other institutions wiLL not attempt to inter-
vene in budget management. 0nty the budgetary authority may be asked - if
necessary - to authorize any substant'iaI changes to the ìnìtiat expenditure
aut hor i zat i ons .
The permanent inter-institutionaL budgetary conci tìation body (see paragr4h gg abore)
coutd be consuIted by the Commission shouLd any particutar difficuLties
arise. There witt be a constant and mutuaI exchange of information between
the Commission and the speciaList budgetary groups t.,ith'in the CounciL and
ParIiament.
tb) [9p!!9fing_:fp!eqgn!e!190: Broadty speakìng, the arrangements for
controL in force in the Community may be retaìned. However, the
Auditorgr investìgat'ive powers Gither at its own initiatìve or at
quest oi the discharge authority) shouLd be made more precise and
both in reLat'ion to the other Unìon institutions and the nationaL
deLegated by the Commission to manage certa'in Union funds.
budget a ry
Court of
the re-
be st rengthened
authorìties
1O1l The annuaL'implementati n of the budget by the Commissìon wiLL be the sub-ject of an annual report by the Court of Aud'itors to determine vhether its
management is regular and sound. 0n the basis of thìs report and the rec-
ommendations attached to it, the d'ischarqe authoritv wiLt act under the
fot Lowing condìtions : 1
102. the CounciI approves the discharge and adopts recommendations addressed
to the Commission by simpte majority (a vote by quatified majority is re-
quired ìf the Commission decLares its opposition); the CounciL may refuse
to grant a discharge, acting by quaIified majority;
See fotrpte 1 m page 10
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103,
104.
105.
106.
- Èef!feqg0!_!e§_!h9__l,lfl_:ry:__it srants a discharse actins by simpte ma-jority or by quatified majorìty if the CounciI refuses to grant a dis-
charge; ìt confirms recommendations adopted by the CounciL and/or decides
on neu recommendations acting by simpLe majority (a quaIified majority
'is required if the Comm'ission dectares its opposìtion). ParIiament may
refuse to grant the Commission a discharge act'ing by quaLified majority,
with at Least haLf of ìts members takìng part in the vote; the resolution
accompanying th'is vote ritL expIaìn the reasons for the refusaL and,
where appropriate, wi l.l. 'indicate the conditions for a subsequent vote on
the di scharge.
{c) [!4g4gig!-gffgngg4g!!§: The Union must have at its dìsposaI a coherent body
of rulesandmechanisms, ìn the form of a singte FinanciaL Regulation, governing
its. operation in generaI and its finances in particuIar. These ruIes shoutd
be sufficientLy detai ted to avoid uncertainties and/or confLicting interpret-
ations but they should aLso be fLexibLe enough to enabte the Commission to
adapt its management in Iine with particutar circumstances; the mechanisms
used shouLd be sìmp[e and clear to enabLe decisions to be taken quickLy.
The Union's Fìnanc'iaI Regulatìon wiLL be adopted - and amended - in accord-
ance with the decision-making procedure appt'icabte to atL officiaL regu-
lations; however, it may - under certain circumstances - be necessary to
make provisions for an ad hoc procedure ensuring that ParLiament has the
Iast word' In vieu of its part'icutar resporsibitities in l6shrdgetary fieLd.
(d) Q9qg91ing-end-!9Ddug: The Union wiLL have at its dìsposaL a unified mech-
anism for borrowing/ Lending to provide financing for certaìn measures in
conjunction with the budget. The Union wiLL thus be in a position to collect
capitaI under much more advantageous conditions than those granted to
nationat organ'izatìons and wi Lt be abte to use them to f inance product'ive
investment in the context of the potic'ies pursued by the Union. l
1thi, 
mechanism
budget deficits
wi L I therefore
as described
be quite separate from borrowings used to cover
in paragraph 11.
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107. These operations wiLL be covered by the Union Budget; the'ir scope wiLL be
determined each year in the context of the budgetary procedure havìng
regard to both their financiaI suitabiLity and the Unìon's overaLt debt
burden. The budget may aLso be used to authorise and finance interest
subsidies for certain types of investment.
108. Cap'itaL coutd be cottected either outside or inside the Union. In
the Latter caser'Union bonds'cou[d be wideLy circulated among the generaL
pubtic, who wouLd thereby be directty invotved in this enterprise.
109. The management of these borrowing and lendìng activit'ies could be assigned
either to the Commission or to the EIB which wiLt act independentty
within the framework of annuaI budgetary authorizations and the supervision
arrangements pertaìn'ing to the ordinary budget.
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I. 9UIqEtINE§-ANq GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. The present document wiL[ seek to expLore, in an open, though not
exhaustive manner, and on the basis of the guidetines contained in the
resotution adopted by the European Par[iament on 6 July 1982, a number of possible
working options',connected with the system of ruIes designed to govern:
(a) the method of constitution and structure of the constitutionat bodies of
the European Union;
(b) the terms of reference of these bodiesl.
2. The mandate g'iven by the European Partiament to its Committee on InstitutionaL
Affai.r2 is based on the premise that it is potiticatty necessary to stcengthen
the Links between the Member States of the Community through the creation of
4
'The adoption by the European Partiament of the by now weLI known resotution
of 6 July 1982 has so far done nothing to quetL the debate as to whether it is
either usefut or appropriate, at the present stage in Community reLations, to
raise the question of rev'isìng the Treaties with a vieH to re-designing the
institutionaI structure. In fact, as discussions trithin the Committee on Insti-
tutional. Affairs have shown, there is no sign of a Lutl. in the argument between
those, on the one hand, who betieve that progress tohrards integration and
the easing of the Communìty's current il.ts cannot be achieved without a neul
institutionaL order, and those who, on the contraty, see this proposed remedy as
the product of an abstract, ahistoric, Entightenment-styte vision, and point
ìnstead to the need for a renered potitical wi[[ geared to the reat problems of
soc'iety, and bringing the ìnstitutions into Line onl.y at a later date with the
degree of integration atready attained through the common resoLution of probtems.
In reaIity, thìs argument arìses from a misteading faiture to understand, ìf
not a desire to spread confusion. It is undeniable that at the bottom of the
Community crisis ties a poLiticaI problem or, to be more precise, a weakening of
the poIiticaL witt (for famitiar reasons connected with the economic crìsis etc.,
which cannot be deaLt with here) and that a poLiticaI revivaL of the European
idea is therefore urgent. However, the reaL question is the choice of the
appropriate means, or rather the priority themes on whìch to base this attempted
revivat. If it is true that the notion of a graduaL, atmost automatic movement
towards integration has proved historicatty vatid onty up to a point, and if it
is equatLy true that the current inst'itutionaI system acts as a brake to progress,
then the [ogicat corotLary is to stress the need to revive the European idea
by means of institutionaL reforms. 0n the other hand, it is atso true that,
aLthough no institutionat system is capabte in itsel.f of ensuring that the aims
of a gjven poLiticaL body are attained, the existence of an effective institutional.
system is stiLt a necessary precondition. In this sense, it can be said that,
togical.[y, institutionaI movement (qfdq_qfdfnan§) atways precedes sociat movement
( grds-erd!oe!s§ ) .
)
'Consisting at this stage of the task of devetoping the generaL gu'ideLines
and drawing up '9n-!hi§_9esis_e_§g1t9§_9I_pl9e99e!§' to be submitted to
ParLìament for consideration (ResoLution of 6 JuLy 1982, paragraph 12).
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a ner supranationaL entity, a European Union3, which wiLt unite the whote
complex of the retations of the t{ember States4 and aLso5 be required by them to
undertake onLy'!hg§g-!A§!§-lhish_9sa_09_qrsss!ed-Egre-91!eggrye!X_u-s9049o-!he0
§y-!he-UeEDer-§la!e§-§epsre!9!v.-gc-!hess-rhe§e-ersss!ien-rqssue§-a-e90!rtbs!l.en
Irqu-the-Uniqn6 -
3. In particular, under the terms of the mandate, the responsibiLities of the
Union must be c[earty ident |fied7, making ctear distinction between the tasks
of the Union and those of the Member StatesS, and taking account from the outset
of those sectors in which an extension of the Unìon's pouers may prove possibLe9.
?
- It seems neither usefut nor easy to attempt a definition of the European Union,
which is intended in the sahìe rray as, and to a greater extent than the present
Cii:r"rnuniùy, to be a unique experineht wìthout preci se poìnts of ref erenee.
Nevertheless, the Unìon must be an autonomous subject of internationa[ lar yith
Legal personaLity in he internat systems of the ftlember States. It tritI not be
a federation, for the fundamental reason that the Member SEates yiL[ retain their
sovereignÙy, but it tliLI have important federaI characteristics such as the
compLexity and subdivision of the institutionat system (yith a directLy etected
partianentary body) and the possibiLity of taking tegaL action wh'ich, in given
cases, may be of immediate concern to the citizens of the Member States.
L
' In the uords of the Communiqué of the Paris Summit of 21 0ctober 1972.
§
- The Community's competence uitI therefore represent onLy a part of the
Unionrs competence. In accordance rith paragraph 10 of the resotution, provision
must be made, as a temporary measure, for att the acts of the present Community
to remain in force untit such time as modifications are introduced by the ttnion.
6 Resolution of 6 Jul.y 1gE?, paragraph 5(a).
7' op. cit., paragraph 5(b).
8
- op. cit., paragraph 5(c).
9'op. cìt., paragraph 5(d). This is rpotent'iaI competence', in the terminotogy
noh, current in the debate on institutionaL reform.
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4. 0n the basis of this premise, the abovementioned resotution anticipates
the outtine of the institutionaI framework, ìn Iine uith a number of guidetines
and generat principLes, which shouLd be stressed initiaIty because they provide
a partìcuLarty ctear and effective statement of the phiLosophy of the project
as a vhole:
(a) the use of the Communityrs institut'ionaI mode[, readjusted §9_Qse_9!-!!g
9ne-h9ad2, 
-!e-e!iuine!s-!hs-9ris!rog-sber!eeEiDe§-enq,.-eo-!hg-s!herz-!e-eneE!e
!he-U!!en-!e-shqs!dsr-ner-!es!s1 0 -
5. t,lith regard to this first guidetìne, ìn itself very c[ear, it ìs necessary
on[y to undertìne the ctearty expressed need to eIiminate the existing short-
comìngs - a task yhich naturat[y presupposes that these can be promptty identified.
6.(b) the principte of the separat'ion of por".r11, ,"", not onty in terms of
Montesqu'ieu's orig'inaL, abstract concept, but also in what has come to be the
estabtished, practicat meaning of the expression. This ìmpLies that the
institutionat order must be founded on a stabte and rationat batance between
the varioìs powers (Legistative, executive and supervisory) w'ith the execution
of these pouers distributed between the constitutionaL bodies in reLation to their
Legitimacy and compos'ition;
7.k) the princip[e of democratìc Legitimacy, rlhìch requires the direct or
indirect invoLvement of the peopLe in the constitution of the bodies and the
poLìticaI controI of their activitiesl2;
8.(d) the principLe of participation by the Member States, which means the need
to institutionaLìze the representation of the Member STates themsetvesl3,
constituted in practice by two existìng Community bodies, the CounciLl4 and the
1S
European Council'', which wiU. be retained with appropriate modifications in the
organization of the future Union;
'O oo.cìt., paragraph 8. This guideLine'is aLready formutated in the second partof paragraph 7.
" 
or.cìt., paragraph 7, tirst and second parts.
op.cit., paragraph 7 first part.
op.cit., paragraph 7, first part
op.cit., paragraph E(c)
op.cit., paragraph E(f)
1?
13
14
15
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9.(e) the criterion of efficiency, viewing as essentiat the need to redefine
the institutionaL system in such a ulay as to ensure capacity for action, prompt
decision-making and, in short, the harmonious functioning of att the bodies.
This criterion ìs formulated first in generaL termsl6 and then stressed vith
particutar reference to the counci LlT.
10. ALthough much of the resolution frequentty referred to is devoted to
institutionaI prob[ems, trith both generaI and, as hre shaLI see be[ow, specifìc
guidelines for each body, the possibte options are stiLL numerous and of great
poLiticaL signìf i cance.
11. In what fottows, we shatL attempt to comptete the picture aLready outIined
in Partiamentrs resolution, with the proviso that at this stage it has not at]rays
been possibte tp put forl,ard definite options for every aspect with aU. their
possibte imptications. In some cases, invoLving matters yhich depend on
decisions not yet taken, we have had to confine oursetves to brief observations,
pendìng agreement on the proposed solutions to these preIiminary questions.
'u or.cit., paragragh l,
" 
oo.cit., paragraph 7,
fi rst part
second part
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II. IE9I§IAIIYE-EqIEB
12. Paragraph 8(c) of the resotution caLts expIic'itty for LegisLative pouer to
be exercised joìntty by the CounciI and the Partiament.
1 ' Ihe-EerlreCIen!
13. The resoLution provides no specific guidetines in respect of the parL'ia-
mentary body and merety states (paragraph 8(c)) the obvious fact that the ParIiament
derives its mandate from the citizens of the Union.
'14. In fact, the present Community Partiament presents no probtems or difficu[ties,
and the constitutìon, composition and period of office of the Union's ParIiament
coutd be based entirety on those of the existing model.
15. The subject of electorat procedure ui[[ remain outside the scope of the
Treaty, as it atready is at present.
2. Ihs-9esnsi.!
16. With regard to the Counci t, however, the resoLution tays doHn a large number
of fairLy expticit principLes and gu'ideIines of both a generaI and specific
nature.
17.G) Method of constitution
The most important considerations as regards the constitution of the CounciI are the
first part of paragraph 7, which lays down the principLe of the partìcipatìon
of the Member States, examined above, and paragraph 8(c). vhich points out that
the Councì L derives its mandate from the Member States. However, account must
atso be taken of the generaI princip[e expressed in paragraph 8(c) that !!9-§gBEgni!X:§
prs!qE!-r!§!t!s!!9!§-§!a!!-b9-r9sdis9!ed-ss-es-"..-!q-s!iutne!9-!h9-9!i§!iDg
§bgr!9981!9§.
1E. It is weLL known that the CounciL is the Community body which is the subject
of most discussion and the target of most critìc'ism, not only because at present
it is the sote hoLder of Legistative and, in pract'ice, of executive pouer, but
above aLt for the way in which it exercises (or faiLs to exercise) the vast
powers vested in it.
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19. t.'lithout wìshing to digress into Lengthy anatyses beyond the scope of the
present document, it is rorth givìng a brief outtine of the major obstacLes rhich
need to be overcome if reforms are to be achieved.
20. It must be remembered that the CounciL ìs a body Lackìng in identity as a
resuLt of the constant changes in its members (a sltuation which exacerbates
its members' disaffection with their duties, with consequent unfavourabIe effects
on the institution's vitaLity); because its activity is atuays broken down into
sectors of competence, it lacks unity of purpose and thus a gLobaL vision of the
probtems facing it; by ìts very nature, it is itL-suited for the inter-governmentaI
role assigned to it and for the procedures on which its action is based as a resutt.
?1. The fact that on 1 September 198?,369 Commission proposaLs with opinions
by ParLiament were pending before the Counci[ ìs, to some extent, an etoquent
and succinct pointer as to how the CounciL shouLd be judgedl.
22. In the Light of these considerations, there is an initiaL step which must
be taken hrithout hesitation: notwithstanding its function as the representative
organ of the states, the counciI of the Union must consist of permanent[y
appointed members.
23. A more delicate problem, however, is the task of determining a system for
the appointment of members by the States. ReaListicaL[y, the onty sotutions
possibLe are to a[low either the executive or the LegisLative authority of
the States to apoint the memberr2, o, to assign the pobrer to settLe the matter
independent[y to the States3.
1 commission of the European communities, sEc(Ez) 133r tina[, BrusseIs,
7 September 1982.
2 lLro feasibte ìs a system of appointment invotving both the executive and thelegistative authority of the States at the same time. This coutd take the form
either of a division between the executive and l.egisl.ative authority of the numberof appointments to be made (this is the proposaL put forward by the institutionataffairs committee of the European Movement) or a jo'int participation in the
appointment by both bodies.
1
- This is the system used in the Swiss Confederation for etect.ing members tothe upper chamber.
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24. The first option is perhaps more'in keep'ing uith the present state of
relations betueen the States and woutd refLect an approach of graduaI reformism.
The adoption of this system, houever, would raise other questions:
shoutd members of the CounciL be government deLegates (and as such, subject to
recaLL, bound by instructions, and with their term of office dependent upon the
fate of their government)4, or shouLd they be representatìves, vested vìth a polrer
of free decision and appointed for a pre-establ-ished perìod? If the option of
government appointment were chosen, it wou[d seem more consistent uith the
reasons behind that choice for the members of the Council. to be regarded as
government deLegates.
25. The option of having members appointed by the nationaL LegisLative authorit'ies,
or at least with their consent, seems more in line with the overaLI approach of
the project as outtined in the resoLution. AIthough'it reserves an important
rote for the States in the decision-making process, the institutionaL modeI
anticipated is nevertheIess geared torards a greater degree of integration betHeen
the Hember States and a higher standard of democracy in the system concerned.
In addition, the format incLusion of the European CounciL within the organization
of the Union t.tith autonomous and precise functions wou[d atready aItow the governments
a say'in the tife of the Union, through representation at the highest Levet.
26. Given the poLiticaL probLems invo[ved in the issue, ìt seems appropriate to
recommend an open sotution, leaving the Member States a free choìce and avoiding
possible confticts, but at the same tìme teaving the Hay open for subsequent
agreement on uniform sotut'ions, by not Laying down any strict provìsions in the
T reat i es.
?7. (b) Distribution of votes between the States
The selection of a criterion for the distribution of votes in the Councit betreen
the States must be based on the considerable differences in the demographic
size of the various Member States.
28. This factor shouLd argue against the criteria either of parity (yhich routd
put the targe States at an unacceptabIe disadvantage) or of proportìonaLity
betueen votes in the CounciL and size of population (which on the contrary woutd
mortify the smatler States).
4 l, is the case for members of the German Bundesrat.
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29. What is needed, therefore, is an
needs of aIL the States (for examp[e,
voting system provided for by Articte
agreed criterion which tritL cater for the
a suitabty modified version of the ueighted
148 of the EEC Treaty).
30. (c) Numericat composition
It Has made clear above that the CounciL needs to be composed of permanent rep-
resentatives; it shouLd now be added that it is aIso vitaI for its effectiveness
that the CounciL of the Union shoutd abandon the system of individuaI representation
for each country in favour of a system which ensures a wider numericaL presence.
To ensure differences in personaI approach, more effective use of individua[s
and the necessasry division of duties within the institution, there needs to be
equìvatence between the number of members and the number of votes a[totted to
each State.
3. Eerecq-s1-!hs-Eer!reEen!-erd-!he-9egnsi!
31. Paragraph 8(c) of the resoLution states expressty that the ParIiament and
t he Counc i I sha L l. iqinlly i '
(a) exercise legistative po]rer on the basis of the Commission's proposaLs
or on thei r own i n'it i at'ive;
(b) ratify treaties conctuded by the Union;
(c) adopt the budget of the Union.
32. The repeated use of the adverb iglAtly cLearLy excludes a rigid division
of competence by sector between the ParLiament and the CounciL; more precisety,
it means that the power to act of one or other of the two bodies cannot be
restricted to specific sectors, as this wouLd prectude its effective particip-
ation in arriving at a final pos'ition.
33. As for the actuaI arrangements for power-sharing, however, tHo possibLe systems
can be envisaged: either perfect identìty of functions or differentiation of
funct'ions, though t.lithin the guidetines Iaid down in ParIiament's resotution.
34. In principte, the second option seems preferabte, a[though its adoption
wouLd depend on hor the problem of the retationship between the executive and
the Legislative authority is to be resotved (if the Patiament al"one were given the
poHer to pass a vote of confidence - and thus of no confidence - in the executive
- 148 - PE 83.326/fin./C.
on the basis of its programme, ìt wou[d be difficult to reducethe ParLiament's pouer
vis-à-vìs the CounciL, even if onLy on certain matters5.
35. In any event, to resotve any confL'icts which may arise between the two bodies,
provìsion shouLd be made for conci tiation systems (joint comm'ittees), compatibte
with the institutionaI structure finaIty adopted and requiring a substantial
majority in one of the tt.to bod'ies to overru[e a contrary vote by the other.
Prov'ision cou[d be made for this facitity to operate differentLr according to the
subj ect concerned.
36. l,Jith regard to the procedures for estab['ishing the wi Lt. of the ParLiament and
the Counci[ (a matter which is again to some extent dependent on the eventuaL
division of functions between the two bodies), ìt seems appropriate for this to be
governed as a generaL rule by the respective Rutes of Procedure of the two bodies.
The Treaty shoutd include a number of generaI principLes concerning the minimum
requìrements for sitt'ings and debates to be vaIid and the need to avoid paratysis
of the entire institut"ionaL system as a resu[t of faiLure to act on the part of
one of the th,o bodies, in cases where decision-making powers are shared.
37. 0n this last point, and in the Light of previous negative experience,
paragraph 8(e) of the resotutìon states expLicitLy, in reLation to the Councit,
that it rss!-bs-q!eb!gdz-Ey-qeeos-91-eepcepcie!e-pr999d9r9§z-!9-!e!q-prgup!!y
degfgfgns_Uhfg!_!ig_!i!ht!_t!§-p9lgl§. Here again, the probLem 'is connected wìth,
and to a certain extent dependent upon, the abovementioned questinn of the eventuat
divìsion of functions between the Partiament and the CounciL in exercising the
powers reLat'ing to partìcuLar sectors. In generaL, to avert the dangers of fa'iture
to act, a provision couLd be introduced to the effect that the CounciL voutd not
be aLLowed to deLay beyond a give4 time timit over certain p.opos.Is6.
s
- In systems under whìch a vote of confidence or no confidence is passed by one
of the two cranches of the Ieg'istature (usuaLLy the Lower chamber), 'it
is this body which takes cLear precedence over the other. In the Urrited States
and Switzertand, where the executive ìs'independent from the Leg'is-
Iature, a baLance'is struck between the two branches of the Legìstature('in the Unìted States for exampLe, the Lower chamber takes precedence on
fiscaL matters and the upper chamber on matters of foreign poL'icy).
6 Siritar to the provision existing, for exampte, ìn the German Bundesrat(concerning proposaLs by the executive - Articte 76(2) of the Basic Law of the
Federat RepubIic of Germany), aIthough the tatter has considerabty more Limited
pouers in matters of generaL LegisLation than the Bundestag.
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4. tegislegieo
3E. LegisLative inìtiative shoutd be the pneugative of the Commission and of
every Member of the ParLiament and the Councit. As forthe passage ulich each draft
Iay must foILor (rhether one or other of the tvo bodles shoutd necessariLy
have priority in examining it and Hhether or not there shoutd be perfect
ìdentìty of functions betreen them), it is Horth repeating the renrarks aLready
made in connection with the relationship betreen the ParLiament and the Counci[,
which depends on the overaLL poLiticat ro[e to be assigned to each of the
bodies and the roLe to be given them ìn the constitution of the executiue7.
39. The specific procedures for examining draft laws shoutd be Laid dowrr bry the
respective Rutes of Procedure.
40. The Treaty cou[d attor the generat possibitity for draft Lars to be adopted
in committee, except in cases of detegated l.egistation, ratification of treatìes
and adoption of budgets.
41. The bodies exercising Legis[ative poeer couLd be given the possibiIity of
instruct'ing the Commission - on specific subjects and h,ith ind'ication of
guìdetines -- to enact decrees having the force of Larrs. The Commissjon itsel.f
shoutd be empowered, without instruction and in urgent cases onty, to eract de-
crees having the force of Laws, with an obLigation to srlbmit these immediate[y
to the LegisLative authority for ratification (in cases where such decrees are not
ratifjed, any tegaL retationships arising from them shouLd neverthetess be
covered).
7
' In Germany, where onty the Bundestag can pass a vote of confidence in the
executive, it is this body which takes precedence in exam'ining draft Iaws(ArticLe 77(1) of the Basic Lau), vhite the Bundesrat has onty porers of veto
whìch can be overruted by a vote by a quaLified majority in the Bundestag.
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III. EXECUTIVE POhJER
42. Ibe-gregu!tys_end_in1!ra!erX_!gOg!ren_e1_!b9_Unt9a is assisned to the
Commission, e§-!hg-piy9!a!-i0§!i!gfi.en-eI-!he-Unfqn1. The conciseness of the
resolution on this poìnt teaves no room for doubt as to the centraL rote rhich
the Commission riLL be required to pLay?.
43. 1. Method of constitution
The resolution provìdes two guidetines on the difficuLt probl,em of how the
Comnrission shoutd be constituted:
- !!§-e!a!s!s-§!e!!-be-rsv!sed-qs-cegecds-!be-uen0Er-eI-r!§-eppeln!re!!-e!d?
st ructure-
;;;r;r;;ir-...-rou!!-per!isipn!ea-i.n-aperep*e!e-reyse-!!-1!§-ee!e!1!s!rsna .
44. The imptication of these guideLines is that untike the present systemrunder
which the governments of the l{ember States have soLe responsibiLity for
appointìng the Commission5, in the Unìon, the Partiament wiLt be requìred to
pelllgipglg in this process.
45. The togic on which the Union is based wouLd dictate that sr.rch partic'ipation
coutd only be achieved by means of cotLaboration between the FarLiament and
one of the two bodies which represent the Member States direct[," - the European
Counci I and the Counci [. Ttlo different systems are possibLe:
46. (I) the power to appoint the Commission could be assigned to the
European Councì [, w'ith the ParLiament being requ'ired to pass a vote of
confidence on its appointment (in this eventuatity, the vote of
confidence by the Councit wouLd be considered automatic).
1 Resolution of 6 JuLy 1gE2, paragraph E(b)
'or.c'it., paragraph 7, second part
' 
or.cit., paragraph E(b)
o or.cit., paragraph 8(d)
5 R.ticLe 158, EEc rReaty
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47. (II) the Commiss'ion couLd be etected by the ?artiar,rent and the Jounci[o
There are various Hays in uhich this cottaboration coutd uork, but
in the event of a jcint etect'ion, steps uould have to be taken to
ensure a proper balance between the votes cast by the partianent
and those cast by the CounciL.
/*8- The t','io systems have differences vhich are of the utmost
'ì rnportance in terms of the retationship between the executive
authorityrand the choìce must be based on an assessment of the
r,rrch it must ref Lect.
potìticat
and the Ieg'isIative
potiticaL situation,
49- The first option wouLd mean that the executìve woutd, of necessity, be
acccuntabte to the Par['iament, as the Length of its mandate yould be dependent on
the ParLrament's wi LL.
50. Under the second option, however, the executive woutd be etected for a pre-
determined period - generaLty commensurate with the term of office of the Lower
chamber - and woutd not be in a position of dependence vis-à-vis the Legistative
at-rt hcr i ty.
j1 
- Unde' the first option, the executive woutd atways be the expression of
a poLitìcaI majority,and'its survivaL, Like its origìnaL appointment, wouLd be
Linked to the'interplay of poLiticaL forces. This wouLd mean a high degree of
poLiticization, coupLed with a danger of instabil-'ity and aLL its attendant
rmpLications.
5:. The second option invoLves no risk of instabitity, but woutd produce a
Less poLiticized, more bureaucratic executive. From this brief and inevitabLy
5rroarfìciaL account of the abstract features and possìbLe advantages and
'Jisadvantages of the two systems, it is easy to see how the choice between themjepends to a Large extent on an assessment of the underLying poL.iticaL situation.
5l' It is no easy task to define the main features of the poLiticaI situation in
':r'iope in a few words- l'Jhat is cLearIy apparent, however, is the considerabLe
'JisLocation which exists betHqen the poLiticat forces. Even when they have a
iormaL strr:cture and organìzation at European Levet, the parties reveat internat
differences on a great many issues, even their support for Europe.
6 olong the Lines of thejojnt assembLy formed by Swiss modet, where the executive is e[ected by athe two branches of the Leg.istature.
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54. In addition, there are parties at European teve[, uhich, atthough strong in
numbers and poLiticaL[y active, are of exctusivety national origin and as such
not atrays open to generat pol.itical agreements. FinaLty, mention shoutd be made
of the existence of a Large number of minority parties and of the absence of
an effective European pubLic opinion (due in part to the tack of proper mass
information instruments), uhich the parties can ctaim to reftect or employ as
an effective gu'ide. ALL this makes it extremeLy difficutt to form permanent
coaLitions or yorking majorities.
55. Under these conditions, the transition from the present system, dominated
by the bureaucrat'ic, intergovernmentat ethic and characterized by unpred'ictabte
and cont'ingent parLìamentary majorities, to a system based entirety on permanent
poLiticaI format'ions and attiances, is Like[y to invoIve serious diffìcutties.
56. 0n the other hand, account must be taken of the fact that a mechanism
enab[ìng the executive to be appointed by the European Councit (which, in poLiticaI
terms, is anything but a homogeneous ìnstitution), woutd be untìkeLy to produce
an executive which accurate[y reflected the potiticaL batance, precìsety because
the appointment wou[d probabty be the resuLt more of a compromìse between
opposing potit'icat positions than of an assessment of the parL'iamentary
strengths and a recogn'ition of poIit'icaL majorìties; it shoutd atso be stressed
that this option woutd invoLve a-terious risk of confLict between the turopean
Councit and the ParIiament7.
57. It shoutd also be added that ìn the case of an execut'ive appointed by the
European CounciL and accountabLe to the ParLiament, it wouLd be difficu[t to
provìde the mechanisms des'igned to increase its stabiIity such as a rconstructive
no confidence vote'8, b"aarra - apart from the remarks made above on the
poL'iticaL and parLiamentary situation ìn Europe which have a bearing on the
issue - the adoption of such provisions woutd mean in practice that the Par[iament
atone woutd hoLd the power of investiture, to the excLusion of the representative
organ of the States.
7 tn ,his connection, see the acute remarks made by
Committee, Working Document, 20.9.1974, PE 37.864,
Institutions)
8 Fo. rlhich provision is made in Germany
Mr Scetba (Po['iticat Affairs
European Union and the
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58. Fina[Ly, it should be borne in mind that in generat, the porer of a parLianent
to pass a vote of no confidence in the executive is usuaitLy baLanced by the
latter's porer to dissolve partiament - a poyer for uhich ìt would be diffìcuLt
to make provision in the context of the option under consideration here.
59. tlith regard to the slstem invo[ving the etectìon of the executive for a
pre-estabLished period by the tlro organs of Legistative pouer, it must be said
that despite the undoubted advantages of stabil.ity and greater efficiency,
there is a risk that it ulould not heLp the Life of the Union to deveLop atong
Lines consistent vith a modeI of partiamentary diaLectics.
60. The resotutìon provides no heLp in resotving this ditemma.
The stìpuIation that lhg-eetltqog0!-she!!-er9t9]99-p9!t!!ge!-g90!r9!-9y9t-!he
.9executive' cannot be seen as justifyìng the option of an executive uhich is
il;;;;; on the Lesisrative authority.
61. In fact, even in cases where the executive enjoys totaL independence,
provision'is made for the tegisLative authority to exercise powers of controt
over itlo
These, then,are the legaI and institutionaL options aris.ing out of
ParIiament's resotution in connection with the crucial. probLem of the relation-
sh'ip between executive and tegistative power, together with the pol.iticaL
questions which they raise.
62. l,le hope that the considerations
initiaL approach to the probtem witL
document and serve as a useful. basis
further cIarify the issue.
9 Resotution of 6 Juty 1gBZ,
10 rnis is true of the swiss
and make recommendations and
submit detai ted reports.
and guìdetines set out above by way of an
fuLfit the usuaL purpose of a working
for openìng a discussion which uli LL
paragraph 8(d)
modet, yhere the tegislature can issue instructions
the executive is obl..iged to report back to it and
63. 2. Structure
The probLems of ìnternat structure (whether the President shoutd be pglqgg
]0!ql-Pelg§ or hoLd genuine pouers of pol.iticaL teadersh'ip) and of numericaL
composition (a fixed or variabte number, varying in reLation to the number of
Member States or the number of the Unionrs sectors of competence) can only be
mentioned in pass'ing here, as they depend to a large extent on the method of
constitution discussed in the previous section.
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64. 3. Porers
In conformity yith its executive function and its role as a poLiticaL
initiator, the Commission must have the fottoring pouers:
- Laying dorn gUldeLines for Comnunity action and taking the necessary
in'itiativesl
- performing an executive function proper by enacting the necessary secondary
LegisLation;
- stìmuLating primary LegisLative activity by exercis'ing its porer of
Legis Iative initiative;
- enacting primary Legistation in timited and cLearLy defined areas, subiect
to prior authorization by and subsequent approvaI of the legislative authority;
- supervising the correct impIementation of the Treaty estabIishing the
Uni on;
- representing the Union in externaI reLations;
- preparìng the draft budget;
- iàpLementing the budget.
rv. EUBqeEAN-qgUNqIt
65. By stipuLatins that '!hg-lg!e-end-e9!eg§-9!-!h9-Egggpge!-gggogi!-Sha!!
Dg_dgflngd' (paragraph 8(f)), the resotution impties that the European
Counci L shouLd be incorporated yithin the institutionat framevork of the Union.
It is reLL knoyn, horever, that no provision is made for the European Councit
in the present Treaties. tdithout rishing to dveLl. on the political role it has
so far pLayed, it is yorth recaLLing that from a LegaI and institutionat vierpoint,
the European CounciI can be considered at present aS no different from the CounciI
of Ministers, in the context of the pouers estabIished by the Treaties-
By virtue of this duaL possibiLity of action both h,ithin and outside the
strict framework of the Treaties, the European CounciI has been defined as a
'hybrid'body.
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66. The profound changes in the role earmarked for the CounciL obviously
mean that the European CounciI can no Longer act as an aLternative form of that
body, in given circumstances.
67. The inclusion of the European CounciI uithin the institutiona[ system
of the Union can therefore be achieved onLy by assigning to it specific
functions, which can be defined as foLLors:
poLiti caL mediation, possibLy ulith responsibi Lity for transmitting
communications to the other constitutionat bodies;
coordination betyeen intergovernmentaI cooperation and the activity of
the Union;
promotìng the appLìcation of the subsidiarity principLe at potiticat [eveIi
fìxìng deadLines and estabtishing methods for transforming potentiaL
competence into effective competence;
- initiating the procedures for revising the Treaties estabIishing the Union,
on a proposat from the Commission or the government of a itlember State,
after consuL.t'ing the Parliament, or on a proposaL from the latte6
- possibLy, appointing the executive, should this option be chosen in
answer to the probLem of how the executive shoutd be constituted (and
functions sìmilar to those performed by Heads of State in systems of
par I iamentary government) .
V COURT OF JUSTICE
68. t'lith reference to the Court of Justice, ParIiamentrs resoLution states
that: 'Partiament ... shatI particìpate... in the appointment of the ltlembers
of the Court of Justicer (paragraph 8(d) ).
69. Since a[t matters retating to the powers and terms of reference of the
Court faIL outside the scope of the present document, it onty remains to propose
that the number of its Members should be increased (to faciLitate the division of
work into sections and, in Line with the guiding princìple quoted above, to
estabLish that the ParLiament and the Councit share the task of appointing its
Members between them).
70. FinatLy, with regard to the individuat requ'irements for judges and the
tength of their term of office, the provisions of the present Treaties can be
reta i ned.
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VI. q9uBr-9!_4UqIIqB§
71. The Court of Auditors witt audit the accounts of aLL the revenue and
expenditure of the Union, whether or not it is entered in the budget.
72. It wiLL also be responsibte for auditing the accounts of any bodies set
up by the Union unLess the acts estabLish'ing such bodies provide othervise.
73. The resuLts of the audits performed by the Court wiLL be detailed in
annuaI reports or speciaI reports (the Latter to be drawn up at the request
of any of the institutions or on the initiat'ive of the Court itseLf, whenever
it sees fit). In aLt cases, the reports must be made public-
74- l.lith regard to the
to be increased, aLthough
they are at present.
75. As was proposed for
the Members of the Court
the Councit.
compositìon of the Court, the number of ilembers needs
the requirements for appointment shouLd remain as
the Court of Justice, the respons'ibi Lity for appointìng
of Auditors shoutd be shared betreen the ParIiament and
vrr. guquq§uaN
76. ALthough parL'iament's resoLution makes no provision for it, it seems
worthwhi te propos'ing that the figure of an Ombudsman be created, atong the Lines
of the c Iassi caI Scand'inavian modeL, responsìbLe for invest'igating and monitoring
the actions of the bodies under the authority of the execut'ive. In order to
guarantee the'independence of the 0mbudsman in the performance of his duties, the
appointment shouLd be made by the ParLiament.
VIII. ECONOMIC AND §9gIAt-q9UUIIIEE
77. The Economic and Sociat Committee witt be the Un'ion's maìn organ of
economic and sociat consuLtation. As,far as'its constitution and composition
are concerned, the prov'isions of the exist'ing Treaties can be retained, with
the f of Lowing addit'ionaL stiputations:
- there must be equaI representation of emptoyers and employees, and provision
must be made for participation by consumers' representatìves;
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- appointments must be made by the executive from a t'ist submitted by the
governments and by sociaL and professionat organizatìons;
- consultation of the Committee must be compu[sory in given casesi in other
cases, the executìvè, the CounciI and the Partiament may choose to consult it;
- the Committee may, under given circumstances, issue opìnions on its own
initiative.
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
20.10.1982 
N 0 T E 
by the rapporteur, Mr SPINELLI 
on 
some problems of terminology 
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DIVISION OF FIELDS OF COIIPETENCE BETbIEEN THE UNION AND
THE IJIEMBER STATES
I. qqUEEIENgE.qT-IEE-UEUEEE-§IAIE§-ANq-qAlEEIENqE.q!-IEE-UNIq!
The !gq!gl-§!e!g§ vi IL retain ggngle!-gq4p9!9n99, i'e' responsibiLitv
for alt areas except those entrusted to the Un'ion by the Treaty of Union'
The UAigD riLt have g§§19!gd-994pq!9n99, i.e. responsibiIity for onLy
those areas spec'ified in the Treaty or ìn LegaL acts deriving therefrom'
II. §U9§IqIAEIII-E8IN§IEtE
ResponsibiLity is assìgned to the union on the basis of the SgbsidiefilI
principte: the Union ìs given on[y those tasks which the ttlember States
cannot execute independentLy - or cannot execute as effectivety.
(N.8. ConsequentLy, Union action is subsidiary to that of the
Member States, and not vice versa-)
I I I. EIqtU§IYE,-qqN9U88ENI-ANq.B9IENU4t.qqEEEIENEE
The Treaty w'iLL specify the areas in which the Union exercises - or
may exercise - its competence.
It wiLL distinguish between the union's excLusive competence,
concurrent competence and potentiaL competenceg
(a) the fieLds of glglg§lyq-ggqpglgngq are those in which the Union atone
has the right to tegis[ate; save in the case of derogation expticitLy
decided on by the Institutions of the Union, the tvlember States cannot
LegisLate in these fietds; they are bound as and rrhen necessary to
adopt decisions impIement'ing Union tegisIation-
Some fieLds w'itL faLt rithin the exclusive competence of the Union from
the entry into force of the Treaty (these may be fields for which the
Community Has responsib[e previousty or neh, areas in uhìch the Union
wi [[ exerc'ise exclusive competence from the outset).
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(b) the f.iel.ds of 9q0ggllg0!_ggEpg!g0g9 are those in rhich the union
shares the right to Legistate wìth the Member States. As [ong as the
Union does not exercise such competence, the Member States retain
the right to tegistate.
To the extent that the Union exercises such competence - within a specified
frameuork - natìonaL competence ìs timited and any natìonat laws are
reptaced by the law of the Un'ion -
Concurrent competence is exercìsed:
- as soon as the Treaty comes ìnto force, unIess otherwise specified
- as soon as the temporaL or other cond'itions Laid down ìn the Treaty
are met
- and ìn any case when - and to the extent that - the subsidiarity
princìpte requi res.
(c) the fieIds of pglga!ie!-§gopglgnce are those in wh'ich the Treaty recognises
the Un.ion's right to tegisLate (uith concurrent competence) - but'in
which such competence is assigned to the Union (uhotty or in part) onty
after a decision of the European Counc'iL (that is to say, the Heads of
Government), adopted on a proposaL of Partiament '
These are fieLds'in which the'intervent'ion of the Union may be found to
be necessary or usefuL at a subsequent Stage of integration.
By uay of i LLustration: the Community has
- excLusive competence'i n the fietd of customs LegìsIat'i on
- concurrent competence 'i n respect of the ri ght to Legi s Iate 'i n the
agrìcuLture guidance f ieLd
- potentiat competence in respect of the right to pursue a common poLicy
in the field of sea and air transport.
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
ggEUIIIEE.9N.IN§IIIUIIgNAt-ATE4!E§
NOTt
by the rapporteur, trlr SPINELLI,
on
the main resoIutions adopted by the European parLiament
in the Community's principaI areas of activ.ity
7 December 1982
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-
Since the etect'ions in June 1979 tho European ParIiament has repeated[y
expressed its profound dissatisfaction n'ith the way the Commission and the
CounciL - i.e., the Community's executive and Legistative bodies - handLe
Communìty poticies.
Atthough the European ParLiament has onLy consuttative pohJcrs with regard
to Legistation and very Iimited powers in the budgetary sphere, ìt has not
resigned itseLf to accepting the modest ro[e assigned to it by the Treaties.
0n the contrary, it has, on its own initiatìve, ggnqgglgd_g_gIlllgg!_gpplelsg!
gl-ytf!ge!!y_e!!_!he_Eei9l-p9!tgtes which shouLd be pursued by the Community
and qQgplgd-rgsglglrg!§ on each of them, specify'ing the approach uhich it
considered usefuI and necessary for the Community.
ALL these resoLutions are Listed and summarized in this document.
There are two interesting poIiticaI Lessons to be drawn from this work.
[ttS!, it wiLL be observed that, though sLight or even significant differences
of opinion, inherent in any democratic debate, became apparent during the discussion
of certain particutar aspects of the pr«rjects under consideration, these resotutions
were adopted by very [arge majorities. ALthough'the common politicaL yitIr is so
difficutt to achieve uhen debate becomes stifLed in the stra.itjacket of inter-
governmentaL negotiations, it is nonethetess vigorous, ambitious and imbued with
the spirit of European soIidarity within and among the poLiticaL and nationaI
groups in the European partiament.
§qggnd, it must regrettab[y be admìtted that these resolutions have been
vìrtuaLLy ignored by the Commission and the CounciL, both of yhich have fLouted
the poLjticaI authority of the Assembty, the former by continuing its tactics
of deLiberatety putting forward isotated and excessiveLy detai ted measures in
Iine with a supposedLy'pragmatic'approach, the Iatter by confirming ìts
determ'ination to reduce everything to perpetua[, and atL too often inconctusive,
intergovernmenta t negot.i at ions.
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In the Light of this fLagrant, and para[ysing, contradiction betveen
the European poLiticaL wiLI of the etected Partiament on the one hand and the
pouertessness of the Communityrs present Executive and the stifIing of any
common European ambition in the CounciL on the other, the institutionaI reform
demanded by Partiament is futLy justified.
o
oo
t'le are therefore convinced that the dIel!-ICggly-gI-Unlen and the major
e9lt9n-plgglegqg-dleln-gp-Dy-EeClleqent and outtined below uitI be !he-!lq
most effective lgqpg3§ in the forthcoming glggllgn-gg4peign.
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HUITIAN R IGHTS AND R iGHTS OF THE C IT IZEN
§ ge!!e-Eeeer!-e!-sPesie!-rlgb!s !§,.!!,!7--9.J.-92-22,.-e,?8
This caLts for the European Convention on Human Right, the United Nations
Convenant on CiviL and PoLit'icat Rights, and the civiL and poLiticaI rights
provided for in the constìtutions and laus of tlember States to be considered
through an agreement on the basis of ArticLe 235 of the Treaty as ìntegrat
parts of the Treaties estabLìshing the Communities. It a[so caIts for various
rights to be granted to Community c'itizens resident in ttlember States other
than their oh,n (after a period of residence) including the right to stand in
and vote in etections and to hoLd pubLic office at the [ocaL and regìonat
LeveL, and equat rights to indigenous inhabitants regarding access to jobs
in the professìona[, sociaI and economic sphere, the right to beLong to
trade unions and the freedom of assoc'iation. These shou[d be safeguarded
!,ith the possibiLity of indiv'iduaI appeaI to the Euroepan Court of Justice.
§se!!e-Eeeer!-e!-!!e-eeeee!!e!-el-!!e-Esrepes!-geEEs!!U-!g-!he-Egrepeen
lsly en! L g!-e!-!sue!-B ! g!!: 2-!'.!,!2 
- -9.!. -9!?7. -P.-É2-
This cat[s for the Community to accede to the Eu]:opean Convention on
Human Rights, to enshrine the cit'izenrs right of petition in the Community
Treaties, and to guarantee in the treaties the individuat rìght of direct
appeaL to the Court of Justice.
§91g!!g-1ep-o-1t-o3-t-r!e--C-oI1Ll-s-s-i-o11-s--gelgo-1agd-u-g-o-1-t[e--a-c-c-e-1{on-ql-tle-
!gtqgl:!z-!9-!!9-Eql8 oJ cio4, p.25J
This report asks the Commission to submit a formaL proposaL for the
accession of the Community to the European Convention on Human Rights.
It considers Articl.e 235 of the Treaty as a suffic'ient LegaL base. It
caLLs on aLt Member States to aLLou the rìght ot individual appeat. It
requests the CounciL of Europe to widen the Convent'ion to ìncorporate
so«.iat, econonric and cuttural. rights, notabIy those tisted in Parts I and
l l oI the European SociaI Charter.
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2. EURoPEAN JUDTCIAL AREA GXTRADITIoN)
Tyrre[[ Reoort on the Eurooean JudiciaI Area (Extradition) 9.7.82 0J C23E
: ! I t; 
-: - - -L--------
P:-91
This report assumes that the creation of a European judiciaI area uiLt be
Linked to the estabtishment and sa{eguarding of the rights of citizens. It
supports the notion of a judiciaL area (ìle. cooperatìon in the Communìty
framework in this fietd). It caILs for :
- the estabtishment of a speciaIised structure at European levet
for the centraLization of information concerning the fight against
terror i sm
- droppìng the concept of poticicaI motive in the context of extraditìon,
but onty as concerns terrorist crimes
- Member States to sign and ratify the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism or, at teast, the Dubtin Agreement of
4 December 1979 concerning the apptication of that Convention among
Member States.
It asks the Commission to propose d'irectives estabLishing common principLes
for extradition and on mutuaI assistance in criminaI matters.
The CqunciL of JusticB rrrinisters, meeting in Luxembourg on 25-26 October,
1982, faiLed to agree on any of these or other measures.
3. SECURITY
[!ep:e!-r9per!-er-Eyrspegl-sr!e-preesIg!9!!-eeepsls!ie! letserz-1222
ParLiament caLLed for the Commission to submit an action programme for the
product'ion of conventionaI armaments ]rithin the framework of the common indus-
triaI poLicy.
The Comrnissjon has since undertaken studies on this suggestion but not put
forward any specific proposats.
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ParLiament catts on Member Stai,'s with
their patrots and to strengthen thei r navaI
of EPC.
Iqsggrvp-reper!-e!-Et9-el9-:egvl!r-pe!isr
navaL forces to coordinate
forces, rlithin the framework
tE_z:.11É
Part iament cat ted for a European peace and security poLicy which
aims at stabi L iz ing East-t,est reIat ions and promot'ing d6tente, such a
poLicy to constitute a commitment to L'imiting arms LeveLs and to the
princìptes of the UN and the 1975 Hetsinkì DecLaration. ParLiament
supported the decision by the governments of the Ten to incLude questions
reLated to poLit'icaI security'in European PotiticaL Cooperation and
dectared that ParIiament ìtseLf can pIay a significant rote in this
fieLd. It pointed out that the Member States of the Community share
a number of vitaI concerns regard'ing security, a concept that goes beyond
miIitary defence, and caU.ed for these to be futLy exptored and eIaborated
in EPC. More effective coordinat ion betHeen consuLtations in EPC and the
Attantic CounciI yere urged.
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2. EURoPEAN JUDICIAL AREA GXTRADITIoN)
Izre!!-Beper!-e!-!!e-Egreese!-J sgie!e!-lree-!El!red!!lenl 2,.2,.9?--91-9?19-
P.-9I
This report assumes that the creatìon of a European judiciat area vitL be
tìnked to the estabIishment and safeguarding of the rights of citizens. It
supports the notion of a judiciaI area (i:e. cooperation in the Community
framework in this fietd). It catts for :
- the estabtishment of a speciaLised structure at European [eveI
for the centratization of information concerning the fight against
terrori sm
- droppìng the concept of poticìcaI motive in the context of extradition,
but onty as concerns terrorist crimes
- Member States to sign and rat'ify the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism or, at least, the DubIin Agreement of
4 December 1979 concerning the appl.icatìon of that Convention among
Member States.
It asks the Commission to propose directives estabL'ishing common prìncipLes
for extradition and on mutuaI assistance in criminat matters.
The Cclunci t of JusticÈ rrrinisters, meet'ing in Luxembourg on ?5-26 October,
1982, faiLed to agree on any of these or other measures.
3 . SECUR ITY
[!9p:9!-r9p9r!-er-Eer9p9s!-gt!!-ptes9r9!9!!-99ep9Ie!!9! J.9!serr-1222
Parl. iament cal. Ied f or the Commission to submit an act ion grogramme f or the
production of conventionaI armaments tlithin the framerork of the common indus-
triaI poLicy.
The Commission has since undertaken studies on this suggestion but not put
forward any specific proposats.
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ParLiament catts on Member
thei r patrots and to strengthen
of EPC.
!eeeeryp-I9peI!-e!-E!9-er9-:gsgti!z-pe!rsr
Stat,'s with navaI forces to coordinate
thei r navaI forces, vithin the framework
ZE--12',!!Q
Parl.iament caLted for a European peace and security poLicy which
aims at stabj L iz ing East-west retat jons and promot'ing d6tente, such a
poticy to constitute a commitment to Iimitìng arms LeveIs and to the
principtes of the UN and the 1975 HeLsinki DecIaration. Part iament
supported the decision by the governments of the Ten to incLude quest'ions
retated to potit'icaL security'in European PoLiticaL Cooperation and
dectared that ParIiament itsel.f can pLay a sìgnificant roIe in this
fieLd. It pointed out that the l.tember States of the Community share
a number of vitaL concerns regarding security, a concept that goes beyond
miLitary defence, and catLed for these to be futty exptored and eIaborated
in EPC. Ilore effective coordination between consuLtations in EPC and the
Attantic Councit were urged.
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4. EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM
Ruf {oto report on the turopean morlg!ily-9I!!99-g:-g!-g§Pgg!-91-!!9
--:-:----:L -- -- -----j'.-,!gtlg!!g!:l! 
-!9!9!eIr-:r !! 9! 1I'1.99--QJ,-9112e-e:1É-
ParLiament ca[[s for the fuLl. imptementation of the Ettls and comptiance
with the originaI timetabLe. The EMS shoutd promote the process of economic
convergence by rev'iew'ing existing poLicies,'introducing new common poLicies
and coordinating monetary poL'icies more effect'iveLy'in particutar exchange
policies in retation to the dotLar. Th'is must go hand-in-hand with a
strengthen'ing of the Community budget by increasing its resources, and with
a reductìon in the disparities betueen the economies of the Member States.
A European Monetary Fund shou[d be created and shoutd devetop gradua[[y into
a centraI eonetary authority.
Littte progress has been made in strengthening the EMS and the originaL
t'imetabLe has been abandoned.
tsrvl:-rgPeI!-e!-!!e-EI§ !! :?- r9?-, 
-9{ - I QÉ. - P :1 !
This report urges the setting up of a European Currency Authority w'ith
a high leveI of autonomy, which wiLL be charged:
- to issue and manage the European Currency Unìt (ECU)
- to coord'inate exchange poticies with regard to foreign currencies
- to foster the use of ECU by governments, bus'iness, individuaLs and
in internat ionaI trade, rrtt imateIy achieving tegaI tender status in
aI t t{ember States.
It asks the Commiss'ion to come up w'ith a proposat within 12 months
aLong these Iines. It urges the coordinat'ion of economic, t ìscaI and
monetary poI i c'ies of ltlember States.
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5- COI{I'IUNITY F INAI,ICE
!9!s9-r9p9I!-9!-evsr!93:-9!9-!g9ge! gIY-9v99!i9!! Nsyes!sr-1222-919192e-P:Il
The ParLiament pornted out that convergence between the
f'lember States can onLy resutt from the deveLopment of genuine
economies of
It is opposed to the concept of'just,. retourr. It caLLs for
f inanciaI equaL isation based on per capita GDP.
common poLicies.
a system of
§pine!!1-Eeper!-e!-!!e-ggqqsni!zl:-eun-reeestse! 2.!.q1--qg-9191.-P.L5-
This report reiterates the need for new Communìty poLicies financed
from the oHn resources. It reaffirms the conviction that in order to
attow a more equitabIe and rationat distribution of financiat resources it
is urgent to bring agricuLturaI expenditure under contro[. In additìon,
the progressive transfer of responsibiLities from Member States to the
Community of those tasks which can be deatt uìth in common more effectiveLy
most go hand-'in-hand with a correspondìng transfer of resources. This trouLd
not increase the overaLt tax burden. Economic convergence of f{ember States
can ìn any case onLy be assured by higher percentage of GDP passing through
the Community budget.
The report therefore catts for the raising of the 1X ceit'ing on VAT,
and for the apptication of a corrective mechanìsm introducing an element
of progressivity by Heighting revenue according to the prosperìty of
Member States. It atso caLIs for a procedure for modifying own resources in
the future: after each European eIection, the European Partiament shaLL
examine the existìng a[location of responsibi Lìtìes and resources between
Member states and the community, and propose changes. 0n this basis the
Commission shatL draft a proposaI for modifying oHn resou?ces and creating
new resources and, after obtaining the assent of the counci[ (vot.ing by a
quatified majority),shaLI forward it to the European ParIiament for adoption
by a three-f i fths majority.
Ihe report atso catts for the budgetisation of the EDF, the merging of
the ECSC budget into the GeneraI Budget, the harmonizat.ion of the VAT tax
base and the issue of European community bonds denominated in ECUs.
Nc, action has been taken on Partiament's proposaLs.
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This report affjrms that the burlget shouLd be an instrument for promoting
convergence of l{ember States' economies. It foresees ths estabLishment of
a system of fiscaL equaIisatjon and caLLs for the raising of oHn resources and
the budgetisation of the borrowing and tending activities of the Communìty.
It requests a ctear and comprehensìve system of distrìbution of taxes
and expenditure between Member States and the Commun.ity. It confirms
Partìament's position in adopting the SpinetIi Report.
9egs!g-Esper!-e!-!be-!gffguins-end-! e!gus-ee!!y!!ies-e1-!!e-geEEiss!en-
? 9. 1. I 3 
- - 
I !. 
-9!?L -e,'. -27
This report emphasises that, although not yet futLy budgetised,
EC borrowing and [ending comes under ArtleLe 296b of the Treaty and is
therefore subject to the powers of controt by the Budgetary Authority.
It therefore requests that the retevant information and documents for th'is
task be provided to Partiament.
It opposes any deLegatìon of power to the EIB such as woutd h'inder the
exercise by the European Partiament of potiticaI controt and the exercise
of the Commission's responsibiLity for defìning investment poLicy.
6. INTERNAL MARKET
Yel-!ggcs-reper!-e!-!!e-releve!-eI-!eghise!-!elrigr:-!e_!re99-i!_!!e
E-rrgpgel-9grry!tU 1É'.19.99
The ParI iament caLted on the Commission to give the h'ighest prior.ity
to I h is sutl j e«: t and asked f or an 'i nternat report on the progress of work.
It caLl-ed tor the quarreI between the Councit and the Commission over
ArticLe 155 o{ the EEC Treaty to be settLed rapidLy.
Iz94rg-rsper!-e!-!!e-resgve!-eI-!es!!ige!-!errier:_!e-!rc{e 1g:19:91
9J 
-9-?qZz-P=1II
This report inctudes Partiament's op'inion on four directives proposed
by the Commission in this fieLd. Partiament approved the Commission,s
proposats and atso proposed a number of ways of speeding up the removat of
technicaI barriers to trade. It proposed to increase the powers of the
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Commissiorr to issue the requisite directives. It caLLed for further
con:rrrttatiorr of the Part iament and tnr. pLacing of a tinre Lim jt with.i n
uhich the counciI must reach a decision, fa'i Ling which the comm.i ssion
may adopt the directive.
Y gl-! gg es- r9P9r! 
-or ! ! 9 1291-prsgreEri_Ier-!!e_cg!tsye!9!!_e1_!!s_ee:!ere_
unron
12.2'.9 1- 
--9 J,-! ?É92- p:§9-
The European Partiament once again catted for a Community customs
administration to be estabtished at the externat frontiers and for a Com-
munity supervisory body to be set up as a first step in this direction.
The convergence of the VAT rates ahd r€rtain excise duties, together with
a further reductjon of MCAs were requested in order to d'ismantLe the
barriers at the Communityrs internaI front'iers. The European ParIiament
reiterated its desire to see a simpLification of the administrative pro-
visions and forms connected with the Community transit procedure, and asked
the Commission to submit specific proposats to ease customs formatities.
The Commiss'ion has put forward proposaIs to strengthen the'internaI
market, but progress in the CounciL has been Iimited.
9gcr!gx-r9per!-e!-!!e-19!!-!e[!]§!ie!-rgper!-e!-eerpe!i!ie!-ee!!sz
!!'.!? r9! 
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ParLiament emphasised the importance of competition poLicy and caLted
for the promot ion of more intensive cooperat ion between industriaI under-
takings and for the Commìssion to examine the effects of exìsting rndustriaI
structures on competit iveness.
Parl.iament asked the ts6pjssion to appLy the rutes on competitìon to
air and sea transport and in the financiaL and insurance sectors. It asked
the Commission to review its guideLines on nationaI aids to the textiLe
industry. It regretted that no decision had yet been taken on a reguLation
on merger cont rot.
In its 11th report on competition poLicy the Commission took jnto
account a number of Partiament's suggestions for appLying competition ruLes,
Lrithout going as far as the parL.i ament had requested.
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9srevele-Egeer!-e!-eqp!ezoel!-eld-e9ep!:.sn-sI-rgrh.ng-!ine !12.2.§1-
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Th'is caLts for the Community to adopt framework directives undertakirg
graduaLLy and in a coordinated way (thus avoiding d'istortion of competition
among Member States) reductions to the annuat duration of trork by means of:
- increased annual. hoLidays
- timits on overtime
- shorter, extra, shifts
- ftexibLe retirement age
- increasing the possibil,ities lor part-time work
- attowing more educationaI and fami[y Leave.
This resotution ted onLy to a Commission proposat on voLuntary part-time
work.
9c!veg-Eeper!-e!-qerusriu-!elggr-Ier!s!-te!!sy !!7,-2,9!,-91-9?ÉQ.p.ÉIl
This report affirms that Member States uiLt onl.y be abte to combat
unemptoyment effectivety if they do so together and proposes some 30
measures to hetp tackte the probtem of unemployment. It catts for the
creation of a European Emptoyment Agency and asks the Commission to bring
forward proposaIs for a directive to harmonize latrs governing empLoyment.
This resoIutìon Ied to a Commission communicat'ion on the priorities for
Corrmunity act ion wìth regard to job creation.
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This catLs for a series of measures promoting vocationat training,
adapting schooI curricu[a and promoting investment in areas of high youth
unemptoyment. It catts for a greater use of the SociaL Fund to these ends.
It supports the aim of ensuring that ulithin five years atI young peopLe
under the age of 18 have either a job or a ptace in training, work experience
programmes or further education.
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This report catIs on the rJumbo'counciI meeting of November 1982 to
provide the ìmpetus for practicat measures to combat unempLoyment. It
ernphasises the need for a coordinated Community approach to poLicies for
money suppLy, interest rates, expansion of demand, and exchange rate poticy,
ìncluding the strengthening of the EMS. It ìnsists on the increase and
restructuring of the Commun'ity budget, w'ith a coordinated appLicat'ion of
instruments and a common enrpIoyment and ìndustriaL poLicy.
The meeting of therJumbo' counciL faited to agree on any substantiaL
measures.
E. INDUSTRIAL POLICY
9g!grsrqz-Esegr!-gl-ingg:trie!_eeepete!te!--lI:2:q1_-gJ,_91 !!z_e.:99\
Ihe report ca[[s for the deveLopment of a pol.icy on industrìaI cooperation
as foreseen by the 1972 Paris Summit. It deptores the dis-agreements in the
Council. and the Lack of initiatives by the Commìssion in spìte of the fact
that most of the necessary tegaL and budgetary instruments aIready exìsted.
It caLts for the setting up of a European Fund for an industriaL
innovation and devetopment, and a variety of specìfic measures :
- the consìstency of nati.onat industrìaI poticy measures to be
examìned in an Industriat PoLicy Committee under the authority
of the Counc i L
- the setting up of ad hoc SectoraI Cooperation Committees with
representatìves of the ttro sides of industry and the Commission
- the cooperation of nationaL institutes of economic anaLysìs
(fai Ling the creation of a European Institute)
- measures to compLete the internat market
- a decision finat[y to be taken on the European company statute
- the defense of Community industry against unfair competition
- an appreciabLe increase in appropriations.
It undertines the need fori nstitutionaI reform resuIting in an
increase of responsibi Lities of the comm'ission and the parLiament.
N() action has yet been taken on this resolution.
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9. ENERGY POLICY
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This draft report asks the Member States of the European Community
to work out a common energy strategy to achieve joìntty agreed object'ives.
This strategy must be based potiticaLLy and symboLicaLLy on a formaL
'dectaration of solidarity'by the ten Member States in the event of a
major energy crisis. This new Community energy strategy aLso invotves
for the Community the recogn'ition of energy as a netJ priority requiring
substant'iaLLy'increased and better coordinated financiat resources.
The draft report asks the Community to inject'new Lifer into the
European coaI Commun'ity; 'contracts for convergence' wouId aILow Member
States which so wjsh to expand on nucLear energy programmes'in Iiajson
w'ith the Communityl contracts for progress between the Communìty and
Member States wouLd permit the speeding up of investment, notably in the
fieLd of diversifica tion of energy sources and rationat use of energy.
10. REGIONAL POL ICY
qe l9:ese!e-repgr!-e!-!!e-r9yi:iel-e1-!!e-Elrepee!-E9ei9!e!-9svs!ep!9!!-Ielq
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The report supports the Commission's proposaLs for changing the fund
reguLation ìn particuIar the foreseen geographicaI concentration of the fund,
the increase jn the non quota section, the coordination with other funds and
the proposaI to proceed on the basis of programmes and programme contracts.
It sees these proposaIs as the first step towards the eLaboration of
instruments capabte of promoting effect ive regionaI poIicy. It requests
that the Commission's proposaLs be suppLemented by, inter atia, powers to
grant Loans for LocaI devetopment and the right to bl.ock funds where a
project'is not being imptemented in accordance with the specified conditions.
It asks for greater attention to be paìd to frontier regions, and to peri-
pheraL, istand and mountain reg'i ons.
CounciL has as yet taken no decision on the proposats.
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This caLLs for integrated devetopment programmes for Mediterranean
regions and the creation of ra European DeveLopment Fund for the
Mediterranean regions of the community and appLicant countries' under
the administrative authority of the European Investment Bank.
1 1 . TRANSPORT
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Th'is report caLts on the CounciL to define the framework for a
common Transport PoLicy as foreseen in ArticLes 74 and 75 of the EEc
Treaty, and to act on the numerous Commission proposaLs atready put
forward to the councit on which Partiament has g'iven its opinion. It
threatens to take the council. to the European court of Justice for
faiture to act as required under the Treaties.
§eele!q-Isper!-e!-!!s-ir:!i!g!re!-e1-preeeeqt!ee-eeei!!!-!!e-gegls!!
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In adopt'ing th'is report, Par Liament decided to bring an action
before the court of Justice under Articte 175 of the EEC Treaty if
CounciL faiLs to repLy to Partiament within two months. If a repLy
'i s received, Par['i ament wjtL consider taking CounciL to Court anyHay
untess the Letter demonstrates a w'itI to act on Counci['s part. A
Letter to the CounciI annexed to the resotution spetts out ParLiament's
requirements in this fietd.
-177- pE 83.326/f in./C.
1?. AGRICULTURE
!!-,q!-rgper!-e!-P9§:r!!e-upr9v9!e!!!-!9-!!9-eetsgl-ggrigg!!gre!-pg!1gt
1 Z :É'.Q1. 
- 
9 ! 
-9!!? z -2 z1?
This report asserts that the present instruments of the CAP must
be corrected as they are inadequate to provide batanced production and
homogeneous regionaI devetopment. The report catts for the introduction
of a gtobat community rquantumr for each sector, beyond which co-respon-
sibiLity woutd come into pLay and guaranteed prices woutd be reduced.
It catIs for greater adaptation of price Levets to market condjtions
distinguish'ing between products'in surptus and those not in surpIus.
It supports the formutation of reguLatory stocks.
It opposes nationaL aids to agricuLture and crit'icises the Commission
for its inabiLity to combat them effectiveLy. It caILs for a register of
nationaL aids. NationaI aids shouLd be authorised onty after consutting
the Commission and the Counci [.
It states that a urrified market cannot be ful.Ly imptemented untiL an
economi c and monetary un ion i s created. Thi s shouLd be achieved rapidLy.
It catts for a coordinated tax system. It regrets that the Commission
has Iost inftuence and feets that the CounciI is excessivety invotved in
poIicy detaiLs.
No action has been taken on this resolution.
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1 3. DEVELOPMENT
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ParLiament requested the CounciI arrd Commission to draw up a series of
measures for the campaign against hunger, and catted for speciaI action to
speed up agricuIturaL and ruraI deveLopmentr'improve Community food aid, and
adapt'internationaL trade in agricuLturat and food products to the requ'ire-
ments of deveLop'i ng countries.
The Comm'i ss'i on supported Partiament's main concLusions. Counci L adopted
iwo resotutions confirming the importance'it attaches to these issues and its
intention to continue its efforts to combat worLd hunger, and enabLìng the Com-
munity to make muItiannuaI commitments for recip'ient countries and to use a
proportion of food aid to create security stocks.
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This report catIs for greater supervìsion and evaLuation of European
DeveIopment Fund grants and EIB Ioans in devetoping countrìes, and in par-
ticuLar for an increase in the poHers of controI of the European ParLiament.
CounciI took note of
series of recommendat ions
!srsi-reper!-e!-1ee9-e1{
the European Partiament resotution and approved a
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ParL iament supports f ood aid as a temporary soIut'ion, whi Ist po'inting
out that ìts current leveL is inadequate. Food aid shoutd be conducted on
the basis of the needs of developing countries, not on the basis of our sur-
pIuses. It shouId be ptaced in the budget as non-computsory expenditure,
and subject to the conci Liation procedure. The Commiss'ion's roLe shouLd be
increased. The need carefutLy to monitor effects and the undesirabiLity of
poIit icaI conditions are emphasised.
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14 . RESEARCH POL I CY
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In this resotution ParLiament un,ierLines the need for Europe to ìncrease
and render more efficient its research commitment, faced with the enormous
chal- l.enge of Japan and the US. Member States are invited to increase thei r
research budgets to at Ieast 2-5ìl of GDP, and to conduct Iarge-scaLe
research in a European framework, thus promoting more efficient use of
resources.
The report urges the deve[opment of research by the Community in the
agricutturaL sector (eg. soì t management, research on animaI diseases, genetic
research, bìomass, etc.) micro etectronics, informatics, aeronautìcs, transport,
energy and biotechnoLogy. SeveraL recommendations are made concerning the
.loint Research Centre's muIt'iannuaL research programme. It is recommended
that the JRC shoutd aLso be responsibte for coordinating and ampLify'ing
nationaI research-
15. ENVIRONMENT
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This resoLution puts forward an overatt concept of environmentaL poL'icy.
It requests the Commjssion to incIude cost/benefits statements ìn future
proposaLs. lt defines a number of priorities for the third action programme
on the environment and gives a detaited survey of immediate and tong-term
measures that shouId form part of a future environmentaI strategy. It aIso
recommends the creation of a fund for environmentat measures.
4!!s l-rsper!-ejyi!e-!!e-ter!ie!s!!:e-eprnier-gn-!!9-lgEEi::ign-preegse!:-1eI
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ParIiament weLcomed the draft programme but asked the Commission to fottoy
it up with concrete proposaLs gìving detaits of uhat shouLd be done, where and
with what resources. It requests the Commiss'ion to pay attention to the guide-
['ines adopted by the ParIiament on 20 November 1981, especiaLl.y as regards trans-
front'ier pottution, potIution connected to agricutture, po[[ut'ion aspects of the
Community devetopment projects and the urban environment. It asks the Councì[
to impLement pol.icies and final.Ly to take a decjsion on the numerous Commission
§roposat s pending.
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16. EDUCATION
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This ca[[s on the Commission and the CounciL to inìtiate and promote
Community action'in those areas of education poLicy rhere cooperation can
usefuIty assist Member States in tackIing common problems and in promoting
the aims of the community. It rejects the notion that cooperation in
education ìs a threat to the diversity of cuttures, stating that the threat
comes from standardisation of technotogy and consumption patterns. ParatIet
act'ion is required to counter this threat and foster cuLturat development.
Direct competence vitI remain in the hands of nationaI governments.
The Community's tasks shouId be to promote cooperation, coordination
and equivatence between educationat systems and the common recognition
of diptomas (not just academic diptomas). ParLiament supports the measures
aLìeady agreed to in principte'in the CounciI for the promotion of tanguage
training'in schoots, education about the communìty and Europe, speciat
measures to assist the chitdren of migrant yorkers and the devetopment of
exchange schemes. It feets these items shoul.d get a higher priority'in the
budget. The lorr leveI of action and the infrequency of meetings of the
Counci L of Education Ministers is depLored.
17. INFORMATION POLICY
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The Partiament made a targe number of detaited recommendations aimed
at improving and expanding the informat'ion poLicy of the Commission and
the Partiament so that the pubLic at Iarge can be informed about the
objectives of the community. lt caLLed for the necessary budgetary
resources to be made avaiLabl.e and requested that its committee responsibl-e
for information poLicy be kept informed on the basis of periodic reports.
The Commission has submitted the guidet'ines for its information poLicy,
uhich are under consideration in a new sub-committee set up for th'is purpose
by the Par L ì ament .
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